Multiculturalism and the Politics of Guilt

Toward a Secular Theocracy

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This book is dedicated to Mary,
who heard it all more often than she would have liked.

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Introduction

From the Managerial to the Therapeutic State

Among contemporary welfare states, the United States stands out as perhaps the least socialist. Major American industries are not nationalized, and, unlike in Europe, a relatively private sector provides most of the salary to well over half of America's workers. The tax burden facing American wage earners is still less than 50 percent of their gross earnings, while the percentage of the gross domestic product going to the federal government has even declined slightly over the last twenty years. Indeed, American public administration at all levels, including the armed forces, takes from those taxed less than half of what their governments impose as a percentage upon the Canadians, Germans, French, Swedes, and Italians. If these standards of comparison were all we had for measuring political freedom, Americans would be justified in rejoicing at their liberty. Like Goethe they might proclaim, with good reason, "Amerika Du hast es besser." After all, public administration in the United States seems leaner and less intrusive than it is in European countries.

But this is not the entire picture. Although the United States as a redistributionist state has lagged behind other governments, in one respect it has created the authoritative model for the rest of the world. Our welfare state since midcentury has become increasingly preoccupied with modifying social behavior. And while American administrative democracy has not gone as far economically as nationalizing production, it has moved into socializing "citizens" through publicly controlled education and wars against discrimination. Such reconstructionist initiatives have been taken in response to what the state, the media, and "victim" groups designate as a crisis, a surging outburst of prejudice that supposedly must be contained and whose representatives need to be reeducated.

In the first volume of this work, an attempt was made to trace the intellectual foundations of the American therapeutic state through a series of works mostly produced around midcentury. In Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* (1944) and in the voluminous

anthology of social and psychological investigation *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950), "prejudice" in the United States looms as a pathological hate that envelops particular victims. It is also a sickness that only public administration, we are assured, is equipped adequately to deal with. In this special pleading, dressed up as clinical analysis, administrators are charged with social healing. They can allegedly attain this goal by reeducating others and by confronting social and moral dissent as an unacknowledged illness. By now the understandings of "liberalism" and "democracy" proposed by sensitizing social psychologists have come to prevail. Today in most Western countries, public speech and written publications that unsettle ethnic and racial minorities have undergone the process of criminalization. Among Americans the outlawing of environments and behaviors believed to offend women, gays, and other "minorities" has achieved the same repressive result as the numerous laws enacted against "crimes of opinion" in Europe.

Feminist author and Stanford University Professor Susan Okin, in *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (1989), maintains that social justice requires nothing less than a concerted political war against gender discrimination. Government, she explains, should not "allow gendered practices that make women and children vulnerable," and Okin advocates administrative intervention in family situations to monitor the relative earnings of husbands and wives and to make sure that sexist toys are kept away from children.[1] Other social reformers, however, claim to respect inherited liberal freedoms, which they state they have no desire to restrict. All they ask is that government take action against inconsiderate behavior and soften unkind attitudes. Thus argues a leading academic celebrity Richard Rorty, who praises the American Left for opposing "authoritarian" thinking but not intellectual inquiry. Surveying the work of "progressive" thinkers, including Communist activist Angela Davis in "achieving our country," Rorty notes with obvious satisfaction "the tone in which educated men talk about women and educated whites about blacks." Instead of the racist, sexist, and violently homophobic society that existed "before the Sixties," we now have tolerance thanks to "the hundreds of thousands of teachers who have done their best to make their students understand the humiliation which previous generations of Americans have inflicted on their fellow-Americans. Life for homosexual Americans, beleaguered and dangerous as it still is, is better than it was before Stonewall," and that

fact, Rorty insists, is due to the efforts of public educators to make Americans think and feel properly.[2]

Rorty also contends that there is no use asking about "the way the world is" apart from human decisions that affect that world (whatever it may ultimately be). Those who like Plato have posed metaphysical questions were often pushing "authoritarian," "theocentric" agendas. It is therefore better to work toward improving human affairs than to speculate about the nature of reality. Like self-described pluralists and multiculturalists, Rorty does not shrink back from talking about "social justice" or from identifying that preferred value with those he fancies, although he does insist, like his idol John Dewey, that objective reality is a "relic of Platonic other-worldliness."[3]

One might ask on what basis, beside subjective, rhetorical appeals to a "country achieved," can Rorty justify this molding of social attitudes through a widened public sector. But this question may be politically irrelevant, to whatever extent Rorty's vision is in sync with modern managed democracy. His view of the sixties, as dividing barbarous insensitivity from properly toned concern, is firmly held among political and verbalizing elites. It is no longer a view widely contested by either "liberals" or "conservatives," Democrats or Republicans, or other bearers of safe political labels.

Today the Center Left criticizes the Center Right for being *objectively* racist, sexist, or homophobic, that is, for not being sufficiently supportive of compensatory justice and affirmative action. It also accuses "conservatives" of issuing coded remarks about minorities by playing up "crime" and "family values," unless it decides to appropriate the same code words for itself. Meanwhile "conservatives" scold their opponents for "misinterpreting" the achievements of the civil rights movement, by wrongly associating that noble crusade with "reverse discrimination." They also maintain that "liberals" insult the legacy of the women's movement by *falsely* imagining that working women want more, and not less, economic control by the state. Whether or not the arguments that come from both sides are disingenuous is beside the point: Whatever crusades against discrimination have been launched by the administrative state since the 1960s have become a sacred legacy—and one that only those who are condemned as hopelessly bigoted would challenge.

While American parties and ideologues wrangle about governmental regulation of business and abortion, or whether the distribution of firearms among the populace should be more or less restricted, agreement has been achieved on what European social critics call “la culture unique.” All respectable members of the political culture profess sensitivity on minority issues, call for open borders or “universal nations,” and deplore the opening of moral questions that should have been settled by the awareness of past collective wrongs. Such sins include, but are not exhausted by, sexism, homophobia, slavery, and a by now multifunctional Holocaust, guilt for which has been ascribed to Jewish indifference as well as to Christian malice.

The facing of these catastrophes, as an unsubdued past, requires a vigilant, progressive state. Its intervention, moreover, is viewed not as a settled matter but as something that must go on continuously, lest bad habits come to the surface. Thus we read about the renewal of agencies to police once discriminatory voting districts in the American South, and about perpetual federal and state commissions to ensure minority representation both in the workforce and at educational institutions. In Europe judges and state officials make object lessons of those who question details of the Holocaust, deprecate Islamic theology, or propose to restrict immigration.

Civil libertarians Nadine Strossen of the New York ACLU and the late French historian Annie Kriegel have complained about the brazen way their colleagues trample on intellectual freedom.[4] After appealing to a threatened liberty in the face of anti-Communism and established religion, intellectuals turned around and demanded the criminalization of what they took to be unacceptable opinions.

Such bitter laments overlook the wider context in which this abandoning of freedom has occurred. In the postwar period, particularly since the sixties, the administrative state, most plainly in the United States, has come to define itself through a struggle against social pathology. In this struggle the distribution of entitlements has not been the sole or even major justification for extensive political control. More essential have been “fairness,” “caring,” “openness,” and other ideals attached to behavioral policies. And these policies have moved in a particular direction: toward delegitimating established social and familial arrangements while normalizing unconventional and experimental human groupings. We are expected to take for granted, and view as beyond critical discussion, “universal nations,” “open

communities," "homosexual family units," and "pluralistic cultures." Note these reformulations are not simply the hobbyhorses of journalistic cliques or of isolated action committees. These things thrive because of government agencies, the judiciary, and *public* education. They represent what democracy as public administration holds up as the happy alternative to how things used to be. And if the state moves boldly to ban insensitivity, that may be necessary to avoid mass backsliding into life "before the Sixties."

Such interventions by political authorities do not arouse widespread protest from American citizens. For all their complaints about "political correctness," moderate conservatives, George Will, Charles Krauthammer, and contributors to the National Association of Scholars' periodical, *Academic Questions*, do not devote their primary attention to the *government's* control of speech and behavior. The battle between supporters and opponents of political correctness is thought to be taking place among warring cultural elites. Moderate conservatives see themselves as contending with New Class intellectuals, but they try not to express a negative attitude toward the American state. It is grievously wrong, according to Will, for conservatives to exhibit "blanket disdain for government and hence for the political vocation."[5] To the moderate Right, it seems better to expose what it views as corrosive cultural influences, particularly those associated with postmodernism, than to treat the state with unseemly suspicion. Not political administrations but literary critics and philosophers who do not accept moral absolutes or else who question the goodness of American democracy are allegedly the creators of our present communal problems.

But the state, whose power to "legislate morality" Will praised in regard to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can and does bend culture.[6] This happens repeatedly in the United States and is illustrated further by a judicial act imposed on South Germans, for the most part against their will, in 1995. At that time Germany's highest appellate court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, went against Bavaria's ministry of education by requiring that crucifixes and other devotional objects be removed from public school classrooms. Although the German Basic Law of 1949 protects religious freedom, such freedom was not held to conflict with the practice of hanging crucifixes in Bavarian classrooms. The Bavarian ministry of education and religion, in paragraph 13 of its

legal code, provides for this custom in “supporting those eligible for educational benefits in the religious instruction of their children.” “A profoundly Catholic region and the second largest of Germany’s Länder, Bavaria has usually enjoyed at the hands of the German federal government benign neglect with respect to its culture. Quite deliberately until now the federal administration has avoided tampering with Bavarian religious life, a practice that even the Nazi government hesitated to initiate.[7]

In 1995 such intervention did occur, and the president of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, Jutta Limbach, in interviews with *Der Spiegel* and other sympathetic newsmagazines, explained her course of action. She and her colleagues would not be swayed by “majority opinion.” Although “justice must take account of the thinking and actions of the population, it should not be entrusted to opinion polls.” As long as someone takes offense at a traditional religious symbol, even one that could be viewed as a “cultural adornment,” it should not be allowed into public classrooms.[8]

With due respect to socially independent judges, wherever they may be, Limbach and a majority of her colleagues were not distilling constitutional meanings from a detached perspective. Nor were they simply, as stated by Bavarian premier Edmund Stoiber, making “a judgment based on intolerance.”[9] The assigned judges were intervening in the settled ways of a population to change attitudes and sentiments. The Protestant North Elban bishop and an ecstatic supporter of the court’s decision, Maria Jepsen, underlined this intention when she spoke up for the court’s reasoning. It is hard, Jepsen remarked, “to distinguish between the crucifix as a personal and public confessional symbol and its role as an artifact of Bavarian culture.” Besides, the bishop went on: “I consider a crucifix, that is the constant sight of a tortured man, to be of questionable value in a classroom. I would object to hanging a cross there if I had my own child.” This therapeutic argument, which the plaintiff also stated, may have trumped other considerations for those who cheered the federal incursion into Bavarian education. According to commentator Klaus J. Groth, the high court, as part of the German federal administration, has conferred upon itself the authority to pass judgment about “any religious or cultural symbol” found in any public institution.[10]

In Europe, the critical awareness of the management of thought and speech sometimes goes deeper than it does among Americans. Two German critics, Claus Nordbruch and Martin Walser, for example, have written copiously about the means adopted by the German state to obliterate "improper thought."[11] Such European analysts emphasize the alliance between public administration and social engineering, and they focus on the intricate coercive mechanisms designed to suppress "fascist" thought. But these European commentators do not entirely explain the thought control they are investigating. Basic to its operation is the public's acceptance of governmentally introduced behavioral and attitudinal changes. The decision by German federal judges to remove devotional objects from Bavarian public schools has not occasioned long-term resistance. Although an unpopular act, protested by the German president and the Bavarian government, the population finally accepted it, albeit with some grumbling. Insisting, like the *Economist*, that Bavarians have not been eager to embrace an enlightened judicial decision is a misleading inference: In a republic founded on regionally distributed powers, popular rule should not be subject to federal judicial fiat. That Bavarians have not embraced judicial rule as readily as Anglo-American society indicates the difference between relatively cohesive and fluid cultures. It certainly does not indicate that Bavarians have less of a democratic consciousness. The question that poses itself is exactly what one means by "democracy." Is it to be identified with self-conscious peoples ruling themselves, or does it entail the establishment and maintenance of "civic culture" by experts with "progressive" social views? Although these two opposed understandings have coexisted in the same societies, they are fundamentally incompatible.

A perceptive commentator, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, offers the view that "public control of entitlements sets up the rest, including the abdication of self-government."[12] Equally necessary for social engineering is the malleability of those upon whom it is practiced. A mercurial public opinion in the United States and in other mass democracies makes one wonder whether a core culture exists there at all. Within a few years a population, the majority of which continues to profess belief in the divine origin of the Bible and the divinity of Jesus, has radically changed its mind about a wide range of social issues.

Tolerance about gay civil rights is a case in point. Changing attitudes on this topic point to a high degree of public pliancy, a response that is equally discernable in Northern Europe and Canada from polls taken there. Whereas into the nineties there was no popular sentiment in favor of this stand, 53 percent of Americans questioned in a Gallup poll in December 1996 believe that gays should be admitted into the clergy. One Gallup poll in May 1996 revealed that 29 percent of respondents favored homosexual marriage.[13] This position has become even more fashionable in England, where Labour Party prime minister Tony Blair and former Conservative opposition leader William Hague have expressed support for gay marriage, while identifying themselves as Anglo-Catholics. Between 1977 and 1989, 20 percent of Gallup poll respondents explained homosexual orientation "as something you're born with"; the vast majority thought that it resulted from choice or environment. By 1996, 40 percent were willing to ascribe such behavior to nongenetic causes, and among women, the genetic explanations for homosexual urges enjoyed approval ratings of 58 percent.[14]

The evidence that respondents cited for their opinions is highly conjectural. It is certainly grounded less in research than the data indicating genetically based differences among the races. Nonetheless, this latter data can claim no political or journalistic respectability. What makes the genetic causes of homosexual behavior an attractive view is the operation of political correctness. The acceptance of this view facilitates the behavioral modification urged by the media and implemented by public administration. By contrast, genetic explanations for racial and gender differences would have the undesirable effect of proving the futility of government programs to render society more "open."

Such shifting opinion defies traditional moral teachings as much as it does scientific validation. In the United States, Protestant mainline churches have abandoned within less than a generation what was considered biblical morality to adopt inverted positions on family issues. The perceived transformations of moral and social attitudes have less to do with scientific demonstrations than with a particular culture, formed by the managerial state and its media-academic priesthood. Liberal Christian theologians and clergy have contributed to this culture but are not its only creators. They have distinguished themselves

mostly by virtue of making others receptive to an ascendant political class. And that class has worked for the fragmentation of an older bourgeois society based on community, church, and family, and for the elevation of those at war with those institutions now under attack.

But this demolition is also linked to a vision of psychological wellness for individuals freed of the past. Such individuals can be taught to live in a global society abounding in expressive freedoms, providing they do not violate the state's judgments about what is insensitive conduct. Given the discrediting or preempting of other authorities, only public administrators and allied arbiters of "niceness," "fairness," and "caring" are empowered to prescribe behavior. Such concentration of social power is possible both because government is powerful and because opposition to its interference is waning in the "democratic world." What might look to some like therapeutic tyranny is a natural progression, from a mass democracy featuring entitlements and an expanding list of "human rights" to a regime that sets out to reeducate world opinion.

The present study begins with a treatment of the turning of the administrative state, particularly in the United States, away from purely material programs, such as expanded entitlements, toward behavior control. We should question the ideas that the government has ceased to be "liberal" or, even less plausibly, that the welfare state is "dead," both extravagant assertions that come from Anglo-American journalists. Public administration has not retreated in the economic sphere, whether or not English Labourites or French socialists denationalize a particular industry. The relevant issues for these economic choices are functional efficiency and the high costs of social programs. A more fruitful approach to understanding the present political climate is understanding the lavish commitment of Western governments to therapeutic projects: integrating culturally alien, relatively poor immigrant populations that the political class has encouraged to come, sensitizing the workforce and educational institutions to the implications of affirmative action, and heightening multicultural awareness in general. While such activities are not as costly as the entitlements targeted at the middle class, they nonetheless underscore the ideology of the administrative state. In Europe, the French Communist and English Labour Parties have conspicuously downplayed the nationalizing programs they advocated in the past. They now endorse multicultural educational plans, including increasingly stiff laws against

insensitive speech and writing. The Race Relations Act passed in England in 1972 exemplifies this new kind of socialist reform.

Chapter 2 examines the liberal Protestant character of the advanced managerial state that has arisen in the United States and among its cultural dependents. According to international relations scholar and Presbyterian thinker James Kurth, the course of Protestant civilization, extending from the search for individual salvation to expressive individualism, human rights crusades, and wars against discrimination, points up a constant pattern. This meandering journey represents a return in different forms to an explicitly Protestant worldview: "All religions are unique, but Protestantism is more unique than all others. No other is so critical of hierarchy and community, or of the traditions and customs that go with them. At its doctrinal base Protestantism is anti-hierarchy and anti-community."[15] Kurth adds to this thumbnail sketch of Protestant religious character a theology and politics of intention, one that infers spiritual worthiness from the believer's disposition. While a secularizing transformation has taken place, Kurth insists, there is also thematic and psychic continuity, from the self-examination of one looking for evidence of divine grace to a mind cleansed of pathological thoughts. A line, though not entirely a straight one, leads from the older religious outlook, stressing a pure heart and a transformed consciousness, to the politics of sensitivity.

Chapter 3 looks at the development of multiculturalism and political correctness as Western currents connected to, though not completely derivative from, American political and cultural influence. Social guilt, antifascist education, and the search for subterranean prejudice are integral to the moral mission of European politicians and intellectuals as much as it is for their American preceptors. The mental cleansing that European sensitizers desire must go so deep that it can never be brought to completion. The road is indeed everything, but on the never-ending road toward the unattainable goal, the prescribed reeducation warrants a draconian control over citizens, who remain susceptible to old ways. This process, we are told, is urgent, since any retreat from it may cause society to turn "fascist," whatever that means at a given moment. The reeducation demanded also points toward a post-Communist social Left, which has pushed American liberal Protestant and therapeutic culture in a starkly totalitarian direction.

Chapter 4 deals with the broadening of the quest for political and mental well-being into an international crusade against prejudice and

insensitivity. Spearheading this mission have been media and academic personalities, from the American president on down, who define foreign policy as an extension of domestic crusades. Those who illustrate this trend have not charted a new course but have followed the path of the Protestant "deformation." The sacred "human rights" for which they urge us to sacrifice blood and treasure are keyed to the points in a continuing Protestant secularization. The Protestant-theme-turned-universal-right to religious freedom has now been joined to a dedication to expressive freedoms and to opposing prejudiced authorities that impede the construction of a new condition of life. This widening moral crusade has also resulted in journalistic pressures being brought to bear on Western governments to treat sexism and homophobia as international problems. The crusade further requires the waging of war against those who violate what is declared to be "human rights," whether or not the violators pose a revolutionary danger to the "human rights" enforcers.

Chapter 5 looks at conflicts produced or exacerbated by the therapeutic state. In non-Protestant societies and in some less progressive Protestant ones, this enforced change has created resentment that nurtures right-wing populist movements. In France, where 5 million North African immigrants and renewed attempts to criminalize "xenophobia" have led to stormy reactions, over 15 percent of the electorate now vote for one of two branches of the National Front. In Austria, Flanders, and German Switzerland, similar reactions against the combination of culturally disruptive immigration and political correctness are dramatically apparent. While it may be asked whether its friends and enemies exaggerate the extent of this reaction, clearly therapeutic politics have a natural limit. They are not equally acceptable in all societies and may be increasingly obnoxious the farther one moves away from their Anglo-American Protestant heartland.

Chapter 5 also explores practical alternatives to therapeutic regimes where they are now being called into question. In the United States, reactions against the therapeutic state have been weak and sporadic. Where regional loyalties and powers have broken down and individual self-fulfillment remains the highest ideal, it is unlikely that much resistance can be generated to the therapeutic ends pursued by public administration. And even where opposition to the therapeutic state has begun to attract notice, political alternatives may be exceedingly limited. Welfare states are firmly entrenched by *popular choice*, and public

administration, which has advanced therapeutic agendas, will likely continue to function as democracy in practice.

One possibility for a future political alternative may come from the polarization of managerial states along ideological lines. While the United States and its imitators speak in the language of human rights and against insensitive social behavior, other countries and peoples are insisting on a right to a majoritarian cultural identity. In some cases these proponents of identitarian politics have a regional rather than national base; thus they come into conflict with identitarian nationalists who favor the reinvigoration of traditional nation-states and their associated institutions. Moreover, not all regional politics in Europe is driven primarily by a sense of the cultural past. Such politics can be an envelope for other concerns, whether economic grievances or the immigration policies pursued by federal administrations. And among some regional rebels, like the Scots, Welsh, and Quebecers, the drive for independence is not linked to anything remotely conservative. Quebecois, for example, push linguistic nationalism but also have built a therapeutic regime more intrusive than the ones found in most of Anglophone Canada.

A relatively conservative kind of managerial state may have emerged if the National Front had reshaped French politics in the nineties. Such a regime also may be in the minds of the German political leaders and scholars who, in a controversial proclamation in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (April 7, 1995), demanded their people's right to become a "self-conscious nation" again. Such developments, which undoubtedly inspire fear among European advocates of multiculturalism, suggest politics in a different key. But what is supposedly a neofascist contagion may not be as critical a departure from the present as some might imagine. It may be nothing more than one small step back from today's managerial therapeutic regime, to a managed "democracy" that has ceased to be therapeutic in the current sense. The European "extreme Right" has moved away from outright calls to dismantle the welfare state and expel undocumented foreigners toward more conciliatory talk about fiscally accountable administration providing social services for *legally registered* citizens.

It might be helpful to indicate how "therapeutic" is being applied here. Since the 1970s, works published by Thomas Szasz, Christopher Lasch, and Philip Rieff criticize the replacement of traditional ethical

values by a cult of psychological normality. Szasz, in particular, has linked this cultural trend to the growing influence of psychological experts who impose their private judgments in the guise of advancing mental well-being. James L. Nolan's otherwise informative book, *The Therapeutic State*, gives this complaint a partisan twist, by identifying the state's increased reliance on behavioral control with the Clinton administration. Characteristic of the Clinton presidency, according to Nolan, is the elevation of government leaders into promoters of individual and collective self-esteem.[16] Bill and Hillary Clinton appealed to their constituents by claiming to "understand your pain" and by disguising their seizure of power as "caring" aimed at children and victims of discrimination.

The partisan side of this approach detracts from an argument that is generally well made. Nolan describes a development that is much in evidence and that both of the major American political parties have worked to accommodate. Invocations of the "good" American people by Ronald Reagan and George Bush involved electoral flattery that was different only in degree from what Nolan attributes to Bill Clinton. Both parties have presided over vast public administrations; and each has introduced and expanded programs intended to dramatize "caring." George Bush, Senior, and Robert Dole, as Republican presidential candidates, identified themselves with the passage in 1990 of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Each justified this federal act as a *Republican* expression of concern for the differently abled.[17]

Szasz and Lasch observe that the therapeutic state has cast a long shadow over American political life in general. It is not a condition we drift in and out of, depending on which party captures the presidency. These critics also understand the role of "mental health" experts in silencing unwelcome dissent and in humiliating its bearers. Whereas Kriegel and German historian Karl D.Bracher associate this activity across the Atlantic with warnings about the "fascist threat,"[18] in the United States suppressing dissent goes back since midcentury to the struggle against "mental illness." Needless to say, these two leitmotivs are not mutually exclusive.

Moreover, the concern about emotional well-being expressed by public administration shows a persistent regard for "victims." Despite an allegedly universal right to self-esteem and to mentally sound attitudes, the state and media treat some groups as specially

disadvantaged, needing protection that must come at the expense of others. Such preferential regard would seem to impact negatively on other groups, particularly on such victimizing heavies as white Christian males. Although the descendants of putative victimizers in the United States occasionally complain about “reverse discrimination,” their repining has not turned into a national issue. Political contests have not turned on opposition to “compensatory justice,” although in California a state referendum to ban racial and gender quotas from education and employment did pass by a few percentage points.

A ceaseless task of the therapeutic state that is now gaining ground in the United States, and in those European states that imitate our example, is the bringing of subject populations into conformity with a multicultural society. Such a society does not arise unbidden but to a large extent is molded by government policies toward particular minorities and through the promotion of Third World immigration as an instrument of internal change. Nothing could be more misleading than to equate a multicultural society with a multiethnic one, for example, of the kind that existed in New York or Vienna in the early twentieth century. At issue is not the coexistence of more or less tolerated ethnic minorities grouped together under an administrative unit or imperial jurisdiction but the celebration of state-sponsored “diversity.”[19] In the new multicultural as opposed to conventional multiethnic situation, the state glorifies differences from the way of life associated with the once majority population. It hands out rewards to those who personify the desired differences, while taking away cultural recognition and even political rights from those who do not. The differences being honored involve not only a wide range of cultural exotica but, perhaps even more importantly, the showcasing of alternative lifestyles. Thus the media, educators, and governments treat gays and, more recently, the transgendered as deserving of special rights and recognition by virtue of having been previously marginalized or traumatized. Indeed, the only means of ensuring that such suffering does not continue is by reconstructing the social conscience of other, more mainstream citizens. The therapeutic state undertakes the building of a multicultural society, pledged to “diversity,” by treating citizens as objects of socialization. Some will be pumped up to feel good about whoever they are, while others will be required to forfeit, disavow, or disparage their inherited identities.

Why then do nonvictims and implicit categorical victimizers accept those status categories the therapeutic state assigns to them? Why don't they object passionately to their own apparent humiliation? Several answers suggest themselves, all of which may contribute to a sufficient explanation. Some presumed victimizers, namely white males, can elicit special consideration as objects of discrimination, providing they are homosexuals or bearers of a politically useful disability. Women can make claims to state protection that are heeded, as historical victims of "gendered practices," while those who are descended from designated minorities may be able to wheedle out of administrators a quasi-victim status.[20] In addition, vocal ethnic minorities, for example, Jews in the United States and North African Muslims in France, who fear the once dominant core culture, typically side with the proponents of further social experiments.[21]

Even more germane for this explanation is the "Protestant deformation" explored by James Kurth. Neither social engineering as a political project nor the victim-therapy practiced and exported by the American political class would be enjoying its present success without a deformed Protestant culture. The stress on individual salvation, unmediated by ecclesiastical authorities, prepared the way for a late modern society, without strong communal ties or respect for a collective past. One must of course be cautious about looking too far back for the roots of this current situation in the dense Calvinist tradition that suffused early American morals and manners. Much of that tradition, according to historian Barry Shain, had to be dismembered before a consumerist and egocentric society could triumph.[22] A religion that stresses human depravity and the need for divine grace for even a minimally good human act should not be seen, argues Shain, as leading into sentimental or moral self-indulgence.

Despite this caveat, the anticommunitarian, antihierarchical Protestant traits noted by Kurth may have been embryonically present all along. The American Protestant heritage absorbed these elements, while remaining open to successive fusions with new political and social forces. At a certain stage American *Kulturprotestantismus* entered into alliance with the therapeutic state. Individual sensitivity, social guilt, and the personal overcoming of one's depraved ancestral society are the common attributes of modern managerial subjects; all of these traits have a particularly strong resonance in a progressively

deformed but also recognizable Protestant culture. The “inner-directed man,” with a Protestant persona, whom the sociologist David Riesman set out to describe forty years ago, has made way for another distinctly Protestant derivative. A less self-reliant type, this latter-day Protestant is the self-absorbed but spiritually uneasy materialist. He looks to the state and media for moral direction while professing belief in therapeutic sentiments and plastic “human rights.”[23]

A point that cannot be stressed sufficiently is the fit between the current state of Protestant Germanic religious consciousness and the politics of guilt. The latter thrives best where the former exists, and among minorities in Western Protestant countries that support the social Left, it is hard to find the pervasive guilt that informs the majority white Protestant culture. It is one thing for a member of an ethnic or racial minority to support special treatment for his group as a victim of the prejudices of the majority or to work to neutralize the traditional majority culture by which he feels threatened. It is quite another to have members of the majority group constantly dwelling on their collective sins and proposing public expiation. Although both sides may endorse the same rhetoric and prescribe the same acts of penance, their motives are entirely different. But the expiating majority continues to find a payoff in what has become a spiraling process of confessing to and compensating for historical burdens. It is allowed to feel righteous individually while being part of a historically wicked society. And as a country redeemed from its own racist, sexist, homophobic past, the repentant Protestant is allowed to go forth and bring enlightenment to others. Thus the humbled, self-debasing sinner achieves ultimate purpose as a crusader on a never-ending global mission.

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1. Susan Moller Okin, *Justice, Gender, and the Family* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 5, 134; and Robert E. Goodin, *Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibility* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

2. Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 81.

3. Ibid., 29.

4. On Strossen’s opposition to college speech codes, see the quotations in *New York Times*, March 13, 1990, B7; and Strossen’s comments in *Academic Questions* 10, no. 2 (summer 1997), 33–40; and Annie Kriegel’s criticism of crimes of opinion in *Le Figaro*, April 2, 1990, 2.

5. George Will, “The Cultural Contradictions of Conservatism,” *Public Interest* 123 (spring 1996): 44. Reflecting the neoconservative reverence for the American “liberal democratic regime” is Will’s *Statecraft As Soulcraft: What Government Does* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), especially 122–39.

6. Will, *Statecraft As Soulcraft*, 86–87.

7. “Kruzifixabnahme in bayerischen Schulen,” *Der Spiegel*, August 14, 1995, 29–30. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the author.

8. Ibid., 23–25.

9. Quoted in *Economist*, August 19, 1995, 16.

10. Jepsen quoted in *Der Spiegel*, August 14, 1995, 23 (for the similar, unmistakably psychological objection to the crucifix from the plaintiff, Ernst Seler, a follower of the anticlerical Austrian mystic Rudolf Steiner, see *Economist*, August 19, 1995, 16); Klaus J. Groth, *Die Diktatur der Guten: Political Correctness* (Munich: Herbig, 1996), 129–31.

11. See Claus Nordbruch’s probing study of the politics of political correctness, *Sind Gedanken noch frei?* (Munich: Universitas, 1998); and Martin Walser, *Über Deutschland reden* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996).

12. Conversation with the author, June 5, 1998; see also Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, “The National Prospect,” *Commentary* 100 (November 1995): 53–54.

13. *Gallup Poll Monthly*, December 1996, 12, and May 1996, 3.

14. *Gallup Poll Monthly*, December 1996, 12–13. On “The Strange Death of Party: UK Political Culture,” see *New Statesman* 127 (June 5, 1998): 31.

15. See James Kurth, “The Protestant Deformation and American Foreign Policy,” *Orbis* 42, no. 2 (spring 1998): 225.

16. James L. Nolan, *The Therapeutic State: Justifying Government at Century’s End* (New York: New York University Press, 1998).

17. For Bush’s ringing endorsement of the AWD Act, see *New York Times*, July 11, 1990, A11; and for Dole’s “emotional defense” of the same act, see *Dallas Morning News*, August 14, 1996, A19, and *Houston Chronicle*, August 14, 1996, 14.

18. Annie Kriegel, “Sur l’antifascisme,” *Commentaire* 12 (summer 1990): 299; see also Kriegel’s autobiography, *Ce que j’ai cru comprendre* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1991), an account of her evolution from a French Communist to a critic of “antifascism” and leftist thought control. For Bracher’s criticism of antifascism as leading to an “overrestrictive conception of democracy,” see Karl O. Bracher, *Faschismus und Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991).

19. For what may be a deliberate confusion of the terms *multicultural* and *multiethnic*, see Michael Barone’s *The New America: How the Melting Pot Can Work* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2001); and the adulatory appraisal of Tamar Jacoby in *National Review*, June 11, 2001, 57–58.

20. On negotiable victim statuses, see Nicholas Capaldi’s perceptive and engagingly written *Out of Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis of Doctrinaire Liberalism* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1985).

21. In a controversial multivolume study, *A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism As an Evolutionary Group Strategy* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), psychologist-historian Kevin MacDonald argues that the neutralization of the inherited Gentile culture exemplifies a persistent Jewish “group strategy” in dealing with Christian societies. Despite a tendency to

paint with an exceedingly broad brush, MacDonald does raise provocative questions about self-conscious minorities in majority cultures they dislike or distrust.

22. Barry Alan Shain, *The Myth of American Individualism: The Protestant Origins of American Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

23. For an imaginative examination of the Protestant deformation examined by Kurth, see John Lukacs's *A Thread of Years* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). Given his ancestral ties to the Hungarian Catholic gentry and his extensive contacts with Mainline Philadelphia society, Lukacs can approach his subject with sympathy as well as critical distance.

1

The Death of Socialism?

The End of History

For several years after the collapse of the Soviet empire, a veritable mountain of studies and editorials took shape around the demise of socialism and why and how it happened. Although by no means ideologically uniform, these writings nevertheless are held together by shared opinions about what had taken place in Eastern and Central Europe and what recent changes in that area portended. The disintegration of an empire marked by extensive economic planning, nationalized industries, and a flawed or nonexistent pricing system spelled the probable end of the socialist experiment sponsored by the Soviet Union. Henceforth advanced industrial states and those trying to match their material achievements would consider socialist models as doomed to failure. Only "markets and democracy," to quote the slogan popularized by, among many others, Elliot Abrams, Michael Kinsley, and Michael Novak, could modernize and humanize economically backward societies.[1]

Typical of this democratic capitalist euphoria was Francis Fukuyama's evocation of the liberal democratic "end of history" ushered in by the Soviet collapse. In an essay in the *National Interest* (August 1989) and more exhaustively in a monograph, *The End of History and the Last Man*, this former State Department employee and paradigmatic neoconservative expounded his own secular version of the end times. Without a Soviet enemy, the American combination of democratic polity and market economy was free to spread throughout the world. The effect of this benign process would be the conversion of most of humankind to a way of life based on peaceful consensus and material improvement. History, as the experience of human conflict and violence, was drawing to a close, and the acquisition of creature

comforts would have the result that Nietzsche and other advocates of heroic life found odious in commercial societies, the softening of human manners.[2]

In an enthusiastic reception of this vision, the social economist George Gilder, in the *Washington Post Book World*, insisted that Fukuyama was a moral prophet as well as historical analyst. "Entrepreneurial capitalism" combined with democracy was now liberating the entire world, as all people of good will were coming to understand certain self-evident truths, namely that "authoritarian capitalism" could not last by "block[ing] the no less imperious expression of political themes and direct[ing] it into the economic sphere"; that "no liberal democratic state had ever made war upon another"; and that moral decency forces us to deny that "nondemocratic regimes have sovereign rights."[3]

While Fukuyama's statements about the future, particularly as restated by Gilder, may be questioned on numerous grounds, including their predictive inaccuracy and unexamined identification of "liberal democracy" with Anglo-American interests and alliances, at least equally questionable is the assumption that "capitalism" has triumphed over "socialism." Both Gilder and Fukuyama point to entrepreneurial activities and the operation of markets to show their economic system is alive and well. But such developments can coexist with elaborate state planning. Until the late thirties, Franklin Adler demonstrates in the case of fascist Italy, state corporatism, though theoretically anticapitalist, left considerable room for investment, capital formation, and market-generated pricing.[4] Moreover, in the twentieth century what Fukuyama and Gilder recognize as quintessentially democratic regimes have produced expanding welfare states. This has not been a mere excrescence of modern democratic culture, but essential to how the popular will has expressed itself. As noted by Raymond Aron in 1968: "The liberal credo as it finds expression today on both sides of the Atlantic owes more to the twentieth century than to nineteenth-century liberalism. It is concerned more with inequality than with freedom in the eighteenth-century sense of individual liberty."[5]

Such a governing arrangement is not a public choice to be made and then rejected, in favor of other political models. "Welfare-state democracy" is the only form in which contemporary democracy expresses, or is allowed to express, itself. Moreover, the experiment,

once having been launched, has proved to be both irreversible and necessarily incremental. Consolidations of the gains made by the managerial state in a period of fitful growth may require temporary slowdowns or halts. But the secular and even decennial trends are in one direction: Western industrial democracies are characterized by states that claim more and more of the incomes of their subjects and regulate increasingly their economic and social activities. Over half the gross domestic product of France, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, and other Western industrial countries is now collected and spent by the public sector, and well over half the salaries paid out to workforces in these countries comes from government expenditures. In France and in other Western European states, the average salaries in the private sector lag well behind those furnished by public employment.[6]

During the height of the Cold War, when the struggle between the United States and its allies and the Soviet bloc was widely presented as a confrontation between capitalism and socialism, public sectors in the West were becoming larger, not smaller. Between 1965 and 1981 the percentage of the GDP paid in direct taxes went from lower rates to 43.7 percent in Sweden, 51.5 percent in Denmark, 22.9 percent in France, 46.4 percent in Switzerland, 17.3 percent in Germany, 26.3 percent in Canada, 28.2 percent in Holland, 22.8 percent in Austria, 27.7 percent in the United States, and 51.5 percent in Japan. Between the midsixties, when Raymond Aron noticed liberalism was turning into social democracy, and the early eighties, the French public sector increased its take from 35 percent to 43 percent of GDP.[7] The expansion of the public sector occurred in the West without regard to changing party labels or to the ideological positions attached to different leaders and coalitions. Although in the seventies and eighties the growth of government-collected GDP in center-left Quebec was 2.5 percent above the Canadian national average, that growth figure was 2.5 percent lower than the one in Tory-run Ontario in the same time period.[8] Despite government expansion in most of the Western world in the 1970s, France and the United States, unlike England, had what were considered center-right administrations through most of the decade. Only periodically since the 1980s has the government-collected GDP percentage come down in any of these countries.

A few observations may be appropriate about the economic policies in question. The attempt to distinguish between socialism and

capitalism on the basis of classical socialist criteria is becoming obsolete. While nationalization or state ownership has continued to be the practice for some key industries in Western countries, it has nonetheless ceased to be fashionable on the political Left, whence the designation in the Western press of Eastern European proponents of state ownership as “reactionary” and “nationalist.” No current social democratic head of state in Western Europe is advocating more state ownership of industries or explicitly attacking the existence of an extensive private sector.[9] Describing a meeting of European social democratic prime ministers held in Washington in April 1999, journalist Ben Wattenberg expresses the opinion that “even the left can learn.” European socialists are “preaching that globalization can be a tool for prosperity. [German chancellor Gerhard] Schröder called for greater flexibility in markets, including the creation of labor markets. The French were not at the seminar, but their government of the Left is privatizing government companies faster than the conservatives did.”[10]

What has taken place, but is ignored by Wattenberg, is the shift of socialist programs toward what Swedish sociologist Bo Rothstein calls the “universal welfare state.” This regime provides for “publicly produced and universally available services such as health care, basic education, care of children and the elderly, and publicly regulated and subsidized housing,” “basic pensions and child care allowances,” and “a mandatory social insurance system.”[11]

Note that Rothstein’s persistent defense of Swedish “socialist solidarity” stresses the merits of individual self-development. An appeal to any historical or traditional basis for national solidarity plays no role in his “liberal” justification of socialism, one whose point of departure is the idea that individuals can only “choose their moral principles autonomously” and “realize life projects” once they have been socialized by the state. The state is held up as a positive institution because of its mission to individuals, whom it liberates from an archaic past and assists toward self-actualization. In defense of this ideal, which Rothstein believes most of his countrymen are willing to pay upward from 57 percent of their earnings to advance, he quotes remarks made in 1967 by Social Democratic theorist Leif Lewin: “State authorities ought so to change society as to make it possible for the many to experience the feeling of freedom.” “With the aid of the coercive powers of the state,” Lewin looked forward to “so altering

social conditions that all enjoy equal prospects of experiencing the feeling of freedom and of developing their potentialities."[12]

In such arguments for social planning, one finds a celebration of individuality linked to a blueprint for coercive government. The two are not at variance, for by leveling both traditional authorities and traditional structures, one may serve the ideal and the blueprint simultaneously. The revolutionary socialist aphorism, "One does not make an omelette without breaking eggs," applies to the social democracy that now prevails. "Individuals" are not to be formed by having public administration stand aside. They must be encouraged to "develop," as plausibly explained by social democrats, through a proactive government, one that removes corporate obstacles to individual identities and furnishes the material resources for self-liberated individuals.

There are two ways, Scottish legal theorist Neil MacCormick tells us, to conceptualize democracy, namely, as rule by or for a sum total of particular individuals, or else as the expression of a corporate will. It has been customary to treat the second as a thin veil for a dictatorship, exercised on behalf of a fictive majority by those seeking to avoid the unpleasantness of real elections. This may or may not be the case, depending on what the corporate identity being appealed to consists of. If one is dealing with the authority of a society ordered independently of the central state, with what MacCormick calls the "institution of institutions," then fixed limits exist to what those on top may do.[13] The possible forms taken by this institution of corporate mediating wills can range from medieval estates and guilds to the once reserved powers of "the several states" that created the American federal union. In this densely layered structure of authority, central states must take into account a multiplicity of corporate identities, as opposed to that invented general will typical of managerial or overtly totalitarian regimes.

But even more important has been the critical role of "individualist democracy" as the *pons asinorum* leading to behavior control by the administrative state. Social engineering by this late modern regime is carried out to "empower" nonactualized individuals or on behalf of groups adjudged by administrators to be in need of collective assistance, as designated victims of traditional societies that the state is undertaking to reform. In neither case does the state have to worry

about substantive obstacles to its will. No corporate bloc will stand in its way by appealing to inviolate tradition or to its own organized popular sentiment. The central government may face lobbies and legal procedure—for example, in the United States requiring sympathetic judges to sanction its action. But this is different from having corporate sovereign entities that limit each other—and different from viewing the central state as one among other forms of authority. Without the successful appeal to decontextualized and aggrieved individuals, administrative government would not have gained its present strength.

Contemporary social engineering, nonetheless, does not exclude all recognition of group identity. Rather it makes a distinction, already alluded to in my previous volume, *After Liberalism*, between, on the one side, traditional national and ethnic communities, especially those established before the advent of the welfare state, and, on the other, unconventional lifestyle groupings or Third World minorities said to be victimized by Western prejudice. Communities that depend for their legitimation on the managerial state are accorded collective recognition and special cultural protection that fly in the face of the radically individualist premises of social democracy. Ironically this situation renders the administrative state even stronger. Selective recognition of collective identities serves the same political end as maximizing individual autonomy. Both weaken the established loyalties of nonvictim groups, particularly those that flow from kinship patterns and a vigorous majority culture, and thereby enhance the state's social control. Admittedly social planners draw upon the momentum of economic and demographic change to achieve their work, but there is another side of this reality. Those in government have accelerated and shaped whatever changes suit their ends. To a widely quoted remark by Isaiah Berlin, made shortly before his death in 1997, "that for the first time since 1789 the European left does not have a project," British political commentator Geoffrey Wheatcroft responded in *Prospect*, that this should be qualified to read "no large political project." A culture war, Wheatcroft suggests, is a different matter. For the cultural modernization and "emotional correctness" advocated by Tony Blair and his cabinet amount to a "project," which the state is empowered to advance.[14]

One final observation about the political economy concerns the compatibility of extensive social planning with material productivity. As remarked by democratic socialist John Judis in the *New Republic*, the

social planning represented by Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Gerhard Schröder, referred to as the "third way," stresses "liberal communitarianism" but not direct state control of production. This third way "seeks to promote rather than hinder the creation of global capitalism but at the same time to foster greater social equality and community within and among nations." Such a political approach, as described by Judis, requires "progressive taxation," "vocational education," and the defense of human rights "linked to the NATO invasion in Kosovo." It embodies an updated version of the attempt made by Herbert Croly and other American Progressives during the "First World War to work toward a progressive national reform agenda," while building a "progressive bloc of nations" abroad.[15]

What distinguishes third-way planners from earlier social democrats is a greater willingness to sacrifice economic collectivism for economic growth. Capital formation, policies dealing with the "grown divergence between rich and poor nations," and trade agreements to soften the effects of "global competition" are integral to the new progressive social agenda. Judis and other advocates of a third way or of a Scandinavian universal welfare state hold up economic growth as the precondition for everything they wish to achieve. Moreover, this reliance on capital formation is entirely understandable. Between 1985 and 1994 the United States registered an annual per capita GDP growth rate of 1.6 percent; at the same time the Canadian rate stood at 1.8 percent and that of the United Kingdom, despite a large public sector, at a respectable 0.9 percent.[16] Notwithstanding the heavy taxes paid in Germany, which cause a transfer of more than half of individual earnings to the government, the per capita GDP growth rate from 1980 to 1994 was 1.8 percent (0.2 percent higher than that of the United States). In 1997, according to the Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, the commercial sector in France grew by 2.6 percent, whereas salaries rose by 3.3 percent. This expansion took place despite the fact that over one-half of GDP in France is controlled directly by the state.[17]

In a detailed statistical study, *Economic Freedom of the World*, published by the Fraser Institute, the data interpreters give high grades for economic freedom to Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. But the evidence cited tells more about economic trends than the conclusions would lead us to believe. What we learn is

not that free-market economies are triumphing or that Western welfare states are withering away, but rather that social democracies can coexist with subjugated markets and regulated earnings. *Economic Freedom of the World* does not include in the government's share of GDP the sizable amounts of corporate and individual earnings set aside in the form of transfer payments.[18] Since that assumed percent has risen steadily in most Western welfare states since the 1970s (to about 15 percent in the United States), it should be listed as publicly controlled money. The trend by now apparent in transferred earnings should be interpreted to mean both growing state interference in economic affairs and the attendant loss of social freedom.

It is, moreover, possible for central states to micromanage societies without running the economy directly. Inasmuch as *After Liberalism* dealt with that process at length, it may suffice to focus on one particularly telling example. While the U.S. budget in fiscal year 1999 for all government spending was slightly above $1.5 trillion, only a few hundred million of those dollars were placed into the Family Preservation and Support Services (FPSS), an agency created by Congress in the nineties as part of the Adoption and Safe Families Act.[19] The act and the mandated services empower a federal agency to investigate first-time parents in the United States and to make determinations about which families are "troubled" and need government guidance. It provides for the collection of data dealing with families of special interest to the FPSS; the computerized information is then fed into a nationwide data bank, the Program Information Management System. The FPSS states as its purpose the furnishing of "universal home visitation for all new parents and intensive services for families most in need." Although "visitations" are not presented as coercive, those who fail to welcome the assigned "home visitors" may be, and have been, reported to Child Protection Services. In some cases, uncooperative parents have been stripped of the guardianship of their offspring.[20]

Instead of dwelling on the horrific implications of such imposed visitations and nonconsensual collection of personal data, one might note here another side effect of the social policy being discussed. Nonelected government officials can achieve an indeterminate power over American family life in return for a relatively small allocation of revenue. Social control by the state does not presuppose a socialized

economy, and government interventions into child rearing, spousal relations, and intergroup dynamics can now go forward in conjunction with market forces. Whether this arrangement amounts to the economic freedom celebrated by neoconservative journalists is open to question. What we really see is that capital formation, proliferating consumer choices, and international free trade agreements do not hold back the government from colonizing the family. Such a project can be undertaken on the cheap, by having public administration distribute entitlements, regulate certain aspects of the economy, and mold the young. In the 1960s and 1970s, according to legal scholar Michael Greve, the American Congress and American federal courts engaged in the practice of "collusive nationalism," reinforcing each other's attempt to shatter the once sovereign immunities of the states, in order to guarantee private entitlements and selective civil rights claims.[21] This extension of its power by the American central state went on during a period of economic growth—and may have been rendered acceptable precisely by that fact.

State guidance of individuals, who will be free to choose their "lifestyles," does not require that government officials contend with unruly workforces or with complicated operational budgets best left in the private sector. Social engineering can go forward without the state having to assume such responsibilities directly. The acceptance by the Left of a predominantly private economy marks the end of its longtime association with grand programs of nationalization. A connection assumed since the nineteenth century by socialists and their free-market critics, it is one that may be ceasing to be historically relevant. But this changed emphasis in social planning does not prove that the socioeconomic pendulum has swung toward a free-market economy or toward the passing of the administrative state decisively. The expressed conviction of democratic capitalists—that the crisis of an economic house divided will be resolved in favor of freedom—is misleading and counterfactual.[22] Unlike antebellum American slavery and industrial capitalism, what we have are not contradictory productive forms or ways of life. Restricted economic freedom can cohabit with an administrative state devoted to social experiments. Providing the capitalist goose is not killed in the process, public administration can be both expansive and financially secure.

Another point should be made about the degree of change promoted by the politics of contemporary welfare states. It is simply not the case that less government tinkering goes on in economic life because welfare-state politicians call for "tiny meliorative increments." What the French call "la politique de rien sauf des broutilles à faire" (the policy of doing odds and ends) and some Americans' "strip-mall socialism" do not describe what is taking place. Those who present government agendas as growing more modest take what ground has been occupied as a given. By not calling attention to what administrators have already conquered, one can plausibly depict "democratic government" that is less power-gorged than the kind that really exists. In this alternative reality, government officials, having renounced sweeping tasks, are attending dutifully to middle-class wants and gripes. According to American Enterprise Institute president Christopher DeMuth, speaking about the United States: "Taking into account the growth of regulation not captured by these statistics (because regulatory expenditures are made largely in the private sector), government has grown more than 50 percent faster than the economy as a whole and now claims more than one-third of America's economic resources."[23]

Significantly, democratic capitalist boosters have not cried out vehemently against such government growth. Harsh critics of Communists in the 1980s, Guy Sorman and Jean-Marie Benoist in France and Ben Wattenberg, Jack Kemp, Michael Novak, and the National Endowment for Democracy in the United States, held up as a counterforce to socialist societies an "American conservative revolution" that would wipe away the predemocratic past.[24] Although this revolution would encourage private investment, it would not supplant democratic welfare states. It would provide the state with more funds for social benefits by generating taxable wealth. Neither markets nor capital formation would exclude the continued operation of a large central state.

Virginia Postrel, an author of the democratic capitalist Right and editor of *Reason* magazine, complains about the persistence of historical "stasis." In *The Future and Its Enemies*, Postrel sounds a "dynamist manifesto," praising technological creativity and deprecating "the forces of conservatism, the 'if-it-ain't broke-don't-fix-it' mentality" and its concomitant cultural values. Postrel's eagerness to eradicate

tradition and established community is so extreme that even a center-left reviewer writing in the *New Republic* finds her neophilia to be one of the "best arguments for conservatism with which I am familiar."[25]

Postrel's enthusiasms are a perfect example of democratic capitalist boosterism, characterized by support for open borders, the mixing of peoples and races, and a continuing redefinition of nations and cultures. Although Postrel hesitates to propose specific government remedies, she frets over the "stasist policy" represented by those who say "I like my neighborhood the way it is."[26] Postrel's vision does not conflict with the consuming quest to change society in a progressive way pursued by social democrats, save for her difference with them over the degree of government intervention useful for the economy. Like other progrowth democratic capitalists, Postrel goes after the Democratic presidential candidate in 2000, Albert Gore, for his most traditionalist stands, concern about environmental pollution and unhappiness about the cultural and social dissolution in American suburbs.[27] The members of her "party of life," who oppose the received order of things and put themselves on the cutting edge of innovation, are the "antistasists," fighting the world as they find it. Their quarrel with the other side is not about abolishing the past but about the best means to bring that about. Postrel's dynamist proclamation restates the democratic capitalist complaint against the communists, for supporting the preindividualist past and encouraging economic stagnation.[28] Democratic capitalists in the eighties were already laying the foundations for a new social democracy, which they now praise for its "moderate" character. In his talking up of the New (British) Labour, one time Thatcher advisor Madsen Pirie gives Blair high grades for facing "the challenge of change in market-friendly terms" and for offering "Thatcherism spoken in a gentle voice."[29]

Neoconservative and neoliberal celebrants of moderate social democracy would do well to note the mutating base of European socialist parties. Throughout most of the century, socialist parties and socialist politics were heavily influenced and often controlled by trade unions, but in recent decades this situation has changed. Between 1985 and 1995 the percentage of unionized workers declined generally: from 47.7 percent to 35.8 percent in Italy, from 51.0 percent to 41.2 percent in Austria, from 45.5 percent to 32.9 percent in the United Kingdom, from 41.3 percent to 28.9 percent in West Germany,

from 51.4 percent to 25.6 percent in Portugal, from 36.7 percent to 24.3 percent in Greece, and from 14.5 percent to 9.1 percent in France.[30] This fact must be taken into account, whatever the cause may be, whether the transition to a service economy or the relative decline of heavy industry as a percentage of the economy in most Western countries. Traditional socialists have deplored the effect on socialist politics that a perceptibly weakened syndicalism has brought about. Thus Pierre Bourdieu and Horst Schmitthenner, standing up for the socialist left in *Le Monde Diplomatique*, paint a gloomy picture of scorned unions, excessive regard being paid to financial markets, the "ultraliberal logic of managing the euro by means of a central European bank," and a politics of stability achieved at the expense of the European working class.[31] These socialist critics lament the high levels of unemployment and the failure of the European Union to launch a wide range of educational and social programs through further taxation on capital.

The Postcommunist Left

But neither these apostles of "moderation" nor the fashionably leftist *Le Monde* notice the radicalizing effect of a socialist politics freed of the militant unionism of an earlier generation. The syndicalist politics that marked the European Left stood for certain unshakably anchored positions: drastic income redistribution, the nationalization of heavy industries, and more and bigger social programs aimed at the working class. But this militant socialism of the postwar era has nothing in common with current notions of political (or what the English call emotional) correctness. The older socialist orientation did not predispose its adherents toward or seek to promote open borders, free trade, sexual self-expressiveness, and the submergence of the dominant Western culture into the flux of incoming ethnic minorities. Multitudinous facts and sources indicate that working-class socialists generally opposed immigration (American unions were vocally active in supporting the Immigration Act of 1921), favored protectionism, and had no special affinity for multicultural politics.[32]

In a commentary (in *Corriere della Sera*) on why the Italian Left fared badly in the municipal and European parliament elections in June 1999, Ernesto Galli della Loggia noted the estrangement of the

“productive middle classes” from the socialist Left. Once an electoral pillar of the Communist Party, in cities like Bologna, shopkeepers and small entrepreneurs had bolted what they viewed as a derailed radicalism and had gone over in some cases to the right. The ties between the Communists and the *“ceti medi produttivi”* (productive middle classes) had rested on the assurances that while the party was aligned to the Soviet Union internationally, it would pursue gradualist reform domestically.[33] Most importantly, it would pressure the ruling Christian Democratic coalition into creating an extensive welfare state that would yield middle-class benefits. Faced by the danger of losing votes to the Communists, the Christian Democrats had responded by providing a *compatto sociale*, a medley of pensions and other social programs serving Italian voters. Moreover, their middle- and working-class constituencies viewed the Italian Communists as morally upright, in their exercise of public office and steady adherence to social ethics. Far from representing the “culturally subversive,” the Italian Communists were outspokenly opposed to what they regarded as capitalist and consumerist decadence.

Paradoxically, observes Galli della Loggia, the supposed move of the Communists rightward, toward renouncing the Marxist-Leninist connection internationally and most of their plans for nationalization at home, caused the Italian Left to “appear” more rather than less radical. The abjuration by Italian Communism of its pro-Soviet and economic revolutionary positions and the Italian Left’s detachment from its old Communist alliances engendered the possibility for an Italian center-left politics, absent “the old cultural universe inspired by a naïve but powerful populist spirit.” This old leftist universe was “predisposed to the values of hard work, discipline, and civic and familial order.” Once it crumbled, a new Italian Left “became more receptive to the chaotic flux of changing lifestyles; of expressive idiosyncrasies, and of an acquisitive-individualist type marked by the moral relativism.” To the extent this Left is willing to defend values, it espouses those that drive away former Communist voters. The reconstituted Left has become the “programmatic party of indulgence engaging in social infractions, indeed a party of frivolous and superficial scoffing at the once cohesive ties of family and community, all done in the name of forbidding the regulation of the private.”[34]

These observations about the old and new Italian Communist constituencies overstate certain distinguishing characteristics. In view of its habitual anticlericalism and links to bohemian society, it may be hard to show that the older Western Communism consistently defended the proletariat or middle-class virtue now being ascribed to it. Often French and Italian Communists in the past took avant-garde moral stands—in favor of legalized prostitution and abortion, easily obtained divorces, and the liberation of women from inherited gender roles. At the same time, it is possible to find evidence of certain Communist accommodations of economically radical but culturally conservative constituencies. On such questions as pornography, gay rights, and the use of mind-altering drugs, the Western Communists until quite recently were not significantly different from the Christian Democrats.

In *The French Communists*, Annie Kriegel, in a form of Marxist-Leninist self-criticism, described her country's Communist Party as "a male collectivity." Until 1946, 88.89 percent of party members were male, and though that figure by 1967 had gone down to 74.5 percent, "political activity of women Communists remained minimal." Surveying the view of the family nurtured by party leadership, Kriegel concludes "that the party that aspires to be the most leftist of all is for the moment in France the most resolutely conservative."[35] The Communists in Western countries have also tried to justify the highly puritanical practices of existing Communist regimes. Particularly in Cuba, China, and other parts of the Third World, revolutionary Marxist governments have been proudly insensitive to gays and drug users. Typical of these attitudes are the socialist invectives issued by Zimbabwean Marxist president Robert Mugabe. A self-described moral custodian of his nation, Mugabe has embarrassed his onetime Western media supporters by sealing off his country to gay advocates and foreign pornography.[36]

Galli della Loggia is therefore on to something when he associates the transformed Italian (or for that matter European) Left with the unleashing of a *"forza culturalment eversiva"* (culturally disruptive force). This is occurring not simply because of "indulgence," but rather because of the conscious pursuit of a particular electoral strategy. The call for hate speech crimes, and for gay and minority rights, infringement of which is treated as a criminal offense, is the way the Postcommunist Left is serving its new constituencies. But, equally

relevant, the Communists are no longer necessary to keep other Italian parties behind the welfare state. No major Italian party, except for the Lega Nord, challenges that by now fixed arrangement. Besides, the European Union, which includes Italy, insists that its members provide a wide range of social programs to be in compliance with its standards.[37]

In a revealing colloquium on labor questions held at the University of Quebec in 1985, angry speakers targeted "the dominant political class that refuses to come down a peg or two *[jeter du lest]* lest it suffer a reduction of power." In these socialist diatribes much was said about the "state and its mechanisms," which "lecture to the community" while subverting "popular organizations." Most of the self-consciously leftist contributors glossed over the role of trade unions in strengthening the modern managerial state, but the thrust of their critique was unmistakably reactionary. The discussants complained bitterly about the "ensnaring discourse *[discours piégé]*" devised by state bureaucrats, who "pay lip service to decentralization but devote themselves to restructuring bureaucratic control while being anxious about losing the benefit from any social experimentation left to communitarian authorities."[38]

Almost all such complaints about social change from the socialist Left treat "neoliberalism" as the "cause" of state bureaucracy. Despite the exaggerated references to free-market greed that punctuate such discourse, there is an aspect of truth here. An alliance has taken place between the managerial state and the forces of capital accumulation. And while the parties of this alliance are not of equal strength, both are necessary for the maintenance of the present regime. Without material affluence and expanding consumer choice, state bureaucrats would have to face popular discontent in building financial resources and exerting social control. Thus Tony Blair reserves his bile for the House of Lords, the residual power of the English monarchy, and white hate crimes. The object of his attacks are certainly not wealthy industrialists or the servants of finance capital.[39] Blair's announced aim is to fashion a "new and cooler Britain," not to radically shift incomes or renationalize English industrial enterprises. A certain level of economic growth, he understands, must be maintained to remake manners, beliefs, and institutions. It is possible to call this the "end of socialism," but it may be more useful to think of new names for what has developed. What is

being designated is a managerial state that seeks to modify social behavior and cultural values but tolerates economic growth, up to a point. Both Right and Left, which operate within an increasingly less differentiated spectrum, misrepresent the surrounding situation.

Blair's appreciative democratic capitalist opposition restricts references to "social policy" practiced by his administration to the costs of public benefits and the support of entitlements. Blair's culturally radical politics, his promises to revamp, with questionable constitutional authority, the framework of the British government, and his expressed willingness to commit English forces abroad to uphold his "values," are no longer seen as inconsistent with a "conservative" social policy. What is highlighted is Blair's apparent reluctance to raise the costs and extent of social benefits. By this standard, he is "light years ahead of the old Labour" as a restrainer of "social costs."[40] Like the New Labour and its continental and North American counterparts, the "other side," formally understood, has a vested interest in not noticing the government's prominent role in the radicalization of society. Reacting strongly may give the appearance of being "immoderate" and therefore harmful to what is now defined as the "democratic" process.

The division between the post-Marxist social Left and older versions of the Left is seen in two other situations: the contest in the 2000 American presidential race between Vice President Al Gore and Green Party candidate and consumerist advocate Ralph Nader; and the appeal to Marx against political correctness on the European populist Right. Contrary to the conventional media view, it is possible to locate Gore, a liberal Democrat in the current sense, to the left of Nader, who combined prescriptions for extensive administrative control of the economy with certain center-right themes. Unlike Gore, and to the consternation of the editors of the *New Republic*, Nader called for restrictions on immigration and ridiculed the Gore-Democrats for demonizing the Religious Right. With some justification, *New York Times* syndicated columnist William Safire speculated about whether Nader had not succeeded in raiding the blue-collar base of conservative populist Pat Buchanan in Michigan. In that state, the white working class, from which Buchanan, as a critic of multinationals and international trade agreements, had drawn strength in the past, seems to have abandoned its former advocate, while Nader had picked up support in working-class neighborhoods.[41]

Likewise indicating new political divides was a recently held interview with an architect of the Flemish separatist movement associated with the European populist Right, Urbain Decat. In the 1960s, at the Free University of Brussels, he belonged to the Freudian-Marxist New Left; a secondary school teacher, he now insists that his present political engagement has nothing to do with giving up Marxist thought. It is the "vulgar Marxism" now called political correctness that Decat wishes to oppose, as an advocate of Flemish independence. He expresses concern about "a Marxist vulgate that has suffocated the true flower of Marxism," namely Marx's attempt to rescue individuals and communities from consumerism and depersonalizing universalism. For this Flemish populist, political correctness is the "end of critical discourse," imposed for the purpose of advancing a homogenizing global agenda. Such a plan is thought to be especially welcome to the leaders of a world consumer economy, who put up with intellectual totalitarians to create wider demand for their products and services.[42] Although this analysis of vulgar Marxists and of a consumer economy makes overly broad generalizations, it is remarkable nonetheless for what Decat brings together: a worldview combining the New Left Marxism of the 1960s with a commitment to the populist Right. The way for such a fusion was opened when the social Left took its recent fateful turn, toward what is mistakenly imagined to be the right. What actually occurred was that the Left turned in a multicultural direction, toward the "Marxist vulgate" of political correctness.

An implicit argument that runs through this text and might be raised at this point is that the popular receptiveness to multicultural conditioning is not reducible to material incentives. Although some minorities benefit from the multicultural spoils system, most of the majority populations in Western countries do not. In fact they see themselves as being collectively humiliated, for example, when Ford CEO Jacques Nasser complained to managerial subordinates in 2000 about "not liking the sea of white faces in the audience." In a similar vein, Ford's vice president for product development, Richard Parry-Jones, let it be known to his employees that "we are trapped in a mono-cultural environment that is dominated by old white males." Such remarks were accompanied by a campaign to hire and promote nonwhites and females that brought praise from *Fortune* magazine.[43]

Although Ford practices what one columnist properly identifies as "anti-white bigotry," which led eventually to a legal suit, in most cases such bigotry is amply tolerated.[44] Most of those who go along with it have been cowed, coaxed, or persuaded into accepting multicultural ideology. Nor is it necessary to assume that they do so because material circumstances are sufficiently good to allow them to ignore coercive social policies. One may argue from the opposite side just as well. White Christian majority populations view their material well-being as having an indissoluble connection to the present managerial state whose legitimacy is intertwined with the multicultural ideology it teaches. Thus the recent energy crisis in California did not lead to a backlash against the influx of Latin American immigrants, including illegal ones, whom the administration of Governor Gray Davis claims to welcome. The national and state reactions were directed overwhelmingly against energy producers, whom the public thought the federal administration should force to provide cheaper services. Unlike ten years earlier, though perhaps much has changed since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, opposition to the state's transformational immigration policy has grown weaker and less vocal. Thus the public by and large does not blame the present energy crisis on the flow of low-skilled immigrants from Central America. It calls on the state and federal governments to exercise further power by punishing profit-driven enterprises.[45]

The electoral success of Tony Blair in the British parliamentary elections on June 7, 2001, further confirms the rise of multicultural ideology. *Der Spiegel* sketches a dismaying picture of the new multicultural Britain, with almost 4 million nonwhites arrived from Asia, Africa, and the West Indies, mostly in the last twenty years, with escalating interracial violence, and large pockets of unemployed Third World families settled in the English Midlands.[46] An outbreak of violence in Oldham, near Manchester, involving more than five hundred rampaging Asian youths, about a week before the election, seemed to create a crisis for Blair and his minister of the interior Jack Straw, who had pursued an immigration-friendly course together with restrictions placed on "inciting" speech against minorities. Despite this threat of an electoral disaster, apparently intensified by the eleventh-hour strategy of the rival Conservatives who denounced him as "a traitor to his nation," Blair achieved an electoral sweep. Forty-four percent of the

voters supported him and his explicitly multicultural party, against the Conservatives and other parliamentary contenders.

Der Spiegel attributes this trend to the fact that, despite underclass despair, "the majority of the British have never had it so good." But there is no close correlation between Blair's being prime minister in the last five years and an alleged wave of British prosperity. Although the growth rate for GDP between the years 1982 and 2000 was 54 percent for the United Kingdom, as opposed to 43 percent for Germany and 40 percent for France, much of that growth occurred in the eighties and early nineties, under Conservative governments.[47] From the midnineties onward, tax rates, particularly on real estate, have risen sharply in England, while British public services have seriously declined, partly under the impact of immigration. It may therefore be inaccurate to ascribe Blair's popularity to material successes, which were taking place even more noticeably before he arrived on the scene. Like Britney Spears, the Spice Girls, and other celebrities who campaigned for him and his vision, it may be that most English voters believe in the ideology Blair personifies.

Three major studies have recently appeared dealing with the cultural and moral revolution that has taken place in England during the last thirty years. Roger Scruton's *England: An Elegy*, Peter Hitchens's *The Abolition of Britain: From Winston Churchill to Princess Diana*, and John Laughland's *The Tainted Source* all treat the multicultural takeover of English society and explore the pivotal roles played by churches, the state, large corporations, the media, and educational institutions in bringing about this change. Two related studies dealing mostly with France and the breakdown of the family and diminishing natality, are by banker-economist Yves-Marie Laulan. *Les nations suicidaires* and *Pour la survie du monde occidental* examine the constellation of cultural variables together with the bloating of the French administrative state that have contributed to the erosion of bourgeois society and the destruction of French national identity.[48] It is simply a gross oversimplification to treat the acceptance of cultural innovation undertaken by the state, at the cost of established liberties and social custom, as the price people are willing to pay for their prosperity. What is thereby overlooked is the state's success in displacing and replacing an entire way of life.

1. See, for example, Morton Kondracke, “The Democracy Gang,” *New Republic*, November 6, 1989, 30; Ben Wattenberg, “Heading back toward Isolation,” *Washington Times*, September 27, 1989, F1; Charles Krauthammer, “Is History History?” and “The Conservative Crackup,” *Washington Post*, August 15 and 20, 1989; and Paul Gottfried, “At Sea with the Global Democrats,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 19, 1989, A20.

2. See Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *National Interest* 16 (summer 1989): 4; and Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 289–329; often ignored by the reviewers is a pessimistic Nietzschean note in the latter work that was missing from Fukuyama’s essay of 1989.

3. George Gilder, review of *The End of History*, by Francis Fukuyama, *Washington Post Book World*, January 12, 1992, 4.

4. See Franklin Hugh Adler, *Italian Industrialists from Liberalism to Fascism: The Political Development of the Italian Bourgeoisie, 1906–1934* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); and Paul Gottfried, review of this book in *Telos* 107 (spring 1996): 96–100.

5. Raymond Aron, *The Industrial Society: Three Essays on Ideology and Development* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), 152.

6. These comparisons of public to private employment in France can be found in *Les Comptes des services en 1997* (Paris: Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques, 1998). See also *The OECD Job Study, Part 1: Labor Market Trends and Underlying Forces of Changes* (Washington, D.C.: OECD, 1999), especially 62–64.

7. These figures are from the appendix to *Statistiques de recettes publiques des pays membres de l’OCOE* (Paris: OCOE, 1983).

8. See the chart in *Statistique Canada: Comptes Economiques Provinciaux* (Ottawa: Commission de Capitale Nationale, 1983).

9. This supposed acceptance of neoclassical economic thinking on the Left is a subject for discussion in A. Giddens, *Beyond Right and Left: The Future of Radicalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Pierre Rosanvallon, *La nouvelle question sociale* (Paris: Seuil, 1995); and Donald Clark Hodges, *America’s New Social Order* (Brockfield, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 1988).

10. Ben Wattenberg, “Even the Left Can Learn,” *New York Post*, April 30, 1999, 37.

11. Bo Rothstein, *Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and the review of this work by Paul Gottfried in *Contemporary Justice Review* 4, no. 2 (2001): 239–43.

12. Rothstein, *Just Institutions Matter*, 48–49; Leif Lewin, *Planhusallningsdebatten* (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1970), 77.

13. Neil MacCormick, “Jurisprudence, Democracy, and the Death of the Weimar Republic,” *Texas Law Review* 77 (1999): 1095–97. While MacCormick does make the point being ascribed to him, the rest of his essay, on Weimar German jurisprudence, indicates his reservations about a traditionalist view of political society. More expansive treatments of the ties between individual self-actualization and administrative centralization are Panajotis Kondylis, *Konservatismus: Geschichtlicher Gehalt und Untergang* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1986); Sandro Chignola, *Società e costituzione: Teologia e politica nel sistema di Bonald* (Milan: Angela, 1993); and Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind*, 7th ed. (Chicago: Regnery, 1986), especially 12–64.

14. Geoffrey Wheatcroft, “Annus memorabilis,” *Prospect*, January 1998, 25.

15. John Judis, “Saving the World,” *New Republic*, May 24, 1999, 6; see also Elliot Abrams, “Is There a ‘Third Way’?” *Commentary* 107 (April 1999), 5, 17; and Tod Lindberg, “Why the ‘Third Way’ Is Winning,” *Wall Street Journal*, May 26, 1999, A22.

16. See *Economic Freedom of the World, 1975–1995*, comp. James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, and Walter Block (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 1996), 93; and *OECD Economic Surveys, 1998: United Kingdom*.

17. See *Les comptes des services en 1997;* and *OECD Economic Surveys, 1998*.

18. *Economic Freedom of the World, 1975–1995*, 12–41, 258.

19. Ibid., 277–79.

20. For the original text of the Congressional act and the plan of implementation, see “Implementation of New Legislation: Family Preservation and Support Services” (1994), available upon request from U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. An altogether unimaginative and indeed slovenly call for such legislation is J. Barthel’s *For Children’s Sake: The Promise of Family Preservation Services* (New York: Edna McConnell Clark Foundation, 1992).

21. See the comments of Robert Holland in “Orwellian Intrusion into Home and Family,” *Washington Times*, March 31, 1999, A19.

22. Michael S. Greve, *Real Federalism: Why It Matters, How It Could Happen* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1999), 62–78.

23. As late as 1932, in *Gemeinwirtschaft: Untersuchungen über den Sozialismus* (1932; reprint, Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1981), classical liberal economist Ludwig von Mises emphasized the necessary connection between a socialist economy and nationalization of the means of production. But in his earlier (1927), extended defense of the liberal tradition, *Liberalismus* (Sankt Augustin: Akademia Verlag, 1993), Mises took a different tack when he made the observation: “It is not decisive whether socialism is achieved through the formal transfer of productive forces to the state; or whether property remains formally with private owners and socialization consists of requiring those who keep productive forces in their hands to act according to the instructions of the state” (65).

24. Among the works praising the explosive effects of the democratic capitalist revolution are Jean-Marie Benoist, *Une certaine idée de l’Europe* (Paris: Cercles Universitaires, 1979); Guy Sorman, *La révolution conservatrice américaine* (Paris: A. Fayard, 1983); George Gilder, *The Spirit of Enterprise* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); Michael Novak, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982); and Ben J. Wattenberg, *The First Universal Nation: Leading Indicators and Ideas about the Surge of America in the 1990s* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

25. See the excerpt in *American Enterprise* 11, no. 3 (April/May 2000): 10.

26. Novak perceives no semantic contradictions when he speaks about the American model of “social welfare democratic capitalism” in *Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, 11–13.

27. Virginia Postrel, *The Future and Its Enemies: The Growing Conflict over Creativity, Enterprise, and Progress* (New York: Free Press, 1999); and Alan Wolfe, review of *The Future and Its Enemies*, by Virginia Postrel, *New Republic*, June 7, 1999, 41.

28. Postrel, *Future and Its Enemies*, 204, 21; see also J. J. Miller, “Rhetorical Gore,” *National Review*, November 23, 1998, 25–26.

One particularly revealing remark about the “dynamists” and their defense of democratic capitalism is attributed to Postrel’s friend, Republican columnist James K. Glassman. When asked in an interview whether he was advocating conservatism, Glassman retorted: “This is

not conservatism. It's the opposite of conservatism. There's nothing I'm trying to conserve at all" (*Future and Its Enemies*, 41).

29. See Madsen Pirie's comments in "Britain: How New? How Labour?" *The World and I*, May 1999, 145. The argument about the convergence of Left and Right is made incisively by Christopher Lasch in "The Obsolescence of Left and Right," *New Oxford Review* 56 (April 1989): 6–15; and in Paul Piccone's "The Crisis of American Conservatism," *Telos* 74 (winter 1987–1988): 3–29.

30. Pierre Bordieu, "Pour un mouvement social européen," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 2, 1999, 16.

31. Ibid.; see also Ignacio Panther Ramonet, "Nouvel ordre global," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 2, 1999, 1; and Reinhard Bispinck and Thorsten Schulten, "Gewerkschaften zwischen Konkurrenz and Solidarität," *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Praxis* 2 (1999): 179.

32. *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 2, 1999, 1, 16–17; for the conflict in aims between the old and new syndicalisms, see "Organisation internationale du travail," *World Labour Report* (Washington, D.C.: International Labour Organization, 1998). For an accurate statement about the sentiments of American organized labor concerning the 1924 Immigration Act, see Roy Garis, *Immigration Restriction* (New York: Macmillan, 1925); and on the connection between unionism and early Latin fascism, see Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite Révolutionnaire* (Paris: Seuil, 1989), particularly 245–82.

33. Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "Quando i ceti medi bocciano la sinistra," *Corriere della Sera*, July 4, 1999, 1.

34. Ibid., 11.

35. Annie Kriegel, *The French Communists: Profile of a People*, trans. Elaine P. Halperin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

36. *Washington Post*, September 9, 1995, A19.

37. Ibid., A1, 2, 3; for a discussion of Italian obligations to the European Union, see *OECD Economic Surveys, 1998: Italy* 1 (Washington, D.C.: OECD, 1999): 62–63.

38. See the published colloquium, *Inégalité sociale et les mécanismes du pouvoir*, directed by Annette Dussault and Victor Piché (Quebec City: Presse de l'Université de Québec, 1985), 262, 260.

39. For a detailed brief on the New Labour, which might have been better without the purple prose, see Hal Colebatch's *Blair's Britain* (London: Claridge Press, 1999). For sympathetic treatments of the same subject, see Tony Blair, *My Vision of a Young Country* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997); "The United Kingdom Overhaul," *New York Times*, May 9, 1999, A14; and "The Ideology of New Labour," *Political Quarterly* 170 (January–March 1999): 42. For a critical perspective on the new globalist idealism, Gottfried, "At Sea."

40. Pirie, "Britain," 36–41; see also S. Reid, "Major Upset," *American Spectator*, June 30, 1997, 86; for the difficulty encountered by Conservative Party leader William Hague in distinguishing himself from the opposition, see *Economist*, January 23, 1999, 54. An enlightening exception to the commentaries about Blair that have come from establishment conservative journals is John O'Sullivan's appraisal, "New Labour's Tony Blair," *National Review*, May 19, 1997, 8. For a counterintuitive endorsement of "Blair's government as a continuation of Margaret Thatcher's," see Catholic conservative author Paul Johnson in *Daily Mail*, March 27, 1998. The collapse of Left and Right into a global democratic capitalist celebration of the present age is a topic that has attracted more analytic interest in Europe than it has in the United States. See, for example, Alessandro Campi and Ambrogio Santambrogio,

eds., *Destra/Sinistra: Storia e fenomenologia di una dicotomia politica* (Rome: Pellicani Editore, 1997); and E. Schweisguth, *Droite-gauche: Un clivage dépassé* (Paris: Documentation Française, 1994). For a defense of the conventional ideological taxonomy, from a social democratic perspective, see Norbert Bobbio, *Destra e sinistra: Ragioni e significati di una distinzione politica* (Rome: Donzelli, 1995).

41. For examinations of the Nader candidacy that recognize its cross-ideological character, see the editorial, "Ralph Nader and the Stupidity of the Left," *New Republic*, November 6, 2000, 11; William Safire, "The Protest Vote," *New York Times*, October 30, 2000, A23; and Matthew Rees, "Put Away Your Pitchfork," *Weekly Standard*, November 13, 2000, 18.

42. The text of this interview with Urbain Decat, which took place on October 15, 2000 (apparently in French), was made available to the author by the interviewer, Robert Steuckers. A Francophone Fleming and multilingual commentator on the European populist Right, Steuckers has interviewed the leading figures of this movement.

43. Mark Truby, "Diversity Gives Ford a New Look," *Detroit News*, August 20, 2000, A11.

44. *Sam Francis Weekly Column*, June 4, 2001, www.samfrancis.net.

45. The Gallup News Service (May 30, 2001) indicates that 75 percent of Californians blame the president and the energy-producers for the energy crisis affecting their state. Although other Americans are less hostile to these particular targets of attack, they are not especially critical of the economic policies being pursued by the California state government. Anxieties arising from uncontrolled immigration from Mexico and the growing numbers of illegal immigrants in Southern California, both issues reflected in California politics of the midnineties, have barely surfaced in the current discussions about energy sources. Concerns about immigration, before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, seemed more muted than they had been in the nineties, although the problems in California centered on limited energy resources continue to exist.

John Lukacs, in an interview with the *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 7, 2001, H7, states an underlying argument of this book when he explains: "In a mass democratic age, all material factors are secondary, are consequences. It's the very opposite of Marx but also the opposite of Adam Smith. I think that the most important thing is what people think and what they believe." What Lukacs suggests as being "the most important thing" is precisely what drives the political consciousness of the current mass democratic age.

46. *Der Spiegel*, June 4, 2001, 144–46.

47. Peter Hitchens, "Gravedigger's Eager Labor," *Washington Times*, June 11, 2001, A17.

48. Roger Scruton, *England: An Elegy* (London: Chatto and Windus, 2000); Peter Hitchens, *The Abolition of Britain: From Winston Churchill to Princess Diana* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000); John Laughland, *The Tainted Source: The Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea* (London: Trafalgar Square, 2000); Yves-Marie Laulan, *Les nations suicidaires* (Paris: François-Xavier de Guibert, 1998); and Yves-Marie Laulan, *Pour la survie du monde occidental* (Paris: Le cherche midi éditeur, 2001). A related but much shorter text was published by the Italian longtime radical leftist Ida Magli, "Perchè dovremmo apprendere il cartello 'tutto esaurito,'" in *Il Giornale*, December 16, 2000.

2

Religious Foundations of the Managerial Therapeutic State

The Waning Mainline

An analysis of the managerial state and its work of social reconstruction would be inadequate without looking at a particular variable. Without consideration of liberal Protestantism, it would be hard to form an adequate picture of the cultural foundations of modern administration. Such an assertion should be qualified by stating the obvious, that some countries with enormous welfare states like Belgium, Austria, and France are overwhelmingly Catholic (at least in terms of their confessional affiliation). Furthermore, non-Protestant voters in the United States, Canada, and England vote disproportionately for political candidates who promise more, not less, public administration. Finally, in such preponderantly Protestant countries as the United States and Canada, Protestants are usually found on the center-right of what passes for the political spectrum.

In a study of liberal Protestantism in the United States, *The Empty Church*, Thomas C. Reeves suggests that the Protestant mainline has become self-destructive. Because of an association with fashionable social views and disagreeable liturgical innovation, self-styled Protestant progressives are losing their base of support. Those seeking spiritual and doctrinal certainty are turning away from a deformed Christianity, toward traditional forms of worship and belief. *The Yearbooks of American and Canadian Churches*, published annually by the National Council of Churches since the 1950s, reveals declining memberships and dwindling financial resources among mainline (mostly liberal) Protestant denominations. A tendency evident since the 1950s, by the 1990s it had become, to all appearances, catastrophic. Communicants of the American Baptist Church in the United States (as

opposed to the more conservative Southern Baptists) had shrunk from a figure of over 2 million in the early sixties to 1.5 million. In about the same time frame, the American Episcopal Church, the Presbyterian Church (United States), the United Church of Christ, and the United Methodists had all lost between a third and a fifth of their membership, which had fallen respectively to 1.6 million, 2.7 million, 1.5 million, and 8.5 million. Almost one half of the children of churched Presbyterians had stopped attending services; by 1983 nearly one half of mainliners were at least fifty years of age. The money available for staffing mainline congregations is increasingly drying up, and most mainline denominations have neither the interest nor the resources for overseas missions. More and more of the 58 percent of the American population consisting of churched Protestants are joining Fundamentalist and Evangelical denominations. The conservative Southern Baptist communion have 16 million members, of which the vast majority are under age fifty. In 1985 an extensive survey of the United Church of Christ (formed out of the Congregational, Evangelical, and Reformed Churches) revealed that most communicants found nothing distinctive theologically or morally about their denomination. The closest they could come to defining a distinctive identity was by referring to general American values.[1]

Equally alarming has been the decline of the Protestant work and education ethic in American Protestantism, and in the mainline churches in particular. In a devastating critique of Protestant seminaries, Paul Wilkes documents the replacement of traditional theological and classical training in Protestant divinity schools by rote invectives about “race, sex and class oppression.” Seminarians can get by without acquiring what had once been requisite learning for their vocation; meanwhile, Yale, Harvard, and Princeton Divinity Schools have centered their training on combating sexism, homophobia, and misogyny.[2] Reeves cites a New Testament professor at Protestant Episcopal Theological Seminary in Virginia who complained of the need to combat in her classes “not only biblical illiteracy but general illiteracy.” Yale University Divinity School professor Christopher R. Seitz observes that his students “don’t know the names of half of the books of the bible, whether Calvin lived before or after Augustine, what it means to say that Christ descended to the dead or acted ‘in accordance with the Scriptures.’”[3]

Underscoring the mainline Protestant decline has been the relative fall of Protestant denominations from the ranks of American high achievers. According to an extensive study by the University of Chicago's National Opinion Research Center concerning the ethnic and religious backgrounds of American whites, Episcopalians, the highest WASP group achievers, rate sixth, with the Presbyterians right behind them, in educational advancement and family income. Both Protestant groups, long viewed as socially successful, now trail behind Ashkenazic Jews and Irish, Italian, German, and Polish Catholics when measured by current achievement levels. Theological and moral mushiness, suggest some critics, is doing more than damaging the seminary training of liberalized Protestants.[4]

Although these observations are correct, neither individually nor together do they gainsay what is being argued. Catholic ethnics, as minorities, have generally positioned themselves to the left of majority populations. This tendency is even more dramatically apparent for American, Canadian, and European Jews, who combine strong nationalist feelings for their own group and for Israel with the advocacy of open borders, alternative lifestyles, and extreme pluralism for their host countries. This Jewish double standard, abundantly documented by cultural historian and clinical psychologist Kevin MacDonald, has aroused considerable controversy. But a double standard of the kind MacDonald notes exists outside of Jewish communities as well. Southern Italian immigrants vote overwhelmingly for center-left parties in Canada but give enthusiastic receptions to Italian right-wing politicians like Gianfranco Fini of the Alleanza Nazionale. Irish Catholics in England vote heavily for the Labour Party but give no indication of transferring these leftist attachments to the Irish Republic. Indeed many are devout, practicing Catholics, who, like Italian Canadians, live in patriarchal households with extended families. Such groups, though not oppressed by the majority populations, continue to view themselves as living in someone else's society. Their political efforts therefore go toward neutralizing the cultural and institutional particularities associated with the majority out-group.[5]

Nor is it especially noteworthy that Catholic countries have well-developed welfare states. Some such countries, like Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and Austria, have developed gargantuan public sectors that continue to grow. Arguably Catholic societies are especially prone

to such arrangements, seeing that Catholic social teachings have traditionally condemned "liberal" economics and advocated "just prices" and other anticapitalist concepts. More than most nineteenth-century Protestant theologians, Catholic social thinkers and churchmen, like Pope Leo XIII, had been sympathetic to labor movements and feared the disintegrating effects of a modern industrial society. This has been chalked up by some to the Church's credit, though others, from Max Weber to "democratic capitalist" Catholic Michael Novak, have held that Catholics have had a long row to hoe, because of persistent neomedieval social attitudes hardened into moral teachings.[6]

It might be asked whether the older Catholic corporatist or antimodernist view of the state contributed decisively to contemporary managerial regimes. The operative term is *decisively*, since it is not being stated that older forms of collectivism had no influence whatever upon later political developments, that is, by inculcating submission to administrative authority. More difficult to show in this case, however, is that *A* leads to *B*, unless a critical variable is introduced: namely, that Catholic political thinking and cultures that are incompatible with classical liberal constitutional and economic arrangements shaped managerial-therapeutic regimes. This assumption, however, exaggerates a variable that seems only remotely related to the situation being studied.

But even granting, all things being equal, a Catholic indisposition to the free market, it may be necessary to distinguish between traditional Catholic attitudes toward work and profit and a managerial-therapeutic ethos. Exemplifying this distinction is the striking contrast between Quebec in the thirties, forties, and fifties and the same French Catholic province today. Between 1936 and 1959, Quebec lay under the iron hand of its premier Maurice Duplessis and his clericalist, initially reform-minded Union Nationale. Provincial subsidies were given to families with children, and social benefits were made available to workers. At the same time, divorces and (a fortiori) abortions were difficult to obtain. Churchmen enjoyed immense respect, and tight censorship of the arts and public morals was a continuing aspect of social life.[7] Against this old-fashioned Catholic welfare state, similar to what existed until recently in Ireland, one might place the government of what by now is only a residually Catholic Quebec. In this liberalized Quebec, Catholic

parental control of the family has given way to social workers and social administrators who have the kind of influence over family relations there that the public sector does in the United States. The provincial government responds readily to feminist and gay demands to be protected against discrimination and has moved toward making education into a tool for instilling sensitivity.[8]

In *The First Universal Nation*, Ben Wattenberg celebrates the global popularity of Americans in literary, academic, artistic, and musical endeavors. Unlike Russia, Japan, and other military or economic powers, observes Wattenberg, the United States is "the most culturally potent nation in the world."[9] America, for example, exports 25 times as many films and T.V. programs as it imports. American political and religious fashions are widely adopted in other literate societies; not since the Roman Empire has such a truly imperial culture flourished. Wattenberg is right on this score, though his attempt to make qualitative judgments about American cultural products is highly questionable. Our European critics may have a point about the convergence of staggering wealth and technological resources with contempt for local traditions as foundational for an exportable American culture.

But there is an American legacy that European states and European citizens have embraced with surprisingly little complaint. Although a possible source of cultural conflict, it has nonetheless established itself in England, Germany, and other parts of Western and Central Europe as a natural progression of universal democracy. This is the grafting on to administrative states of therapeutic and punitive agencies for forming social consciousness and chastising those with defective sensitivity. In Germany such indoctrination was not hard to explain after the Second World War. The attribution to the German people of sole responsibility for Nazi tyranny and the insistence by the occupying Allied forces that Germans adopt a "militantly democratic" government necessitated a process of mass reeducation. From the creation of a Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and a federal court that shields the German Constitution against "undemocratic enemies," to the use of public learning and government-subsidized culture to combat German nationalism and to inculcate "human rights," postwar Germans had reconstruction thrust upon them. Although its primary targets shifted in the seventies, from Communist revolutionaries to conservative

nationalists and Holocaust-deniers, German censors of “undemocratic” speech and writing can always fall back for credibility on the Nazi past.[10]

It should therefore not be entirely surprising that every year about eight thousand German journalists and scholars are tried by the government in courts for *“Volksvehetzung”* (inciting the public) against the democratic foundations of the German constitution. Thousands have been put into jail for this offense, so that the *New York Times* (October 11, 1998), while exhorting vigilance against “rightwing extremism,” voiced alarm about treating “truth-seeking journalists as common criminals.” More Germans are now languishing in prison for expressing (unprogressive or insensitive) opinions than there were in East Germany before the fall of the Communist regime.[11]

The Politics of Remorse

These painful efforts at protecting democratic sentiments base themselves on what is seen as the especially malignant character of the German nationalist Right. They are justified as attempts to isolate those attitudes that are said to have culminated in Nazi war crimes. Given Germany’s recent sad history and the tendency of the mass media throughout the West to focus on “extreme nationalists” in Germany’s political life, one can understand this extravagant reaction to unauthorized opinions. Less explainable is the similar path embarked on by the British government, with only scattered popular objections. Without a Nazi past to atone for or a noteworthy history of black slavery, the British nonetheless have declared war against the scourge of prejudice directed against racial minorities that have immigrated to England.

In a study of the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968, and 1976 and of the Commission for Racial Equality created by these acts, Ray Honeyford explores how the British government came to imitate the crusade against discrimination then being waged across the Atlantic. (In due course, Canada, Australia, and other Anglophone countries would do exactly the same.) By now the commission and those associated with it are authorized to remove books from libraries and schools (which rarely protest) and to prefer criminal charges against authors or publishers, when offense is thought to be given to an ethnic

or racial group (excluding in practice white European Christians).[12] Honeyford provides an exhaustive discussion of the commission's powers and practices, while noting that the minorities who came to England did so to seek their fortunes.

When the British Nationality Act of 1948 made all citizens of the Empire into citizens of the mother country, non-Western immigrants began streaming into English cities. Only in 1952, when the Immigration Act set limits on the previous open-door policy, did the numbers of immigrants diminish. By then tens of thousands of West Indian immigrants had settled on the East side of London, producing an increase in violent crime and a subsequent white backlash. Thereafter a widely publicized pressure group on the multicultural Left, the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD), arose to put force into the 1965 Race Relations Act, which criminalizes discriminatory publications. The Race Relations Act of 1976 went even further to satisfy CARD. It bans communications revealing ethnic prejudice, even those not likely to spark public disorder. The same act calls for proportionate racial outcomes in hiring situations (a bow in the direction of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission then functioning in the United States) and authorizes the Commission for Racial Equality to look for hurtful language directed against racial minorities. In response to the act's Provision 70, dealing with incitement, a future Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, laments that abusive language had been separated from the intention to abet riotous disorder. This goes against a fundamental principle of English common law, "that a crime should consist of two elements: first, there must be a prohibited act, and then there should be a state of mind. Quite deliberately the Government has created in this new clause an indictable offense in which the mental element is removed altogether."[13]

Hailsham is half right on this point. Although the 1976 act did not pay the attention required by common law to the mental state of the presumed offender, it did take into account a "state of mind." The intention on which it focused was moral purity, as inward separation on the part of the white Christian majority from what are thought to be bigoted attitudes. Honeyford emphasizes the social "guilt" abounding in his country, and the effectiveness of CARD in appealing to a widely shared sense of contrition. He also notes the unsettling definition of "racial minority" that came from the English High Court when the 1976

Race Relations Act was challenged: It excludes religion, biology, and even common usage, but plays up “distinctness” in “cultural tradition” and “social customs and manners”—or having been “conquered” or “oppressed.” The majority population was being put on notice that any “ethnic” or “racial” group conspicuously different from itself or having once been victimized has to be accorded special treatment. Failure to conform to this conduct would be treated as a criminal offense.[14]

Far less interesting than why minorities looking for a leg up on other groups or distrusting majority populations support such controls is why majority societies accept them. Such acceptance has not been the historical rule. Even relatively tolerant Anglo-American peoples until recently did not behave with deference toward those recently arrived and culturally alien. Immigrants were accepted or discouraged from coming, depending on economic needs, and depending on whether they could be fitted into an existing society. The desperate efforts now being made by Western countries, particularly by Protestant ones, to raise themselves morally by receiving populations entirely “distinct” from themselves is not a continuation of older attitudes toward immigration. It is in fact a novum, like the eagerness of Western governments and the media to accept collective blame for racial and ethnic callousness and for the lack of social concern.

The relevant political-moral attitude is an ostentatious guilt about the historical past that the majority society is supposed to exhibit. This guilt is apparent whether one looks at Germans erecting Holocaust monuments to real Jewish victims, or to smaller, less certifiable numbers of victimized gay men, or to lesbian nonvictims. The same cultural trend seems to be at work when American Protestant organizations launch expiatory marches across Europe and the Middle East seeking to apologize to descendants of Muslim and Jewish victims of the Crusades.[15] The most obvious example of this guilt is the linkage made by German politicians, clergy, and journalists, between Germany’s present regime and expiation for the Nazi and (sometimes) German Imperial past. As formulated most tellingly by Social Democratic academic commentator Theodor Eschenburg in 1959: “The recognition of the indisputable and sole guilt of Hitler is indeed the basis for the entire politics of the Federal Republic.” Or, put even more portentously by judge and legal scholar Rudolf Wassermann in 1994: “He who denies the truth about Nazi extermination camps threatens the

very foundations upon which the German Federal Republic is erected."[16]

One highly respected German feminist theologian, Dorothee Sölle, insists that German Christians should now devote themselves to seeking absolution before the world for Nazi crimes. Sölle mocks those Christian traditionalists who "are so ideologically isolated that a happening like Auschwitz does not cause them to alter their [theological] position."[17] The alternative to the despair produced by a sinful disposition is "to come to terms with how we are entangled in the [political-economic] structure, how we profit from the structure, how we conform to the introverted names that we regard as self-evident." Sölle urges her countrymen to "assume guilt for political sin," which they can expiate by embracing revolution against the received authority structure.[18] This structure that decency requires us to repair is identified with the social past but not with the socialist regime, founded on the task of national penance, that Sölle is proposing.

Organizers of "Weimar 1999," according to the *Economist*, seized upon the 250th anniversary of the birth of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe to request federal and provincial assistance. This aid was then used to showcase not so much the medieval Thuringian town, where Goethe lived as a princely advisor, as the World War II concentration camp at Buchenwald, five miles away. Exhibitions of the works and effects of Goethe and Schiller (another former resident of Weimar) were interspersed with reminders of the Nazi death camp nearby, including samples of the hair of Nazi victims. Essential to these proceedings were what turned out to be the halting dialogues arranged between former camp inmates and German schoolchildren. In the new Germany, such a learning experience has come to characterize democratic culture and civic patriotism. Assessing recent German assaults on historical, genetic, and anthropological research, Claus Nordbruch concludes that facticity is a matter of little concern for his countrymen. Far more crucial to the custodians of political correctness is the maintenance of a contrite mood that serves social reform.[19] This priority operates equally in the Anglophone world, where "sensitivity" often has greater value than truth claims. Sensitivity requires that members of the majority society give special consideration to the self-esteem of those considered as disadvantaged or victimized. In the United States hate crime legislation is widely accepted, on the explicit

assumption that a much higher percentage of interracial violence originates among whites and Asians than among blacks. The facts, as reported by Justice Department statistics, are exactly the reverse: Black males are at least six times as likely as white or Asian males to engage in interracial violence, a figure close to the one given for interracial crime in England.[20]

Why then does the majority population accept this easily refutable reporting of interracial violence? From people's unguarded comments it seems that they do understand the racially disproportionate sources of violent crime committed in the United States. Perhaps Americans pretend not to see this reality for the same reason that Ralph Reed, of the Christian Coalition, agreed to charges by Abraham Foxman, of the Anti-Defamation League, that American Christians were not sufficiently sorry about the history of Christian anti-Semitism. Reed remarked in particular upon the failure of American Christians to come to terms with either the Spanish Inquisition or the Holocaust.[21] Such a coming-to-terms by a "conservative" Christian and descendant of Anglo-American Protestant dissenters, has nothing to do with a specific blame. It shows that the politics of atonement has spilled over to the American Christian Right, the side of the religious spectrum where one might think it would be hardest to find. Note also the insistence by Christian conservative Republican hopeful Gary Bauer that as president he would exclude from consideration for a Supreme Court nomination "first of all anyone who is a bigot." The bigotry that Bauer deplores is exclusively the white Christian kind, seeing that the prejudice of minorities is now widely viewed as reactive.[22]

A transformation of the self-image of the majority population would have had to take place in order for the therapeutic state to have reached its present strength. This change can be traced to, among other things, an altered religious consciousness that has affected Protestant majorities in the United States and in other Anglophone countries. For the sake of clarification, it may be helpful to distinguish those past conflicts among American Protestants from what is going on now. As Sydney Ahlstrom and George M. Marsden show, stormy and divisive confrontations were an integral part of the American Protestant past, that is, between antirationalist and Enlightenment Christians, and between those who accepted and rejected Evolution, biblical criticism, and Christian socialism. These Protestant lines of division convulsed

the American cultural landscape for almost two centuries. Yet it is incorrect to regard what today passes for liberal Protestantism as the mere distillation of earlier conflicts between the forces and opponents of scientific modernity. Unlike the Protestant liberals of the nineteenth century, their supposed present-day counterparts are not leading "Protestant churches into the world of modern science scholarship, philosophy, and global knowledge." Our own modernists are not imitating the Protestant champions of Charles Darwin who, according to Marsden, attacked the older Protestant "interrelationship of faith, science, the Bible, morality, and civilization."[23] In seminaries and at conferences, Protestant liberals depict St. Paul as a repressed homosexual, reformulate biblical language to remove sexist impressions, and deliver invectives against the Christian West for offenses against the rest of humanity.

Now it is possible to explain these practices in the manner of Leonard R. Klein, a contributor to *First Things*, by focusing on a liberal "bureaucratic inner circle" that has been allowed to swallow up mainstream Lutheranism. The "dysfunctional politician of church culture empowers the most aggressive," and, given "a prior decay of theological coherence," Lutherans and other Protestants simply go with the flow.[24] But would this "dysfunctional politeness" continue to operate if other groups of willful people tried to take over church congregations and synods, say white racists or self-declared patriarchs? Would the Lutheran rank and file submit to any inner circle—or must it be one whose moral authority it is already disposed to accept?

Is the liberal Protestantism that the outer circle accepts, moreover, derived from what liberal Protestants believed in earlier times? Today's Protestant liberals are not crusading, after all, for scientific methods and, outside of ritualized quarrels with creationists, have no burning interest in evolutionary biology. Protestant liberals are now among those who resist genetically based thinking, or indeed anything carrying a social evolutionary spin.[25] It may be equally an exaggeration to view Christian liberals as "consumer Christians," in the manner of conservative Catholic psychologist Paul C. Vitz. If liberal Protestant clergy and their parishioners were only self-indulgent hedonists, asserting "the divine right of the consumer to choose as he or she pleases," why do they depict themselves or allow themselves to be generically depicted as racists, sexists, and homophobes?[26]

The American Jewish involvement with the Holocaust from the late sixties onward is a theme historian Peter Novick treats quite minutely in *The Holocaust in American Life*. Here Novick elaborates on the heavy-duty role of the American Jewish preoccupation with Jewish suffering. Assuring American Jewish support for Israel by invoking the fate of European Jewry, maintaining tribal solidarity among a group that is intermarrying, and making American gentiles willing to support what are perceived Jewish interests are some of the advantages Novick sees as tied up with the focus on the Nazi catastrophe.[27]

Even more intriguing is to speculate on the reasons for this interest in a European event among American Christians. For the Christian Right, the Holocaust serves as an object lesson for what happens when traditional morality is undermined. Thus the Religious Right emphasizes the impiety of the "pagan" Nazis who tormented and killed undesirable Christians as well as Jews. For the Left, including the Christian Left, Nazism exemplifies the danger of reactionary institutions and personalities that have not been sufficiently tamed. The way to contain these explosive right-wing forces, it is stressed, is by resocializing people through public instruction and the banning of "hate."

According to Novick's (Nietzschean) observation, "the Holocaust fits into a religious tradition that has made an implement of agony and death its primary symbol." Novick contrasts this to a Jewish culture that has been "sharply critical of endowing agony and death with religious significance."[28] The contrast may be starker yet. Often the Jewish emphasis on righteous victims has been self-pitying and, in some cases, even manipulative, whereas for Christians the invocation of the suffering just provides an occasion for collective atonement. This has not been the case, however, with all Christians everywhere. In the past, American Protestants saw themselves, by analogy to the Israelites, as a covenanted people inhabiting a chosen land. This Protestant Old Testament Christianity, once characteristic of American Calvinists, has given way to a celebration of redemptive suffering inflicted upon the victims of the Christian West. Novick quotes a professor of Jewish studies at Washington University, who provides this description of Jewish-Christian encounters dealing with the Holocaust:

> The Christian partner in Holocaust discourse, standing as heir and representative of the Christian cultures in which . . . the Holocaust was nurtured, must obediently hear, acknowledge, and memorialize the truth of Jewish anguish and the legitimacy of

> Jewish outrage. The proper response of the Christian to the Jew is, by a kind of tacit mutual agreement, a spiritual self-annihilation, a confessing openness to one's own guilt that mirrors in subtle ways themes of classical Christian theology.[29]

Such outpouring of guilt by those only remotely (if at all) responsible for the historical situations commemorated raises questions about whether pleasure is at the heart of contemporary progressive Christianity.

Contrary to the view of Paul Vitz about American Christian beliefs, today's therapeutic religion does not exclude the outward acceptance of orthodox Christian doctrines. *The People's Religion: American Faith in the Nineties*, an analysis of surveys conducted and interpreted by George Gallup Jr. and Jim Castelli, describe Americans as a "nation of biblical illiterates," of whom 81 percent believe that the Bible is the word of God. Eighty-two percent of the American population identifies itself as Christian, and 59 percent of those surveyed agreed that belief in Jesus Christ is the only assurance of eternal life.[30] A Harris poll from July 1994 indicates that 95 percent of the respondents believe in God. Of these respondents, 90 percent believe in Heaven, while a substantial majority accept the reality of Hell but take it for granted that they will be headed elsewhere after death.[31] Looking at these figures, the Catholic priest and social commentator Richard John Neuhaus comes to this agonized conclusion: "Statistically, at least, America is as much a Christian nation as it was, and perhaps more so." Neuhaus then continues: "One of the most elementary facts about America is that its people are overwhelmingly Christian in their own understanding, and that they and many who are not Christian assume that the moral baseline of the society is the Judeo-Christian ethic."[32]

This conclusion is both surprising and true, surprising because of the paucity of biblical and theological knowledge (and often interest) among the vast majority of Americans, and true because of their willingness to pay at least lip service to traditional Christian doctrines. But a distinctively American religiosity does seem to exist. Despite the rampant theological illiteracy and self-indulgent ethic encountered by Gallup pollsters, one finds widespread evidence in the United States of an identifiably Protestant mind-set. The focus on sinful dispositions and a separating of the elect from the damned are Protestant concerns that the current "liberal Protestantism" adapts to its use.

To identify this liberalization exclusively with "aggressive" mainline elites is to ignore its more general impact. Mainline congregations put

up with liberal preaching because they believe it, in some sense, to be Christian—or pointing toward a higher ethic than the one they themselves practice. Thus Thomas Reeves, while grieving over disintegrating mainline Protestant denominations, nonetheless praises them "for their long record of social and political activism (at least from the Social Gospel to the civil rights movement)."[33] The feminist, gay, and anti-Western attitudes and rhetoric that Reeves associates with ailing mainline Protestantism are found in other Christian denominations, such as the Quakers, Anabaptists, Evangelicals, and Catholics. The lack of distinctiveness that mainline Christians associate with their groups may stem from the fact that what is fashionable in the mainline prevails in other confessions almost as much.

It is also questionable whether one should ascribe this trend to some catchall "secularism," when Americans in fact still consider themselves to be conventionally orthodox. In this self-description they differ from Europeans, who, for the most part, do not pretend to be religious. American secularism also goes back to the country's Protestant past, according to James Kurth, who sees religious dissent and religious individuality as derived ultimately from Reformation theology. While Jews or Muslims may draw on the same tradition, they sound like Protestant dissenters when they do.[34]

According to late French president François Mitterand and Italian feminist and former president of the regional council of Campania (including Naples), Giovanna Borrello, feminism flourishes in Northern Protestant societies more naturally than among Latin Catholics.[35] Borrello contrasts to a "Greek-style democracy, which makes no provision for a female presence in its political life," the "Northern European democracies, that make ample room for women."[36] She is not alone in her observation. For all of his socialist declarations, Mitterand balked at the idea of introducing sexual harassment measures into his Latin Catholic country. Here a judgment Kurth makes is relevant, that Protestantism, when being itself, is "fundamentally anti-hierarchical." The Protestant sectarians who settled in the New World not only opposed monarchy and the ecclesiastical structure attached to it, but also assigned less importance than Catholics and High Church Protestants to those ecclesiastical dignities that accentuated sexual distinctions. Note the functional position of women in the Baptist, Methodist, and Quaker denominations, relative to where they stand in

the Catholic and Anglo-Catholic communions. Although sectarian Protestants did not abolish gender distinctions entirely, their religious life was more open to what moderns consider to be gender equality.

Equally pertinent for the Protestant contribution to the present managerial regime is the view of sin as an overshadowing existential problem. In the classical Calvinist formulation, as passed down by Puritans, Presbyterians, and Baptists, natural depravity taints whatever human beings do. So ubiquitous are the effects of Adam's Fall that unredeemed humanity is incapable of truly good acts—or of doing anything to advance personal salvation. The grace by which the elect are justified is an unmerited kindness provided by God who ascribes grace from without to a fallen humanity.

As Calvin explains in *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, "Justified by faith is he, who excluded from the righteousness of works, grasps the righteousness of Christ through faith, and, clothed in it, appears in God's sight not as a sinner but as a righteous man." "And we say that it [justification] consists in the remission of sins and the imputation of Christ's righteousness." The Calvinist idea of the sinner's total dependence upon divine redemption fostered in colonial New England a belief in "double predestination." Outside of all time God had chosen a fixed number of human souls for both salvation and damnation. No subsequent human action can change this grim decision. The most we can do to advance our eternal fortunes is to look for signs of grace in the way we live and in the companions we keep. Christ, the Calvinists believed, died not for all sinners but only for the elect.[37]

This gloomy theology led, ironically enough, not to fatalism but to a flurry of activity intended to prove to the incipient believer and to others his status as a saint. "Perseverance of the saints" was as much of a Calvinist tenet as the other teachings proclaimed by what, for American Calvinists, was the authoritative Council of Dortrecht in 1618. Beside the beliefs in total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, and irresistible grace, Calvinists found theological grounds to reach out to other possible vessels of divine grace. Looking for and living among the redeemed framed the Protestant experience as it developed in early America. Barry Shain's *The Myth of American Individualism* shows the Calvinist communities that were constructed in the American colonies as exhibiting the kind of moral order thought appropriate for visible saints. This sanctified living was extended to all family relations and

was characterized by stern parental discipline and steady admonishment against sloth and frivolity. In Shain's opinion, the social virtue and character development favored by applied Calvinism contributed to the moral foundations of American republican government. In a diluted way, this mind-set and the accompanying culture continue to mark the contemporary political climate. Without Protestant, or, more specifically, Calvinist attitudes and concerns, the therapeutic state cum victimology would not have made such inroads in the United States and in other predominantly Protestant societies.[38]

The feminization of Christianity, and particularly of American Protestant denominations, is the subject for investigation by Catholic theologian Leon Podles. In *The Church Impotent*, Podles explains in detail the ways in which feminist influences have affected theology and worship in Western Christianity and how men's withdrawal from public religious activity has made these changes possible. He traces this process back to the bridal mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux and of other medieval theologians and to a feminized trinitarian thinking, going back to the early church. This development is seen as moving beyond liberal denominations to the Catholic Church and to once traditionalist Protestant confessions. In a similar vein, historian of American religion Colleen McDannell explores the way the "Christian home" in nineteenth-century America became the focal point for an increasingly feminized Christian culture. Catholics, and particularly Irish Catholics, and Protestants, came to see the home as the center of devotional life. And though initially fathers had presided over the household prayers and Bible reading, by the end of the Victorian era, "maternal domestic leadership" had taken over.[39]

Basic for American religious life is the fusion of a victim-centered feminism with the Protestant framework of sin and redemption. This inherited Protestant framework now responds to two cultural particularities, general indifference to or ignorance of biblical texts (as documented by Gallup polls and by professors of biblical theology), and an equally strong indifference to theology as a subject or existential concern. Cultural and historical illiteracy shapes the theology of guilt by turning the past into a tabula rasa. For example, a majority of Americans polled consider the Holocaust to have been the worst "tragedy in history" and something about which Americans should be constantly reminded but also something about which the respondents

"know little or nothing."[40] Given this popular devotion to somber responsibility for the factually unknown, it is easy to understand another related development, a reformulated Protestantism that incorporates politically correct martyrologies.

These features turn up in the feminized Christianity of Rosemary Radford Ruether, which recasts the narratives of the Fall, Christ's suffering, and promise of redemption in socially fashionable terms. In Ruether's view, "sexism must be seen as the original and primary model for analyzing the state of the Fall." Indeed "social alienation begins in self-alienation experienced as estrangement between the self and the body. The oppressive relationship of the man to the woman is essentially the social projection of the self-alienation which translates certain initial biological differences into a power relationship. This relationship in turn is totalized in social structures and cultural modes that eliminate woman's autonomous personhood to define her solely in terms of male needs and negations."[41]

From these statements it is possible to extract an account of the Fall emphasizing the pervasiveness of sin and tracing its operation back to a loss of original wholeness. Because of this primal disaster there resulted gender identities and the structuring of human relations around them. This variant on the biblical Fall is not orthodox Christian but adapts to feminist needs a primal Protestant belief, that a radical falling away from God took place at the beginning of time. The feminist Fall integrates into its narrative the Protestant core convictions that sin came into the world, profoundly altered human nature, and now requires radical outside assistance to be mended. In Ruether's scheme, the dehumanized female victim rises by "anger and pride," here seen as "theological virtues," to challenge the patriarchal status quo. From this infused revolutionary anger, women gain "the power to transcend false consciousness and break its chains."[42]

Liberated women raise the moral awareness of men equally trapped in "totalizing social structures," a particularly pressing task, according to Protestant pastor Daniel H. Krichbaum, given the tie between "masculinity and racism." Krichbaum views sin as masculine false consciousness, witnessed by "the ease with which white males discuss both urgent social issues and the unsatisfactoriness of their own lives." Krichbaum inveighs against "dehumanizing competitiveness" and "white masculinity," as the fruits of an unredeemed society. Against

these evil forces he points to the hope of “expressive personhood.” This will flourish where “the liberated male will define as productive only that part of his time, energy, and skill that he devotes to the needs caused by injustice, disease, and social callousness.”[43]

Often banal and badly cobbled together, these assertions about sin and redemption may well distress serious theologians and traditional Christians. But they are restatements of beliefs that have become central to American Christian thinking and are recognizably Protestant even in their present formulation. Thus Ruether, instead of dispensing with all references to Christ’s sufferings, offers an updated theology of the cross that warns against “stifling the cry of Jesus by speaking of his victory over death.” The cross “stands for unjust suffering throughout history” and must be recalled so that Christians today “can work resolutely to liberate women and other oppressed groups from status and hierarchical relations.”[44] The same theology of the cross is applied to those with alternative lifestyles in other contemporary Protestant tracts. In *Come Home: Reclaiming Spirituality and Community as Gay Men and Lesbians*, theologian Chris Glaser presents Jesus as incipiently gay and suffering to dramatize the evil in a world not yet redeemed from insensitivity.[45]

Such ideas, by now popularized in mainstream Protestant publications, do not merely reprise an older feminized Christianity any more than they restate the enlightened or scientific Christianity of the nineteenth century. They invoke a particular social consciousness, whether a sensitized one for the nonvictimized or an indignantly revolutionary one for designated victims, which is thought to incorporate Christian sentiments. The bearers of such elevated social consciousness will seek others in the community of grace and express their spiritual state through suitable verbal gestures. An act of rejection by a nonvictim group directed against their civilization, gender, race, or ancestors indicates sanctified living in a world or society held to be reprobate. The society that offends this visibly redeemed consciousness must be swept aside to make room for what Ruether calls the “messianic state,” a world in which Christ, as a synecdoche for all designated victims, will no longer be crucified.

Philip Jenkins illustrates the transfer of the images and idea of redemptive suffering in American culture from an orthodox Christian to a politically correct context: “The example most commonly offered for

this role, the consensus choice for ultimate sanctity, was Martin Luther King, crucified for our sins in Memphis." Jenkins also observes the "liberal hagiography" surrounding the slain homosexual Matthew Shepard, who was murdered in Wyoming in October 1999: "The crime was portrayed strictly in terms of martyrdom and Calvary, complete with the grotesque image of crucifixion on barbed wire. The rhetorical implications were hammered home repeatedly and unsubtly. We are all guilty for his death, we must purge such sins from ourselves and our communities, how thoroughly our whole culture is permeated by sin and ungodliness." In a conclusion that coincides entirely with the argument of this chapter, Jenkins states the view:

> Americans believe in saints, martyrs, and Christ figures [if not Christ]. They accept the notion of original sin in the perverse form of original abuse and they hope for redemption through therapy. In however warped a form, traditional Christian and particularly Protestant assumptions still have a deep resonance for Americans. This is important enough in understanding our social ideologies, but the idea is also crucial if we are to understand the kinds of political rhetoric which are going to appeal to an audience which mistakenly thinks of itself as secular but is actually imbued with biblical and apocalyptic assumptions.[46]

It may further be necessary to distinguish Jenkins's theology of victimization from feminized Christianity as treated by Podles and McDannell. Although women, and, to a lesser extent, gays have become dominant in Western Christian life, what has resulted is not merely an intensification of an older demasculinized Christianity. Far more significantly, the current Christianity is at war with gender distinctions: It treats them as oppressive and symptomatic of humankind's fallen state. Not a mere outgrowth of Victorian domestic religiosity or of the moral crusades waged against booze and male carousing by Methodist matrons, this crusade entails a recasting of the Judeo-Christian account of Creation and the Fall in starkly androgynous terms. Feminist theologians have raided hermetic, Kabbalistic, and other Neoplatonic sources to construct usable myths about human origins. They seek to drive home the lesson that sexual differentiation and its social consequences represent a falling away into sin from an original hermaphroditic perfection.[47]

Such ideas have become mainstream Protestant ones as American Protestantism has abandoned its former adherence to biblical texts and to a binding theological tradition. But the larger point is that a normative

Christianity, derived from at least vestigial Protestant categories, exists and thrives in the United States and other Anglophone societies. Americans consider themselves to be a churchgoing people. Fifty-one percent of them belong to Christian denominations, which they support financially and whose services they attend at least once a month.[48] Self-described Christians who keep coming back to services are not demonstrably disgusted, though they may feel belabored by the liberal messages they hear. The predominantly female auditors in all probability agree with this preaching, while the men who go with them to church may be less enthusiastic but not downright hostile to what is taught there. To the extent these male churchgoers have thoughts about religious and moral questions, we must assume, unless shown otherwise, that their views parallel those of their wives. The hemorrhaging of mainstream denominations does not have to signify a growing Protestant skepticism about the politics of social guilt. Such politics have in fact spilled over from mainstream Protestantism into other denominations. While conservative denominations are attacked for not reaching out to victims sincerely or sufficiently, they too engage in liberal Protestant gestures. Evangelicals who wish to cure homosexuals to make them "feel better about themselves" or Southern Baptist conventions that apologize for slavery and racism may not convince the Protestant Left that they are truly open-minded and contrite. But the difference here is one of degree and not of kind. It is hard to see what political gain is to be had when Fundamentalists go about apologizing to blacks for racist acts they have not personally committed. What worldly benefit is there, for example, when the president of Abilene Christian University, Royce Money, makes a practice of asking forgiveness from blacks for the segregation enforced at his school until the 1960s? Money lets it be known that "we need to confess the sins of racism and discrimination from the past. We are truly sorry."[49] In October 1999, the troubled Christian educator convened at his Fundamentalist institution a "One-in-Christ Conference" at which he repeatedly asked "forgiveness" for himself and for the Abilene Christian University for racist sins.

Evangelicals for Social Action and other smaller, similar groups try to bridge the distance they perceive between conservative Protestant theology and liberal Protestant politics. This bridge building has yielded success for the Protestant Left, which has not had to move rightward

theologically in order to pull Evangelicals in their direction politically. Although rooted in an apocalyptic, otherworldly form of faith, the Religious Right has followed certain liberal American Protestant practices, apologizing to Jews and blacks for past Christian (usually European Christian) misdeeds and "entering into dialogue" with gays. Moreover, as one passes on to the Evangelicals who have located outside the South and are entering the professional classes, Mark A. Shibley explains, "the social-class differences between evangelical and mainline Protestants diminish, and as evangelicals slowly but steadily come to embrace many elements of modern culture, including greater tolerance for alternative lifestyles, it follows that we must look beyond ideology to explain its current popularity." Shibley offers the view that "the evangelical churches that are growing are distinguishing themselves as service-oriented congregations."[50]

Liberal Protestant theology is entirely compatible with the managerial state's evolution into a regime promoting victim self-esteem. Without administrative assaults against biological and social distinctions, argue liberal Protestants, the sin of discrimination would rage even more fiercely. This is the message of J. Philip Wogaman, the Methodist pastor of Bill Clinton. As a Christian, Wogaman insists, it may be appropriate to treat the President's sexual escapades as a "private vice," offset by his continuing war against sexism, racism, and social injustice. Like other Protestant liberals, Wogaman has moved from a Social Gospel witness, advocating radical economic redistribution as a federal project, to what are presented as Christian concerns about the victims of Western society. Wogaman has championed his positions as the spiritual head of a prestigious Methodist congregation, who turned to the ministry after a long, distinguished career as a professor of Christian social ethics.[51]

It is now incumbent on Western, particularly American, political leaders to lament past offenses against designated victims. Such acts are the modern equivalents of the days of fasting and public penance practiced by the visible saints in Puritan New England. They are the signs (similar to the Calvinist *notae*) by which the godly community and godly magistrates recognize the workings of grace. It is less significant whether whites in the United States are collectively responsible for the sin of slavery than the fact that President Clinton has made this

assertion. Clergy and journalists rose to his defense when he did because of the need for public confession on behalf of a sinful nation.[52]

Exemplifying the power of multicultural concepts to influence political celebrities independently of tangible career interest is a speech given by Bill Clinton to the student body at Georgetown University on November 7, 2001. The former president dwelt on the terror that had existed in the United States for hundreds of years and on how "the nation is paying the price" for its support of slavery and "for looking the other way when a significant number of Native Americans were dispossessed and killed." "Here in the United States we were founded as a nation that practiced slavery, and slaves quite frequently were killed even though they were innocent." Moreover, "in the First Crusade, when the Christian soldiers took Jerusalem, they first burned a synagogue with 300 Jews in it and proceed to kill every woman and child who was a Muslim on the Temple Mount. I can tell you that story is still being told today in the Middle East and we are still paying for it."[53]

Clinton overstates his case that the American and European Christian past has been characterized by continuing reckless violence against certain minorities now featured as multicultural victims. Even assuming black slaves were abused in the United States (though no more so than elsewhere), it is questionable that their masters killed them in great numbers, given the fact they represented a heavy investment of money. It is even more questionable that those living in the United States today bear personal responsibility for a mode of economic production that marked all human civilization until the modern age, except for most of the Christian West, where slavery was ended earlier. As for Clinton's thumbnail sketch of the Crusades, it is remarkable for what it omits more than for what it includes. Having defenders of Turkish-occupied Jerusalem, whether Muslims or Jews, slaughtered indiscriminately after the capture of the city in the First Crusade is regrettable but not surprising, given the savage nature of the struggle on both sides. What is left out of the account are the unprovoked attacks on Rhineland Jews carried out by the Crusaders en route, and the far more ghastly but irrelevant, from the standpoint of multiculturalism, massacres of tens of thousands of Eastern Christians during the Fourth Crusade. It was, by the way, the Turkish assault on the Christian Byzantine Empire, in which Muslims massacred Christians, which spurred the Crusades, as a response to Muslim

aggression.[54] Perhaps Clinton does not know or care to recall that Muslim rulers occupied large chunks of the Balkans, after being pushed out of Central Europe, until the end of the nineteenth century. Christians who inhabit those regions tell stories of atrocities, done by Muslims, that befell their families far more recently than during the First Crusade.

But more pertinent for our purposes than the mistakes and omissions in Clinton's remarks was that he spoke out as he did in the presence of more than one thousand Georgetown students, only weeks after the attacks launched by Muslim terrorists against Americans and against American government buildings. On November 8 he seized the occasion of his Georgetown appearance to catalog alleged Western Christian misdeeds, including those directed against Muslims. Such a move could not have conceivably benefited his public career and might well have seemed for many of his auditors to be over the top. What is hard to question is that Clinton was expressing beliefs that, in his mind, testified to the goodness of his intentions. Neither checking the validity of these statements nor pursuing his professional interest mattered as much for him as being able to point out the social sins of the American nation, in which he as a member of that nation declared himself to be implicated.

The dismissal of this kind of gesture by some conservative Christians as "cheap grace" or grandstanding overlooks its religious function. The public affirmation of a liberal Protestant theology of social guilt reflects the transformed Calvinism that now animates American confessional life and American civic culture. The declaration of guilt, to be taken seriously as a moral act, need not be based on airtight documentation or lead to painful individual exercises of penance. Confessing guilt for the Holocaust or slavery does not require that the actor ask for punishment as a Nazi war criminal or perpetrator of racial injustice. In 1995 the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada passed a strong resolution against its theological progenitor for "violent invective against the Jews." These "diatribes," spoken by Luther as dinner conversation, were said to have produced "tragic effects on later generations of Jews," an undemonstrated but grave accusation referring to the Holocaust. Despite its expression of regret to "the Jewish community in Canada," the ELC did not proceed to the logical next step of disavowing Martin Luther and altering its denominational

name.[55] The reason, it may be argued, was not hypocrisy or insincere remorse for exaggerated charges. The meaning of the confession is to be found in the act performed. It signifies the purity of heart that marks the spiritually redeemed in a culture of victims.

On the basis of reason, one can draw a valid distinction between being "complicit" in the Nazi Holocaust and living under a government that did much but not all it could to save eventual Nazi victims. The United States did oppose German Nazism while giving refuge to at least some of those fleeing Nazi tyranny, including members of my own family.[56] Although it certainly might have done more, the United States's record in this matter looks sterling indeed, particularly in comparison to the pitifully little the American government did to rescue the victims of Stalin, an oversight for which liberal Christians, remarkably enough, never blame their country. Why must American Christians then go on confessing guilt for the partial sin of omission committed by an administration that in any case did fight and overthrow Nazi Germany?[57] Such questioning, however, does not explain why people proclaim their guilt for acts they have not committed. Public contrition serves to showcase the self-consciously virtuous, while at the same time satisfying those embattled minorities that are demanding public recognition as victims. The Anti-Defamation League and Canadian Jewish Congress, both of which exist to expose "anti-Semitism," applauded the expression of collective guilt offered by Canadian Lutherans.[58] Ethnic special pleaders have no trouble accepting confessions directed at them from those who claim to have caused prejudice against their group. Such acts of recognition justify their sense of grievance and thereby strengthen their organizational and ethnic unity.

Unlike Catholics and traditionalist Lutherans, most Protestants have no sacrament of penance and may carry with them an unresolved sense of personal guilt. Since the classical Protestant view of original sin is that of a totally disfiguring power, unless covered over by divine grace, this guilt may be assumed to weigh heavily on the religiously serious. It may also account for the oscillations among classical Protestants between mortifying unworthiness and personal exaltation, as standing among the elect of God. Depending on how the individual sinner looks at his relation with his divine judge, he may experience either state of mind. But there are rituals of repentance built into

Protestant cultures, from the fessing-up done by repentant sinners at revival meetings and at Southern Baptist services to the days of "public humiliation" practiced in colonial New England. In "From the Covenant to the Revival," historian of American Puritanism Perry Miller explains that days of fasting and repentance were a common feature of the American Revolutionary era.[59] At the national and state levels, such days were proclaimed and multiplied, so that the country in arms might, in the words of the proclamation issued at Valley Forge in December 1777, make a "penitent confession of their manifold sins."[60] Acts of penance were entirely public, for those who participated in them were affirming fellowship in a godly community.[61] Penitential acts were also public in the sense that those who performed them were exhibiting ascribed grace. Thrown back on their own nature, sinners trapped in original sin would not be able to achieve genuine acts of repentance. According to Calvin's *Institutes*, authentic penance indicates a prior operation of grace.[62]

Public penance and the accompanying confessions have a long, colorful history in the United States and are characteristic of the political and moral conversions of public personalities. In a genre at least partly descended from St. Augustine and the seventeenth-century Puritans, a Jewish Marxist with "second thoughts," a onetime Communist who became a Quaker and conservative, and an erstwhile conservative turned gay left-liberal activist have all expressed themselves in a confessional form betraying a distinctly American Protestant mentality.[63] The same cultural judgment would apply even more strongly to the politically correct form of penance herein discussed. The persistence of the American Protestant establishment in churning out confessions tells as much about old habits and memories as it does about present ideological engagements.

Making others aware of one's personal and ancestral guilt gives evidence of virtuous intention and signifies a reaching out to the benighted in one's own society and to bigots and victims elsewhere. This may be seen as the operation of grace in a world steeped in sin as insensitivity. Zealous outreach also helps explain the direction in which Henry Kissinger fears that NATO and more generally Western international relations are now moving: toward "a new style of foreign policy driven by domestic politics and the invocation of universalistic moral slogans." We are warned about the "liturgical purposes" toward

which Western alliances under Anglo-American guidance have been turned. Kissinger points to Clinton and Blair for special blame, as morally driven violators of the sovereignty of other countries that have done us no harm.[64]

Summing Up

To sum up the major points of this chapter: A religious worldview gives direction to the managerial state's progress toward a therapeutic regime concerned with the self-esteem of victims. This worldview is liberal Protestant, understanding that term in the current sense and not in the way it might have been taken in the past. While such a view prevails in the Anglo-American world, it is less compelling the farther one moves away from it culturally. At the convocation of Anglican prelates held in Lambeth, England, in 1999, Asians and Africans voted angrily and overwhelmingly against a proposal to permit the ordination of gays. By contrast, many Anglo-American bishops defended that proposal as expressing authentic Christianity. Bishop Spong of Newark complained bitterly about the "backwardness" of Third World churchmen who stood in the way of his quintessentially Christian agenda. Both sides were in fact right: the Asians and Africans when they appealed to biblical morality and Christian natural law tradition; and the American and British when they drew on their own liberal Christianity.[65]

It may also be argued that liberal Protestant thinking has gained currency because of a general predisposition to what it teaches. If mainline denominations, by their own admission, have failed to hold on to the young, their ministers nonetheless preach ideas that have come to define generic Christianity. Mainline denominations may be rendering themselves redundant by exporting their moral and ideological content to other parts of the confessional landscape. This exported content is now giving substance to American religious culture in general, which has been predisposed to it by particular circumstances, biblical illiteracy, submission to congregational inner circles, and what Methodist theologian William J. Abraham refers to as "institutionalists concerned less with the rightness or wrongness of homosexuality and related issues than with the future of the denomination."[66] The result in

any case is the symbiotic relationship formed between American religious values and the therapeutic state.

This kind of regime, which imposes political correctness and interprets sin as insensitive behavior, builds steadily upon pervasive social guilt, an attitude and sentiment instilled by American religious culture. It can also be argued that mental and conceptual bridges continue to link the current liberal religion to older American Christian symbols, themes, and experiences. Although, as explained by both traditional Reformation theologian David F. Wells and Rosemary Radford Ruether, "systematic theology of the old stripe" has yielded in the United States to centuries of moral and intellectual ferment, not all continuity between the old and the new religions has vanished.[67] What has allowed today's fashionable Christian ideas to progress is not only "obscene niceness" but also residual memory. Contemporary liberal Christianity combines rituals of Western self-rejection with established Protestant attitudes about individuality and equality, the radically fallen state of the sinner, and the simultaneous self-debasement and self-elevation of the saint.

While no attempt has been made to explain the turn the managerial state has taken in terms of a single variable, special emphasis has been placed on religious attitudes. This variable explains why majority populations act *"naturwidrig"* (unnaturally) in the sense that Max Weber understood the inner-worldly asceticism of early Protestant society. Without a Calvinist moral theology, reasoned Weber, one could not fully grasp the sacrifice that the early modern European bourgeois made in its accumulation of investment capital.[68] People do not sacrifice the opportunity for immediate pleasure without strong moral or theological reasons. In a similar way, without the guilt ethic preached by contemporary Christianity, it would be hard to imagine the sweeping affirmations now taking place about the moral superiority of alien cultures or former president Clinton's expressions of shame about past Western "terror."

Although, in view of Nazi atrocities and postwar "German reeducation," the German situation may be exceptional, minimizing one's national heritage has become a matter of good taste for other Western peoples as well. Thus Canadian political commentator Michael Ignatieff warns in the *National Post* against "exaggerating the importance of Canadian history for Canadians." Ignatieff "refuses to

believe that the widely diffused knowledge of Canadian history is essential to Canadian identity and some kind of necessary prerequisite for adequate citizenship." Canada is neither about a history nor about a heritage but based on "shared understandings" about the rules of democracy. Behind this downplaying of "common cultural capital" is an unmistakable moral-religious imperative, applied to Western Christian countries, not to notice what sets them apart, except when recalling past intolerance, engaging in public confession, or trying to overcome their own history.[69]

Efforts by distinguished scholars Philip Rieff and Paul Vitz to define American therapeutic religion in terms of "feeling good about one's self" without the Christian imperative to "die to self," overlook the unpleasurable side of the current liberal religion. In *From Mainline to Sideline*, K. L. Billingsley explains that conservative denominations do not attract members simply because of hard rules and austere living. Many converts are tired of being preached at constantly about alleged social failings. They prefer being told that they are righteous and standing up for God's word. Billingsley suggests that it is the upbeat quality of Evangelical Christianity that accounts for much of its recruiting success. In a related flight from a guilt culture, reported by the *Jerusalem Post*, young Germans are seeking to move to Israel and asking to become Jews (if the Jews will have them). One German woman now in Israel gave as the reason for this behavior that her people "want to regain a sense of ethnic pride in a country where nationalist sentiments are not tainted with associations of collective guilt."[70] While undoubtedly Jewish organizations have contributed to this sense of guilt, it has also received crucial support from agonized German theologians and pastors.

For most Americans there is nothing extraordinary about the connection made between Christianity and a liberal social agenda. Nor would readers of *Christian Century* likely balk at the description of lesbian Evangelical singer Marsha Stevens as "a Jesus-loving, Bible-believing, God-fearing, lesbian Christian." While most Americans do believe in the Bible as revealed truth, they also make little effort to study it. And, unlike those fervent Calvinists evoked by Barry Shain, only an American minority now belongs to communities organized around biblical morality. While most Americans are at least nominally Christian, they have little or no interest in theology. Such Christians take their

religious and moral bearings, like most people everywhere, from those in authority and without anguishing over the bad fit between religious revelation and political sensitivity. The first, it is hoped, can be subsumed conveniently under the second. If mean-spirited zealots, moreover, cite scriptural passages to justify gender distinctions and strictures against gays, quoting Scripture can be attributed to bad manners or else to not stressing sufficiently Christ's example of nonjudgmental love. *Globe and Mail* columnist and Toronto Lutheran Pastor Peter Mikelic sums up this teaching as follows: "God doesn't discriminate, why must the church?"[71]

Those who embrace such Christianity are habituated to its products by life under the managerial state. For several generations Western peoples have accepted democracy as socialization and as rule by public administrators. The behavioral patterns thereby formed have increased social conformity and discouraged widespread questioning of established social truths. But the patterns of influence may be reciprocal. Eric Werner points out, in looking at social and political conformity in his native Switzerland, that resistance to state directives and to the multicultural policies of the Swiss federal government has been generally weaker in Protestant regions than in Catholic ones.[72] The reduction of religious values to a personal affair and the blurring of the line between institutional religion and state authorities render Swiss Protestants particularly receptive to centralized administrative control. A distinctly Protestant predisposition may be at work here, even without the social guilt attached to American liberal Christianity. But such a predisposition may be even more firmly rooted where such guilt is alive and well and where public administration helps to enforce multicultural attitudes. In its peculiar way, the modern state has revived the alliance of throne and altar once cherished by nineteenth-century enemies of the French Revolution. The complementarity of the secular and ecclesiastical swords has been restored, in the sense that the dominant religious culture gives aid and direction to state purposes. The doctrinal pluralism proclaimed in the postwar period as the cornerstone of United Methodism has evolved exactly like the pluralism of the managerial state, as a provisional stage in the appropriation of institutions by the implementers of "inclusiveness." That the proudly secular managerial state imitates this liberal Protestant "inclusiveness" only adds to the irony of the present situation.

1. See Thomas C. Reeves, *The Empty Church: Does Organized Religion Matter Anymore?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), particularly 1–37, 133–66; *Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches 1996* (Nashville: National Council of Churches, 1996), 255–56; and Wade Clark Roof and William McKinney, *American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 152–54. The judgment concerning the nondistinctiveness of denominations receives a positive twist in William M. Newman's "The Meanings of Merger: Denominational Identity in the United Church of Christ," in *Beyond Establishment: Protestant Identity in a Post-Protestant Age*, ed. Jackson Carroll and Wade Clark Reef (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1993), 305.

2. Paul Wilkes, "The Hands That Would Shape Our Souls," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1990, 74.

3. Christopher R. Seitz, "Pluralism and the Lost Art of Christian Apology," *First Things*, June/July 1994, 17–18.

4. The data for declining rates of professional and economic achievements for mainline Protestants relative to other white ethnic and religious groups can be found in Barry A. Kosmin and Seymour P. Lachman, *One Nation under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society* (New York: Harmony Books, 1993), 257–63. See also the summing up of the data examined by Kosmin-Lachman in James Webb's editorial essay, "In Defense of the Six-Pack," in *Wall Street Journal*, June 5, 1995. A14.

5. See Kevin MacDonald's methodologically uneven but occasionally illuminating studies on the effects of Jewish alienation, *Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994–1998), particularly the third volume, *The Culture of Critique* (1998). For a study of how Italian communities in Canada have had a group identity foisted on them by the managerial state, see Paul Piccone's "Secession and Reform in Canada," *Telos* 106 (winter 1995–1996): 3–25.

6. See Novak, *Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*.

7. For an extensive study of the social and cultural transformations of twentieth-century Quebec, see Leon Dion, *Quebec: The Unfinished Revolution*, trans. Therese Romer (Ann Arbor: Books on Demand, 1999).

8. See Wattenberg, *First Universal Nation*, 17.

9. Ibid., 210–13.

10. See Eckhard Jesse's provocative defense of intellectual freedom, "Streitbare Demokratie und 'Vergangenheitsbewältigung,'" in *Verfassungsschutz in der Demokratie* (Cologne: Heymanns, 1990), 257–305; Martin Walser, "Uber freie und unfreie Rede," *Der Spiegel*, November 7, 1994, 130–38; and Petra Wernicke, "Zensur und Willkür," *Nation Europa*, May 1996, 17–19.

11. See Daniel G. MacNeil Jr., "The World: Taboos, Globally Speaking, Like Politics, All Political Correctness Is Local," *New York Times*, October 11, 1998, D5; Gerald Bennett, "Journalisten-Verfolgung in Deutschland," *Der Schlesier* 26 (June 27, 1998); Nordbruch, *Sind Gedanken noch frei?* especially 213–67; and for a broader treatment of the persecution of dissenters in Germany, Hans-Gerd Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991). For a mostly positive depiction of an intellectual architect of the new politically correct Germany, see Detlef Horster's *Habermas zur Einführung*, 2d ed. (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 2001). Like other progressive Germans, Horster does not seem to notice the contradiction between Habermas's prescription for "interpersonal discourse," as basic to German constitutional government, and his exclusion from public consideration of views he considers to be reactionary. For Habermas, not all providers of views

have a right to be heard, but only those intellectuals to whom he assigns the label "rational" and who are mindful of the task of German national atonement. Australian legal scholar Andrew Fraser notes the growing popularity of Habermasian concepts among "militant cosmopolitans" in Australia who wish to abolish the British monarchy in "A Marx for the Managerial Revolution: Habermas on Law and Democracy," *Journal of Law and Society* 28, no. 3 (September 2001): 361–81.

12. Ray Honeyford, *The Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy and the Multiethnic Society* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 51–91.

13. Ibid., 40.

14. Ibid., 46–49; for another overview of English antidiscrimination laws, see Paul Gordon, *Racial Violence and Harassment* (London: Runnymede Trust, 1990).

15. See the Associated Press story by Dina Kraft, May 2, 1999, dealing with the "reconciliation march" undertaken by Western Christians (primarily American Protestants) as the descendants of Crusader "victims." An ethicist and professor at Reading University, Christie Davies, in *Salisbury Review* 18 (winter 1999): 24–25, offers a bizarre reading of this phenomenon. According to Davies, Christians who apologize to the Muslims "dilute the force of the only real apology that they owe to members of any other faith: their apology for past and present anti-Semitism." Though Davies is widely regarded as a cultural-moral traditionalist, he too affirms the need for Western Christian guilt for what his countrymen or even most of their ancestors were not responsible for.

16. Theodor Eschenburg, *Kritische Betrachtungen, 1957–1961* (Munich: R. Piper, 1961), 164. Wassermann's comments are cited in *Das Freie Forum* 4 (1994): 1.

17. Dorothee Sölle, *Beyond Mere Obedience*, trans. Lawrence W. Denef (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1970), 87.

18. Dorothee Sölle, *Political Theology*, trans. John Shelly (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 92.

19. See *Economist*, September 4, 1999, 52; and Nordbruch, *Sind Gedanken noch frei?* particularly 164–76, 188–94.

20. See the polemical but densely documented study by Jared Taylor, "The Color of Crime: Race Crime and Violence in America" (Oakton, Va.: New Century Foundation, 1999); the summary of that study by Robert Stacy McCain, "Poll Finds Ambivalence about Diversity," *Washington Times*, June 1, 1999, A2–3; and Ray Honeyford's figures for English crime in "Is There a Problem of Black Crime," *Salisbury Review* 132 (December 1995): 27–31.

21. *New York Times*, April 4, 1995, A1; and the accompanying sarcastic response by *New York Times* columnist Frank Rich that Reed's apology to Jews was too little too late.

22. See the statement by Bauer explaining his litmus tests for Supreme Court nominations in *New York Times*, August 17, 1999, A12.

23. Sydney Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 783; George M. Marsden, *Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism: 1870–1925* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 17.

24. Leonard R. Klein, "Lutherans in Sexual Commotion," *First Things*, May 1994, 35.

25. See, for example, the invectives against the "hierarchicalism of evolutionary theory" and the "racist assumptions" in Rosemary Radford Ruether, *Sex and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), 86–87. D. G. Hart, in his study of an antievolutionist Presbyterian theologian, *Defending the Faith: J. Gresham Machen and the Crisis of*

Conservative Protestantism in Modern America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994) notes that the dispute over Evolution among Protestants at the beginning of the twentieth century was over moral issues more than over epistemological and scientific ones.

26. Paul C. Vitz, *Psychology as Religion: The Cult of Self-Worship* (Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1977), especially 91–105.

27. Peter Novick, *The Holocaust in American Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 207–63. An equally devastating assessment of the American Jewish investment in the Holocaust industry is the review of Novick's work by Norman Finkelstein, *London Review of Books* 33 (January 6, 2000): 33–36. Although both are full of sound judgments, neither work, in my opinion, takes sufficient account of the liberal Christian investment in Jewish victimhood. That investment may be as great as the one being held by Jewish organizations.

28. Novick, *Holocaust in American Life*, 237.

29. Martin S. Jaffee, "The Victim-Community in Myth and History," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 28 (spring 1991): 227–28. Jaffee makes provocative points about the ritual role of the victim in stressing the differences between Jewish and Christian reception of the Holocaust as religious narrative.

30. George Gallup Jr. and Jim Castelli, *The People's Religion: American Faith in the Nineties* (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 4, 20; *Gallup Poll Monthly*, May 1995, 4, and March 1995, 1.

31. Gallup and Castelli, *People's Religion*, 25–26.

32. Richard John Neuhaus, "Pluralism and Wrong Answers," *First Things*, June/July 1994, 72–73.

33. Reeves, *Empty Church*, xi.

34. Kurth, "Protestant Deformation"; see also Paul Gottfried, "Thinking about Secularisms," *The World and I*, July 1999, 320–29.

35. Mitterand, interview by Marie-José Ragalo, in *Ex Femina*, July 1997, 16–17.

36. *Il Mattino*, July 18, 1999, 24. Most of this interview, with accompanying comments, conducted by Maria Chiara Aulisio, does not come to terms with the Latin Catholic aspect of Aulisio's subject.

37. John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 1:726–27, 770–78.

38. Shain, *Myth of American Individualism*, 128–35; Karl Holl, *Cultural Significance of the Reformation* (1911; reprint, New York: Meridian Books, 1959), 155–240. Although Shain notes the residues of "Protestant communalism" present in American life (320–28), he is not responsible for *my* argument, about the transposition of Calvinist attitudes into a liberal Christian theology.

39. Leon J. Podles, *The Church Impotent: The Feminization of Christianity* (Dallas: Spence Publishing, 1999), 102–39; Colleen McDannell, *The Christian Home in Victorian America, 1840–1900* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 17–19, 127–49.

40. "Poll: Most Americans Want to Learn about Holocaust," *Jerusalem Post*, April 24, 1998, 3.

41. Rosemary Radford Ruether, "Sexism and the Theology of Liberation," *Christian Century*, December 12, 1973, 1224.

42. Ibid., 1226.

43. Daniel H. Krichbaum, “Masculinity and Racism: Breaking Out of the Illusion,” *Christian Century*, January 10, 1973, 46.

44. Rosemary Radford Ruether, *To Change the World* (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1989), 67.

45. See Chris Glaser, *Come Home: Reclaiming Spirituality and Community as Gay Men and Lesbians* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990); and the review of Glaser’s book by Elizabeth Carol Reiss in *Christianity and Crisis*, November 18, 1991, 372–73.

46. See Philip Jenkins, “New Faiths for Old,” *Chronicles* 23, no. 12 (December 1999): 15; see also Claus Nordbruch, “Die selbsternannten Tugendwächter im Visier,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 12, 1999, 13.

47. A vast and continuously expanding literature examines the gnostic and hermaphroditic aspect of modern religion and political culture. See the bibliography in Paul Gottfried, *Conservative Millenarians* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1979), 153–72; Eric Voegelin, *The New Science of Politics*, trans. W. J. Fitzpatrick (Chicago: Phoenix Press, 1952); Eric Voegelin, *Science, Politics, and Gnosticism*, trans. W. J. Fitzpatrick (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); and the anthology on political gnosticism by Jakob Taubes, *Gnosis und Politik* (Munich: Fink Verlag, 1984).

48. *USA Today*, April 1, 1994, A2.

49. On the “seeking of forgiveness” by President Money and Abilene Christian, see *St. Petersburg Times*, November 27, 1999, 5.

50. Mark A. Shibley, *Resurgent Evangelicalism in the United States* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1996), 4–5. The leaning by establishment Evangelicals in the direction of mainline Protestantism is a driving concern for *Modern Reformation* magazine and its “Classical Reformation Christian” founders; see *No Place for Truth: Or Whatever Happened to Evangelical Theology?* written by Reformed theologian David F. Wells (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1993).

51. Similar arguments characterize the defense of Bill Clinton’s presidency in J. Philip Wogaman, *Eye of the Storm: A Pastor to the President Speaks Out* (Westminster: John Knox Press, 1999). Wogaman’s assertion cited in the text was made in a CSPAN interview (February 3, 1999) and discussed in *Reformierte Presse*, August 5, 1998, 1, “Sexuelle Verfehlungen diskreditieren einen Staatsmann noch lange nicht.” See also J. Philip Wogaman, *Guaranteed Annual Income: The Moral Issue* (New York: Abindon Press, 1988); and the review of *Eye of the Storm* by David Heim in *Christian Century*, March 17, 1999, 278–79.

52. See “Clinton’s Contrition,” *New York Times*, April 1, 1998, A12.

53. See the feature story by Joseph Curl, “Clinton Calls Terror a U.S. Debt to the Past,” *Washington Times*, November 8, 2001, A2.

54. For an exhaustive study of the Crusades in the English language that has been available for decades and which President Clinton might have consulted to verify his assertions, see Steven Runciman, *History of the Crusades*, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

55. This resolution is found in the printed minutes of the annual convention of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Canada, held in Winnipeg on July 14, 1995, 47–48.

56. Some of the counterarguments to the “Jews were abandoned” thesis are presented by Novick, *Holocaust in American Life*, 52–59.

57. See particularly Lucy Dawidowicz, “Could America Have Rescued Europe’s Jews?” in *What Is the Use of Jewish History?* (Syracuse: University of Syracuse Press, 1980), 160–73.

Dawidowicz, who made a reputation as someone passionately concerned about the deaths of six million Jews, cannot be reasonably charged with whitewashing the perpetrators.

58. See the penetrating essay on Novick's *Holocaust in American Life* by Allan C. Brownfield, in the American Council for Judaism's journal, *Issues*, fall 1999, 1, 2, 7.

59. Perry Miller, "From the Covenant to the Revival," in *The Shaping of American Religion*, ed. J. W. Smith and A. L. Jamison (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 322–68.

60. *Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–1789* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905), 9:854–55; also cited in Shain, *Myth of American Individualism*, 198.

61. See Edmund S. Morgan's classic study of Puritan social and familial relations, *The Puritan Family: Religious and Domestic Relations in Seventeenth-Century New England* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966).

62. See Calvin, *Institutes*, 2:930–32, which discusses the "external and unchangeable plan" of divine election.

63. Typical of this confessional mode as a vehicle for expressing one's political shifts are David Horowitz's *Radical Son: A Generational Odyssey* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998); Whittaker Chambers's *Witness* (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 1999); and the "Apology to Bill Clinton" by his formerly conservative gay critic David Brock in *New York Times*, March 10, 1998, A1.

64. Henry Kissinger, "The World, Europe, Intellectuals, and the Undergirding of NATO's New Style," *Los Angeles Times*, August 15, 1999, 172.

65. See the *Lambeth Daily* (official newspaper of the Lambeth Conference), July 4, 1999, 1, 4; and August 8, 1999, 1–3. Although the printed report emphasizes ecumenicism and the celebration of diversity, references are made (as on p. 1 of the August 8 edition) to the "sense of rejection" caused by the vote on "Sexuality" on the previous Wednesday.

66. William J. Abraham, "United Methodists at the End of the Mainline," *First Things*, June/July 1998, 28–33.

67. Wells, *No Place for Truth*, 93; see also R. R. Ruether, "Whatever Happened to Theology?" *Christianity and Crisis*, May 12, 1975, 109.

68. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 159–83.

69. Michael Ignatieff, "Do We Need Canadian History?" *National Post*, September 4, 1999, B5.

70. Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic Uses of Faith after Freud* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Vitz, *Psychology as Religion*, 90–105 (see also Katherine A. Kersten, "To Hell with Sir," *Wall Street Journal*, September 17, 1999, W15); K. L. Billingsley, *From Mainline to Sideline: The Social Witness of the National Council of Churches* (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Policy Center, 1990); *Jerusalem Post*, October 11, 1999, 1; see also Samuel S. Hill Jr., *Religion in the Southern States: A Historical Study* (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1988).

71. *Christian Century*, March 17, 1999, 313–14.

72. See the interview with Eric Werner in *Catholica*, summer 1999, 97–105; and his books (with Jan Marejko), *De la misère intellectuelle et morale en Suisse romande* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1981); and (with Jan Marejko), *L'après-démocratie* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2001).

3

The Managerial as Therapeutic State

Thinking Therapeutically

This chapter builds upon the concept of the managerial state developed in *After Liberalism*. Chapters 3 and 4 of that work attempt to trace the evolution of "democratic" public administration as the most significant long-range political process of the twentieth century. Among the achievements of the democratic welfare state have been the bitterly contested suppression of alternative managerial models of governments, the successful identification of managerial rule with "liberal democracy," and the creation of popular consensus through social programs. All of these changes have occurred in conjunction with material and technological progress, a development that today's political class, particularly the media, ascribe to the growing central government.[1]

Public administration has led to ambitious programs of socialization no less than it has to dental and medical care. *After Liberalism* describes how this mode of social control has gone forward ever since the early twentieth century. From crusades against conventional vices condemned by Protestant reformers, such as drunkenness and gambling, advocates and implementers of government policy have marched from one agenda to the next, allegedly to improve social behavior. Since the 1960s, most of these reforming efforts have focused on fighting discrimination, removing stereotypes, and promoting "diversity." Whether characterized as "pluralism," "multiculturalism," or "diversity," this behavior modification does not represent an entirely new undertaking for American intellectuals or for the government. Such projects have deep roots in the war against fascist and authoritarian cultures going back into the 1930s. Not surprisingly, the advocates of the new offenses against "prejudiced"

conduct invoke the danger of Nazism and of “one thing leading to the next,” the next case being some facsimile of either the Third Reich or the segregationist South.

The keeping of “prejudice,” however it may be defined, from becoming oppressive is thought to require state control of social relations, to be guided by “social professionals.” This last point in particular has not gone unnoticed, and perceptive commentators, including Thomas Szasz, Philip Rieff, and Christopher Lasch, underscore the connection between public administration and coercive social and psychiatric services.[2] One reason this cooperation has progressed is that social ideologues, working hand in glove with the state, have been able to depict unfashionable thinkers and retrograde views as “pathological.” Those who express “prejudice” or who try to open questions that the political class has decided to close do so presumably because they are “sick.” Thus Atlanta pitcher John Rocker, who made disparaging remarks in an interview with *Sports Illustrated* about the gays, blacks, and Third World travelers he had encountered on Subway Train 7 in New York, was delivered, after a media outcry, to psychiatric care. What would seem more brutal insults directed against whites, policemen, and women by a Seventy Sixer basketball star and black rap singer Alan Iverson did not bring forth a comparable demand for psychiatric solutions.[3] Unlike Iverson’s vocal artistry, Rocker’s comments, it was decided, were “prejudiced.” They were the unguarded sentiments of a rural white Southerner, which were aimed at politically protected groups and were therefore symptomatic of a sick personality. Not all insults directed at minorities, as seen from this starkly ideological perspective, are “pathological.” Such an epithet is reserved for what the political class does not wish to hear or have said.

There are at least three ways in which managerial regimes are now engaged in managing consensus. One is for political and media opinion setters to stress that agreement has already been reached, for example, over immigration or multicultural programs; therefore those who oppose the policies now agreed upon either have missed the debate or are stirring up needless controversy. The second course is what German spokespersons of conscience call *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (overcoming the past) and their opponents call *Vergangenheitskeule* (employing the past as a club). By harping on the real or imagined evils of the past, proponents of state-controlled

socialization appeal to the guilty conscience of their listeners. They meanwhile energize the American liberal Protestant mentality and furnish occasions for exhibitions of public righteousness. But for those who continue to hold out, there is the possibility of treating dissent as a form of illness. Those who disagree with a policy to make us more "diverse," to help expunge the remnants of fascism, or to accommodate the marginalized are prejudiced and therefore sick. Their sickness requires treatment by professionals whom the state certifies or by sensitive judges who understand the effect of hate speech. In Canada this approach to the sick-prejudiced has been seized on by the courts, which enforce both federal and provincial hate speech codes: "Prosecutors are not required to show proof of malicious intent or actual harm to win convictions in hate speech cases, and courts in some jurisdictions have ruled that it does not matter whether the statements are truthful." In an interview with *Washington Post* reporter Steven Pearlstein, secretary general of the Canadian Human Rights Commission John Hucker explains "our position," that "you can't rely simply on the free exchange of ideas to cleanse the environment of hate and intolerance."[4]

In equally revealing language about this sniffing out of social sickness, the assistant prosecutor for the Superior Court of Paris, Martine Valdès-Bouloque, calls for legal surveillance of Paris bookshops that "exist only through and for the diffusion of this "unhealthy food *[nourriture malsaine]* called racism." Similarly, the president of the Superior Court of Versailles, Bernard Darcos, has called for strong legal action against "cultural neoracism." In addressing his colleagues in January 1994, Darcos complained about the "hydra" and "evil beast" slouching behind the "attachment of high value to one's cultural identity" as a European. Such an attitude, which undoubtedly masks a claim to "racial purity," requires monitoring and legal prosecution.[5]

The two most common reactions to these sensitizing initiatives in the Western world are popular indifference or public endorsement. In Italy, Germany, and France, national polls suggest that fear of verbal and intellectual repression does not register particularly high as a political concern. In all of these countries, unemployment (which is between 10 and 15 percent) is the major issue that citizens believe the state should address, though the present high level of support for

center-left, explicitly pro-multicultural governments in France and Germany does not seem to depend on reducing unemployment—or even preventing it from growing worse.[6] Although immigration remains a political problem in Europe, according to an extensive poll among Italian citizens, immigration and crime for 80 percent of the respondents are "in large part identical themes." Those who consider immigration as a problem mean that "it is related to crime, not that it necessitates a difficult process of assimilation."[7] Neither coercive multiculturalism nor the criminalization of hateful ideas was felt to be a pressing issue for all Italians as late as 1999.

In the United States, the public responds to the enforcement of politically correct behavior usually by going along. In a national survey for *American Enterprise*, 67 percent of the respondents gave as a "responsibility of the federal government" "ensuring fair treatment of women and minorities." A related task assigned to the federal government, which 53 percent of the respondents approved of, is "guarding against discrimination in hiring." "Helping the poor and unemployed" made it as far as 40 percent.[8] Although there are different ways of understanding the thinking involved here, one conclusion seems evident. No strikingly negative response has been registered to the government's crusade against "discrimination," going from extensive and intensive sexual harassment training in the workplace and steady litigation on behalf of offended minorities to the establishment of minority set-asides and the imposition of politically correct terminology.

Well-researched books by Frederick Lynch and Alvin Schmidt suggest a different view, namely that some Americans have grown dissatisfied with the political enforcement and policy ramifications of "diversity."[9] Lynch and Schmidt do not deny that diversity politics, taking into account working women, provide benefits to a substantial part of the population. But the cost for others may have become prohibitively high. Intrusive government action against "sexual harassment" has led some feminists into pulling back from the task of reconstructing gender relations. The translation of women's rights, as the granting of a carte blanche to the government to intervene in the family, has widened the split between those who call themselves "moderates" and those whom they designate as "radical feminists."

According to Lino Graglia, the “slippery slope” effect of enforcing diversity at educational institutions is becoming common knowledge.[10] Filling political quotas with designated minorities does not end this social engineering project. The institution (or employer) is expected to create a “non-hostile” learning or work environment once the minorities have been admitted or hired. Otherwise there may result suits and other forms of government bullying. Nonminority members of the workforce are sent to special therapeutic sessions, where they are taught to minister to the self-esteem of those deemed victims of past discrimination.

In view of these bothersome practices, why does one continue to find widespread approval of antidiscrimination measures—or, for the most part, tepid opposition, where some resistance persists? Going beyond the more obvious explanations, that some people benefit from diversity policies and that poll respondents are afraid to sound insensitive, there may be another reason that Americans (and Europeans) endorse what political analyst Robert Weissberg calls “coercive tolerance.”[11] Like Germans, Americans have been exhorted, and now wish to “overcome the past.” That past, including the recent one, is believed to have been so insensitive that it behooves us to root it out—and to assist a caring state toward that end. Although some of the cultural past may be allowed to survive—for example, brownstone buildings that can be gentrified, a symphony or Flemish tableau vivant that minorities may like, or a still “living constitution” that advances social engineering—most of our Eurocentric heritage is thought to express and transmit a reactionary consciousness. From the standpoint of the media and minority representatives, the removal of this consciousness is an eternally present task—and one that must be addressed by reforming public education, renaming buildings and streets, and removing “noninclusive” flags and monuments. One Southern conservative critic, who observes such violence being done to *his* heritage, scolds New Orleans officials “who had removed Washington’s name from an elementary school because he was a slave holder.” He objects to the fact that Robert E. Lee’s picture had disappeared from a historical display along the Richmond, Virginia, waterfront, after a Black Muslim councilman had protested. He further complains that black students are saluting the black liberation flag in

New Orleans schools, while Confederate flags are being dragged down as hate symbols throughout the South.[12]

Such actions have certainly occurred but, except for some manifestations of Southern white opposition in the case of the Confederate flag, have not led to a major political backlash. The majority white Christian population put up with, when not openly acclaiming, the cultural and perceptual reforms introduced for the sake of inclusiveness. The general impression conveyed by the media, and by now, it must be assumed, widely accepted, is that the past, which survives in the form of white, male Western consciousness, stands in the way of social harmony, whence the value of forcing students and employees to attend diversity and sexual harassment sessions, the suppression of nonauthorized ideas and speech, and the vigilant removal of symbols and icons showcasing the unreconstructed past.

Such a strenuous project would seem to have its home on the political left. But in the United States the establishment Right has competed with its opponents in calling for the obliteration of certain insensitive appurtenances of the inherited culture. Conservative celebrities rush to affirm the social progress they believe has been made in the war against prejudice; they dwell on how much the United States has improved in their lifetimes as a result of these extraordinary exertions.[13] Neoconservative and moderate feminist Daphne Patai deplores recent government zeal in the prosecution of sexual harassment but approves of the concept behind it: “For a brief time it did identify something outrageous that needed to be stopped.” And Patai insists that the heterophobia that pervades contemporary feminism would have been entirely acceptable a hundred years ago. Feminists “would have been justified in taking a more aggressive stance at a time when women’s relationships with men were characterized above all by women’s civic inequality, their extreme economic dependence, their lack of education, and their vulnerability to constant pregnancy.” Patai begins her critique by negatively describing those Western societies in which feminist consciousness has not yet come to prevail.[14]

According to *Wall Street Journal* commentator Francis Fukuyama, it may be wrong to agonize too much over the slaughters unleashed by twentieth-century Western history. “That may have been the price paid for a situation in which 40 percent of the world’s population live in

politics that can reasonably be labeled democratic." If German armies had taken Paris in 1914, at the outset of the First World War, Fukuyama reasons, the victory "would have left unimpaired the cultural self-confidence of 19th century European civilization." But the result would have been to stunt our moral consciousness: "A German century may have been peaceful and prosperous, but in the social sphere it would also have been stratified, corporatist, ultimately based on racial and ethnic hierarchy—a world made safe for South Africa."[15]

Fukuyama's "neo-Hegelian" defense of an unfolding progressive consciousness may be less common as a justification for the present age than the insistence that all of us have agreed to be sensitized. Significantly, it is never demonstrated that the "all" to which reference is made chose one social policy over another. In European versions of the same choice making at the crossroads, Jürgen Habermas and Ralph Giordano in Germany and Bernard-Henri Lévy in France have presented their countries as poised "between the two cities," one characterized by xenophobic communitarianism and nationalism, and the other by the Enlightenment dream of openness, human rights, and internationalism. One is given the impression that an existential turning is now taking place, and each one of us can pick between the multicultural equivalents of Christ and Barabbas. According to Lévy, a prominent French ally of the American neoconservatives, the struggle for diversity and human rights is fraught with demonic temptation: The Antichrist, which is the Old France of "archaism" and "organic identity," lies in waiting for the unsuspecting. Like Calvin dwelling on the insidiousness of human depravity among those seeking to be virtuous, Lévy explains how "French fascism operates through changing discourses, indeed not by clear and distinct statement but by furtive, wandering, and malevolent slips." A "French ideology," opposed to human rights, "functions as a lexicon, an encyclopedia, a tightly closed circle, a system of images—French fascism is a language literally structured as an unconscious force." This undiscovered intention that remains embedded in language and custom supposedly indicates the need for a cognitive reformation. Lévy does not explicitly designate the educational instrument desired, but it may be inferred that he does not oppose the crusade in his country against "crimes of opinion." Like German spokespersons for conscience, Lévy does not complain about

"antifascism" eating up bourgeois liberties but about its failure to decipher the tactics of its enemy fully.[16]

The Therapeutic State Deciphered

There are three defining characteristics of the therapeutic regime that sprang from the managerial welfare state of the twentieth century: the attempt to present as mere psychological and educational matters what are increasingly intrusive uses of government power to alter social behavior; dividing society into victims and nonvictims (or victimizers); and a politics of disposition, in which "sensitivity" becomes the decisive issue for drawing friend-enemy distinctions. Underlying the argument offered is the premise that multiculturalism is no passing eccentricity in an otherwise liberal polity. Nor is the "menace of multiculturalism," as intimated by Dinesh D'Souza, Chester Finn, and Gertrude Himmelfarb, primarily its effects in dividing American citizens and breaking down consensus. To the contrary: The political class has adopted inclusiveness and diversity as a political instrument, as a means of controlling a society it has set about reshaping. What Frederick Lynch calls the "diversity machine" is a mechanism of state power that operates without anyone being permitted to notice its coercive nature. Therapeutic regimes are packaged in a way that disguises their resort to force; both the Left and establishment Right in the United States, which misrepresent political life, have helped to make this concealment possible.

On the left, argues Robert Weissberg in *The Politics of Empowerment*, "The clamor for more empowerment is a convenient escape from more daunting labor," "to wit, a slothful illiterate should mend his or her ways and enroll in school if steady employment is the aim, not be rescued by some bureaucratic deus ex machina." After providing numerous examples of whose interest empowerment plans serve, Weissberg makes this observation: "It is ironic that each communal employment incites hiring more bureaucrats and the issuance of more detailed directives. The model of government assembling the necessary resources, for example, enforcing laws and providing police protection, and ten standing clear, has been superseded by the model of an expanding government, *benevolently* granting empowerment."[17] The rhetoric of "empowerment" is now

inevitably used to recommend or prescribe a variety of government directives and plans, from “banning” hate, as proposed by President Clinton, to requiring public school teachers, as explained in communications from federal departments, to accentuate the “normality” of gay relations and gay marriage. Such managerial efforts to recode “sexist” or “homophobic” misfits are not shown to be coercive. They are presented as expressions of caring that require hard love for those who resist.[18]

One striking case of the rhetorical avoidance of the bullying aspects of behavior modification were the justifications offered by Social Democratic intellectuals on behalf of the East German Communist government before its fall in 1989. According to Deutschland Radio Director Günter Müchler, even while the Berlin Wall was coming down, Social Democratic politicians and spokespersons went on acclaiming the Communist state, in the words of Günter Grass, as a “comfortable dictatorship.”[19] Choosing to deal with East German Social Democrats as opposed to members of the Communist coalition government, calls for jamming airwaves between the two Germanies until the summer of 1989, and protests against monitoring violence against dissenters in East Germany were all actions that West German officials, and most prominently the Social Democrats, endorsed. And even after the Communists fell, “intellectuals of conscience,” most noticeably Jürgen Habermas and Günter Grass, came forth to warn against the perils of German unification and extolled the reconstituted East German Communist coalition.

According to German Jewish journalist Hendryk Broder, this “washing-clean” of Communist collaborators and tyrants and the refusal to express “simple joy that a totalitarian system had collapsed” testifies to a passion among intellectuals for social control. For German progressives, the Communist East German government was a social experiment that was worth preserving. Not only was this *“Nischengesellschaft”* (dainty, hole-in-the-wall society), as Grass called it, seen as a useful model of social planning. It also was held up preeminently as an instrument by which Germans could work off the burden of the past. The fall of the Communist regime, as noted by the historian Joachim Fest, rendered the self-appointed spokesmen “for critical consciousness entirely speechless.” Only with the deepest

reluctance did they "renounce [in this instance] the role of being a moral-political high court."[20]

An equally striking concealment of power is reflected in how centrist conservatives interpret the relation between government and society. Here the managerial state is presented as what is best in the American constitutional regime, a government that is self-limiting and supports a free market and cultural and social differences. Our political model, according to the neoconservative *Weekly Standard*, is too good to be kept entirely to ourselves. Editors William Kristol and Robert Kagan invoke a "new American nationalism" that will bring American political institutions to other societies, if necessary, by force. The precedent Kristol and Kagan cite is Woodrow Wilson's crusade against the authoritarian Central Powers, which helped to make the world safe for democracy. Similarly, Allan Bloom, in *The Closing of the American Mind*, praises American participation in the Second World War as "really an educational project undertaken to force those who do not accept these principles [freedom and equality] to do so." Indeed, when Americans speak seriously about politics, they know that "the American project is not only for Americans."[21]

Conservative spokesmen also insist that a "conservative revolution" took place during the presidency of Ronald Reagan and during Margaret Thatcher's tenure as prime minister in England. As a result of this "revolution," explains conservative activist and Heritage Foundation scholar Lee Edwards, "the American conservative movement politically has triumphed." The welfare state was tamed, the United States was rendered fiscally responsible, and the Soviet Communists were driven from the world stage. All that remains for the completion of this ongoing revolution is for the "Right to take back the culture." This continues to be in the hands of an insidious counterculture that took over the United States sometime in the sixties. But without the burden of world Communism, ample opportunity is present to mount an offensive against the presumably beleaguered forces of the Left. A former *National Review* publisher, William A. Rusher deplores the "sin against reality" that keeps conservatives from acknowledging the magnitude of their victory. Rusher urges his comrades-in-arms to press on to the "final struggle" against the "metaphysical" enemies of Judeo-Christian religion.[22]

References to a “counterculture” and to its allegedly widespread effects abound in conservative academic, aesthetic, and social commentaries. The most persistent alleged sources of moral pollution, according to Allan Bloom, are the American university’s “German connection” and its continued devotion to literary postmodernism. The war on national standards and coherent discourse, according to Bloom, carries a decidedly fascist and Teutonic whiff. Students of Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche are now marketing in the United States the antidemocratic nihilism that in Germany led to Nazism and the Holocaust. Bloom is agitated less about feminist, gay, or explicitly revolutionary socialist ideologies than he is about the spread of foreign pollutants. These imports are, to his mind, the grave problems, to which he keeps returning in his commentary on cultural-educational decline.[23]

Similar concerns, albeit other more timely ones, crop up in Alvin Schmidt’s *The Menace of Multiculturalism*, which deals critically with the “leftist political ideology” springing from “the marriage of cultural relativism and postmodernism.”[24] Schmidt devotes almost two hundred pages of his work to the double standards that multiculturalism applies, for example, the right of “indignant” gays and blacks to insult and physically assault politically incorrect opponents who are not permitted by the media to exhibit *their* anger. He draws on the conclusions of Arthur Schlesinger, in *The Disuniting of America*, that culturally divisive academic trends have convulsed American society and are now influencing our government. He ends his book by recounting the “American record” that the multiculturalists presumably ignore: defeating the Third Reich, “overcoming the corrosive social effects of the sixties,” and achieving the downfall of Communism. By accentuating such accomplishments, Schmidt tells us, we can help Americans overcome the “syndrome of white guilt” and restore patriotic virtue.

A variation on this view of a culturally driven politics can be found in Gertrude Himmelfarb’s *One Nation, Two Cultures*, a study that focuses attention on the “demoralization and remoralization of American society.” Himmelfarb is deeply concerned about the weakening of the traditional nuclear family and about the “crisis of legitimacy” to which judicial incursions into social questions have contributed. These developments are traced to a cultural war in which “two cultures” are in contention, one derived from European ideas and from the “adversary

culture" diagnosed by Lionel Trilling in 1965, and the other from the middle-class roots of the American founding. Himmelfarb's sympathies are unmistakably with the second, but she also fears that those beyond the establishment Right are trying to "illegitimize legitimate government." They "reach for hyperbole" when they deplore the effects of intrusive judges and officious administrators.[25] While Himmelfarb explores social breakdown by pointing to capitalism, prosperity, and academic culture, she hesitates when it comes to criticizing the "polity." Like George Will in *Statecraft and Soulcraft*, a work she quotes with obvious respect, Himmelfarb adorns her description of the federal government with high-sounding quotations from Aristotle, Burke, and Hegel. And she depicts herself as occupying a middle ground between "bureaucratic zealots" and the "armed fanatics of the right," who treat American government as a tyranny.

The culturally deterministic argument stated but never proved by Himmelfarb avoids any recognition of the modern state as a builder of culture. Like Schmidt, Schlesinger, and Bloom, Himmelfarb pays only scant attention to how central states shape society. She fails to note, for example, that such regimes attract and hire those who are compatible with its agendas. It is not simply that the "counterculture" has temporarily occupied public administration. The opposite may be more likely, according to one homosexual libertarian critic of the gay movement, Justin Raimondo. The "political successes" that gay activists celebrate are the acts taken by the state against declared or perceived opponents: "Today the so-called gay movement sees government as the agency, not the enemies, of liberty. From socialized medicine to anti-discrimination legislation to mandatory 'tolerance' lessons in the schools, there is no scheme to increase the power of government these alleged freedom fighters do not endorse." "As a specialized contingent of an army dedicated to ramming multicultural socialism down the throats of the American people," argues Raimondo, the gay movement thrives in part because those seeking to increase state power hold it to be a suitable vehicle.[26] Raimondo makes a point worth discussing about the relation between moral revolution and managerial control. Unlike respectable conservatives, he does not confuse the federal administration with the philosopher's regime. The government now in place, as opposed to one that comes clothed in Burkean rhetoric, searches out radical forces in order to break down

“noninclusive” behavioral patterns and to subjugate citizens. Those who favor such a course, for individual or collective reasons, will empower the state to pursue it.

The view of a generally weak state being up for grabs by contending cultural factions recalls the pluralist conception of government put forth by Theodore Lowi and Robert Dahl. In this once academically prevalent conceptualization of American “liberal” government, various groups compete for and thereby participate in civic and political affairs. Those groups that do better than others enjoy certain organizational advantages or material benefits but otherwise have no privileged power. This is the weakness of liberalism as embodied in American institutions, according to Lowi: “Liberal government cannot plan. Planning requires the authoritative use of authority,” whereas U.S. civic culture produces “economic negotiators instead of political leaders.”[27]

A recent formulation of this view, from Brookings Institute researcher Jeffrey Berry, is set forth in *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups*. Analyzing what are viewed as the “postmaterialist agendas of citizen activist groups” and their impact on congressional action, Berry never denies that the social policies of “liberal” activists triumph far more often than those of “conservatives.” Feminists, environmentalists, gays, black lobbies, and consumerists gain their legislative and administrative goals at the expense of their opponents, a trend Berry documents in detail.[28]

The reasons for this tendency go back to organizational strategies. “Liberal citizen groups have thrived not only because they have caught the fancy of the media and affluent suburbanites but because they have built strong well-managed organizations,” are effective in targeting core groups, and have “richer resources.” Most of these advantages have something to do with how one is depicted by the media, a condition that Berry readily concedes but also believes to be “justifiable.” “The state militias are truly radical in their political orientation, and the negative tone of these stories largely reflects the groups’ extreme rhetoric condemning American government. Most would regard it as irresponsible of the press to run stories that treated these organizations as if they were in the mainstream of American life.”[29]

One defect in this analysis is the failure to take into account other, more problematic examples of media bias. According to Berry, the

“business community” and conservative Christians fare among the mediacrats as badly as do state militias; and this public relations problem adds to the organizational difficulties faced by the American Right. “Richer resources,” reaching core groups, awakening public sympathy, and intimidating legislators all seem tied, in varying degrees, to how the media filters current events. Berry might have noticed that both public administrators and their media allies have definite interests in particular agendas. It is not simply a wash for the managerial state and its advocates whether tobacco companies get shaken down for money or are left alone. Nor is it a trivial choice for those who favor a weakening and eventual disappearance of a bourgeois Christian civic culture whether the gay agenda is advanced or retired. Finally it is never explained why the media is “justified” in making right-wing militia men look bad for not being “in the mainstream of American life.” The media does not do this when it interprets the “indignant” discourses of black or Hispanic nationalists or the anger of gay activists directed at traditional Christians.

A foundational practice for the therapeutic managerial state is the division of citizens (and by now resident aliens) into victims and nonvictims (or victimizers). These lines of demarcation are directly related to questions of power, for unlike the notion of the United States as a self-indulgent “nation of victims,” what is being argued is that the cult of victims is first and foremost about control. The point to be made is not that *everyone* craves self-esteem or needs to be “included” but that some groups have a privileged right to recognition and benefits and that the state determines who receives what. The interpretation by Frederick Lynch that public administrators and advocacy groups run the “diversity machine” for their private uses, is undoubtedly correct.[30] But even more relevant, as maintained in *After Liberalism*, the diversity machine produces vast reservoirs of power that devolve on the managerial state. “Caring” government is authorized to decide to what categories of treatment various groups and individuals are to be assigned. In Europe and Canada, this power prepares the way for another, related one, the right to suppress opposition deemed as “insensitive” to government-protected minorities.

The Therapeutic State in Historical Perspective

A particularly prescient analysis of the modern state came from Austrian Marxist Rudolf Hilferding, while hiding from the Nazis near Arles, France, in 1940. Contrary to the assertion by his commentator, Benedict Kautsky, that if Hilferding had survived the War, "he would have contributed to the further development of Marxism," that part of his literary legacy published as "The Historical Problem" suggests Hilferding was turning in a different direction. "Force," he stresses in his essay, "is decisive. That situation does not permit the belief that the economy determines the content, aim, and results of force."[31] Hilferding insists in the face of what passes for Marxist causal explanations that force has repeatedly given birth to far-reaching economic change. European patterns of settlement, distributions of land, and modern political economies all point back to periods of conquest and to the consolidation of nation-states.

"Force is blind and its consequences remain unpredictable," but it does create patterns of human interaction, which has been increasingly the case, according to Hilferding, since the outbreak of the First World War. The efforts by European states to mobilize for that struggle had resulted in increased political supervision of the economy and society. Despite a settled belief that material relations shape political life, Hilferding explains, Marxists should comprehend that "the political superstructure of society is a power in itself, with its own organs, tendencies, and interests. Simultaneous with the evolution of the modern economy has come the evolution of state power." Moreover, "since 1914 historical development has been characterized by the inherent interests of the state being extended to society, through the extension of its authority to once free areas of human activity, including the economy." Hilferding remarks on the "subordination of the hitherto implicit aspects of society *[der bisher gesellschaftlichen Unbewussten]* to the oversight of the state, which has risen to become the dominant social power."[32]

Note Hilferding does not deny that the kind of classical bourgeois society that developed in Western Europe depended on the availability of state power. Legal right assumes the threat or exercise of force; and political sovereigns provided the necessary protection for commercial economies based on investment and profit to take off. Nonetheless, what characterizes the contemporary political scene, the subordination of "self-regulated social spheres" to a unified state and the collapse of

any effective opposition to state direction, is something different from the early modern European past. “As the state subjugates to itself persons, it moves toward becoming a total power,” without the feudal restraints that limited European sovereigns. Hilferding rejects the notion that “the state is somehow bound by current productive capacities.”[33] In the modern world these “technical limits” are being pushed steadily back; and once the state can encroach “upon what was once an independent social sphere but is now a political one,” it is hard to imagine what will hold it back. At most, analysts might try to understand the aims of these increasingly unbounded states, and they might consider the “psychological” drives of those wielding power rather than the “objective context” of less significant socioeconomic variables.

Although Hilferding’s discussion of the state precedes a more or less conventional Marxist analysis of material relations and social consciousness, the first topic does not lead conceptually into the second. A thematic lacuna separates the two. And Hilferding tips his hand by presenting Marx’s historical view as applying “to struggles that take place in a sphere without a strong state and are not consciously controlled by rules.”[34] The contenders in this social struggle compete for the levers of political power, while the state acts as the deciding force by throwing its weight to one side or the other. Hilferding was drawing a picture of a distinctly modern state that was emerging at the time he was writing.

He was making reference to the managerial regime that came into its own in the first half of the twentieth century. Although Hilferding admittedly has in mind the total state that engulfed Central Europe in the thirties, he is also preoccupied with bureaucratic control as a characteristic of his time. And he explains that one way the “state-will” has come to prevail is by presenting itself as a counterweight to competing social forces. His observations overlap those of James Burnham and Robert Nisbet about managerial political power and about the apparent unstoppability of the expansion of the modern administrative state. But Hilferding saw more deeply than Burnham when he stressed the primarily political character of power (as opposed to the circulation of social elites). He also foreshadowed a later understanding of managerial government when he realized that socioeconomic analyses could not entirely account for the political developments of his age.[35] Since that time, the therapeutic state has

added a more subtle form of despotism to Hilferding's concept of managerial rule. This updated state masks the exercise of power as a form of caring, while moving toward the abolition of "private social relations" in order to sanitize group consciousness.

While this now-dominant Western regime does not engage in brute force, it marches nonetheless through once "independent social spheres." As both the protector of designated victims and the sensitizer of consciousness, this expanding central state is authorized to make constant interventions, directly or indirectly, in a wide range of human and commercial relations. In the United States, a residual liberal mentality still persists as a restraint on the political, but in Canada and Europe, the war against discriminatory thoughts and deeds (the second by now is equated with the first) has led to such invasive policies as criminalizing insensitive statements, even when demonstrably true, and jailing the perpetrators of hateful opinions and scholarship.

The German case is particularly worth exploring because of the extent to which German governments and German courts promote multicultural thinking. The Nazi regime weakened what remained of a classical liberal sensibility in German society; the postwar occupation pushed a defeated and humiliated nation into accepting a "democratic civic culture," which could only be built, or so it was explained, by imposing censorship and social engineering; and ever since the forties the Western media and American Jewish organizations have played up the insufficiency of German atonement for the German past. By now there are no strong sources of opposition to thought control in Germany, save for the self-identified regionalist Bavarians. Indeed, the more energetically "antidemocratic" and "nationalist-conservative" enemies are pursued by the courts and interior ministries, the more "world opinion" presses down on the Germans to deal with the "burdens" of their history. A common lament heard among Germans is *"Sie lassen uns die Meinung nicht aussprechen"* (they don't let us give our views)." The questions to be asked are: Who is doing the censoring, and what prevents the Germans from removing the censors and making their society more tolerable?

In Germany the now-established approach to "democratic" mental hygiene is known as *"Dispositionsjustiz."* Although occasionally subject to critical attention, it has remained, for the most part, popular with the media, and it is not something that even most center-right politicians spend their time challenging. For the German Left, *Dispositionsjustiz* is

seen as necessary to overcome the National Socialist past and to build reliable democrats. For the pro-business Right, “democratic education” is a means of getting along in what is thought to be a generally Teutonophobic climate. It is best, or so it seems, if Germans are viewed as perpetually atoning, in order to build contacts and prosper in a global economy.

In a detailed legal-historical study, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit*, Hans-Gerd Jaschke documents the contributions of the German Center Right to the policing of thought and opinion in German society. The Basic Law that set up the German Federal Republic in 1949 draws on a consciously antifascist perspective.[36] Most of the rights, starting with article 1, taken from the United Nations Charter, were presented as human rights, not as those pertaining specifically to citizens. The list of human rights, as explained by an architect of the document, Carlo Schmid, was “not merely an appendage of the organizational part of the constitution but its guiding principle.” In accordance with the commitment (expressed in articles 1 and 2) to protect human dignity and to provide for the “free development of personality and the physical protection of bodies,” article 16 proclaims a right of asylum that the new German government would extend to all refugees of oppression. Such intense concern with human rights issues, according to Jaschke and other German constitutional historians, were linked to the recent experience of Nazi tyranny and to remorse about the collapse of the pre-Nazi Weimar Republic. The new German way was further laid out by the determination of the occupying Allied forces, as expressed in the Potsdam Agreement of August 2, 1945, to keep “German militarism and Nazism” from returning to Central Europe.[37]

Subsequent attempts to associate the new German constitutional state with “militant” or “self-defending” democracy can likewise be traced to what is described by G. P. Boventer as “the political historical perspective of looking backward to Weimar and the Nazi era.”[38] Postwar Germany not only promulgated a document that played up the universal scope of those rights denied by the Nazis, but also took additional measures, like establishing the Federal Constitutional Court, to protect the “liberal democratic basic structure” it had erected, against “extremists.” This would be done, according to the Basic Law, article 9, by taking out of public discussion and electoral campaigns

both parties and candidates who might threaten the practice of democracy.[39]

Such arrangements have greatly benefited, as shown by Claus Nordbuch and Eckhard Jesse, the antifascist, politically correct Left, but for more than two decades it was the anti-Communist Center Right in Germany that determined the gloss on "militant democracy": Surveying the early years of the Cold War and West Germany's role under Konrad Adenauer and his Christian Democratic successors, as the first line of defense against the Communist East, Jaschke concludes: "Anti-Communism, viewed against the background of the theory of totalitarianism, is the interpretive key to understanding what served as the political enemy in the forty-year history of the old federal republic in its collective institutional orientation." Jaschke's sympathy for the German revolutionary Left notwithstanding, he is correct about the understanding of militant democracy during the height of the Cold War. "Democratic life was equated with institutional stability, public order," and "stigmatization of the totalitarian enemy," which meant the Communists and their West German sympathizers. A ban on the Communist Party in 1956, the arrest for treason of the editor of the leftist muckraking *Spiegel* in 1962, after illegally publishing military secrets, the emergency laws, *Notstandsgesetze*, issued in 1969 against predominantly left-wing revolutionaries (permitting the police to search mail and suspend habeas corpus for those suspected of subversion), and the enactment in the 1970s of loyalty oaths for government employees together with bans on professional activity for suspected revolutionaries must be read against the backdrop of the Cold War and of leftist terrorism in Germany. Although actions in the same period were taken against the "extremist" Right, for example, restrictions placed on the German National Party (NPD), the preferred German foe in the fifties and sixties, was on the revolutionary Left. Thus, observes Jaschke, a state mechanism took form that in the name of democratic self-defense engaged in the practice of "excluding, defining, and redefining" what is "antidemocratic."[40]

Significantly, the German intellectual Left did not dispute this close identification of German political and educational institutions with the imposition of "militant democracy." The chief complaint of Habermas, Kurt Sontheimer, and other progressive academics was that democratic consciousness had been yoked too closely with "internal

security."[41] The Cold War had derailed German reeducation, which should have led to a deeper and more sincere "coming to terms" with the nationalist and conservative past. The critique that emanated from German intellectuals against the "police state" measures introduced to protect German democracy did not reveal primarily a "liberal constitutional" motivation. Sontheimer's "critical condition of consciousness," as opposed to the mere "stability of political institutions," betrayed an uncritical attitude toward leftist violence and Communist dictatorships, driven by expressed anxieties about the German fascist past. Jashke quotes as representing "the leftist version of the discomforts of political culture" Social Democratic author Volker Hauff, who sounds remarkably similar to French neoconservative Bernard-Henri Lévy.[42] Hauff alludes to "the historical reasons for the defective democratic substance" of the German Republic, and laments that "unconquered residues continue to pervade the depth of our historical awareness while German history is allowed to go on in a closed fashion *[klammheimlich]*."[43]

As the leftist critics of "militant democracy as internal security" pursued "democratic education," increasingly after Willi Brandt became German Chancellor in 1969, the result was not freedom of dissent but an increasingly invasive investigation of unadjusted political dispositions. Particularly in the last two decades, according to Jaschke, "political justice against the Right does not consist of the warding off or condemnation of any immediate danger to the state or constitution."[44]

> Political justice against the Right is the judging of disposition *[Gesinnungsjustiz]*, and the corresponding measures include legal sanctions being brought against individual, incriminating opinions and the state regulation of social communication. Through punitive measures, the state intervenes repressively in the already developed communications structure of society. Right extremism and neo-Nazism in particular are always judged against the background of the Nazi past. Their potential as a threat is measured in terms of political hygiene, the international standing of the Federal Republic, and the danger of misleading the young. Countermeasures are justified as an act of cleansing and distancing oneself from the Nazi past. The indexing of books by the Federal Examining Agency for Writings Harmful to Youth is an illustration of this connection. Almost all works now being banned are said to have a "right-extremist content."[45]

While the repressive punishment of thought in Germany has come more often than not from the "antifascist" Left, operating largely without journalistic censure, it is hard to ignore the other side's foolishness in

greasing the skids. For years, as explained by Nordbuch and Jaschke, center-right authors and politicians were demanding that the Ministry of Interior and Security face up to left-wing subversion. Windy theoretical justifications were produced on order, like Günter Rohrmoser's voluminous polemics against the Nietzschean temptation that was held responsible for pushing the young into terrorist acts.[46] Rohrmoser and a second antiterrorist philosopher, Hermann Lübbe, were featured at Christian Democratic congresses and at party educational forums. And while some of their arguments include a thoughtful reformulation of Bloom's comments on the academic Left, these spokesmen were treading on dangerous ground. Such high thinkers claimed to be vindicating the "Christian democratic state" against the "opening to totalitarianism" that they blamed on the German Left. But their learned admonitions to the state to press on mightily against "totalitarians" would not be followed in a way these intellectuals intended. The professional blacklisting they were happy to see enacted would affect not only revolutionary leftists but also those who were being spied on by their colleagues.[47] By the late seventies, government-issued bans were ceasing to target the far Left, and by the eighties the thought police were directing their expanded power against "disturbers of peace" almost invariably identified with the Right.

An added weapon wielded by the forces of social conformity in Germany has been the publicized investigations pursued by regional agencies for protecting the German constitution against "nationalist-conservative" authors and publications. As a result of this hectoring, according to German jurist Alexander von Stahl, unfriendly bureaucrats have "thrust the editors, subscribers, contributors, and advertisers of a suspect magazine into the limelight of judicial investigations."[48] In the last six years, the interior ministry of Nordrhein-Westfalen, the most populous of the German Länder, has issued reports, as a guardian of constitutional democracy, against the fortnightly *Junge Freiheit*. Although a Socialist regional government has not found what would be considered hard evidence of "right-wing extremism," it has condemned the paper's "intimations" of a nationalist, xenophobic outlook: Such an "orientation," according to the warning that accompanies this finding, does not allow for desirable social change. Because of this report, issued for six years in succession and which anxious editors are still challenging in court, *Junge Freiheit* operates on the edge of legality. In

2000 it lost its account when Berlin banks, which tremble at the possibility of adverse publicity, would not deal with it commercially. The editors also face a steep uphill battle to win back advertisers, who, like the Berlin bankers, are concerned about taking on the German federal and regional authorities.[49]

In an address upon receiving the Peace Prize of the German Book Trade in 1998, literary scholar Martin Walser observes with obvious sarcasm: “Everyone knows our historical burdens, the perpetual shame: No day goes by without their being thrown up at us.” Walser points to the ritualized acts of atonement, “the exploitation of our shame for current uses,” and the public displays of conscience by intellectuals “working in the gruesome service of remembrance.” His remarks are timely and courageous, particularly his distinction between recognizing historical atrocities and suspecting ulterior motives when those atrocities “are being constantly paraded” before one’s eyes and when those only remotely responsible for them are required to apologize perpetually.[50]

A Common Multicultural Fate

Where Walser exaggerates is stressing the peculiarly German character of the burden he describes. By now all Christians have been generically indicted for the Holocaust, which has been extended to gays and explained in such a way as to minimize the suffering of identifiably Christian victims. An emphatically anti-German reading of the Holocaust, Daniel Goldhagen’s *Hitler’s Willing Executioners*, begins by attributing the murder of European Jewry to Christian civilization; only once that blame has been categorically asserted does Goldhagen launch his indictment of Germany’s “eliminationist” anti-Semitic past. As documented by Peter Novick, the American Jewish view of the Holocaust (which is also accepted in the Christian community) has shifted from sharp distinctions drawn between Nazism and Christianity to a gradual blurring of the two.[51] The attempts by German governments to oversee hateful or inappropriate communications, which Jaschke, Walser, and Nordbuch document, have taken place in other European countries and reached Anglophone North America. Despite the pejorative talk about Germany’s Sonderweg, the once-patriotic German path to state-enforced political correctness is neither

solitary nor exclusively German. Just as the onus of Hitlerism is said to fall in a specific way on Germans and Austrians, equivalent historical burdens have been ascribed to other Western peoples with equal solemnity. Not only are all Western Christians guilty of racism, sexism, homophobia, and anti-Semitism but also individual Western nations are made to carry additional millstones. Thus Euro-Americans express a collective duty to atone for their racist past, and because of this historical weight, according to Canadian historian, Richard Iton, they have produced an "exceptionalist Left" that remains deeply mired in American racial issues.[52] In point of fact, none of this "exceptionalism" is truly exceptional. What is being designated is a penance that befalls Americans but one requiring the same breast-beating that all Western populations are now performing.

There are several characteristics of the present shared political-cultural fate. One is the presence of a vast state apparatus that is willing and able to practice behavior modification. Another trait, examined in depth in *After Liberalism*, is the bureaucratic and media efforts to "pathologize" attitudes and views by placing them outside of public discussion. Only the mentally unhealthy, we are told, would be disposed to present these views, the range and variety of which continue to grow. The pathology in question is invariably of the fascist kind, or, in the language of *The Authoritarian Personality*, part of the "prehistory of fascism." We are supposedly dealing with a pattern of socially and culturally unacceptable beliefs, which in the thirties and forties resulted in right-wing derailments and may do so again. There are those who admit to this problem and, according to Walser, have turned displays of conscience into public ceremonies. No longer a brooding, individualized activity, the appeal to conscience for German intellectuals is an act of self-glorification, in which "negative nationalism" is vented upon others. Such behavior fits the liberal Christian paradigm that now towers over Western culture. The righteous few make a show of good conscience by apologizing for collective sins—and by exhorting the state to enact compulsory penance.

At the same time, the political class in Western countries has embarked, with minimal opposition, on a program of mental purgation. Government, educators, and the media seek to cleanse us of the "unsubdued vestiges" of the past that still cling to our minds and society. Only by calling forth these residues can we exorcise them as a

mental and historical burden. The predilection among German intellectuals for the term *Heraufbeschwörung* to designate this process seems appropriate: The word conveys an exorcism as well as an act of calling up. “Prejudice,” “hate” and other historical residues work beneath the surface, and their opponents accordingly refer to the unconscious forces that progressive custodians of mental well-being should obliterate from people’s minds and from public life.

What makes these residues especially harmful, we are told, is their insidious operation in ordinary life—and the refusal of the uninstructed to come to terms with them. This takes, among other forms, the habit of arguing empirically against the need for reeducation. A point ponderously developed by the postmodernist Left is that unwelcome refutations and investigations, drawn from ideologically incorrect observations, supposedly have no place in “critical” discussions. This broad maxim guides not only the humanities departments of major American universities but also how the media and government treat insensitive argumentation. Those critics who argue against expressions of inclusiveness, even with airtight documentation, are seen to be contaminating the rest of us. According to Stanley Fish, there is no moral reason to grant nonprogressive voices any status in a conversation or to tolerate the expression of reactionary opinions in civil society.[53] Judgments that uncongenial speakers bring forth must be evaluated with reference to the political situation. The wielders of a hegemonic discourse, favoring the oppression of blacks, women, gays, and other victims, may have to be silenced for the good of the weak. Although not averse to the deconstruction of meanings, Fish makes clear that such activity should help the marginalized and not the dominant class, gender, or race.

Thus when the sprawling 120-page Justice Department *Hate Crime Report* plays up the white Christian majority’s hatred of “blacks, Hispanics, Jews, and Muslims,” or when *Le Monde Diplomatique*, in the dossier, “Les crimes de haine, symptômes,” targets white male Christian perpetrators of “ethnoviolence,” all sensitized readers understand the operative terms.[54] “Ethnoviolence” and “epidemic” acts of hate do not refer to that overwhelming majority of cases involving interracial violence, namely, those committed by blacks. Recalling this “fact” indicates the presence of embarrassing historical residues—something the speaker or writer has not yet been put behind or faced

honestly. We are thus required to bring to justice or at least stigmatize the makers of insensitive statements, even of statements that happen to be statistically or empirically defensible. There is only one mentally healthy and socially sensitive response to the "hate problem," which the state and the media claim to be giving us. It is to accept the task that former Attorney General Janet Reno brought to public attention, to keep close watch on other Americans, and particularly school students, in order to protect them against the forming of hateful stereotypes.[55]

Although it is sometimes stated that we are taking action against the incitement to violence by nativists and other reactionaries, the objects of this repression do not usually pose a credible physical threat to the state. One illustration is the punishment that goes on in Europe against "Holocaustdeniers" and critics of gay rights and immigration. These groups are certainly not positioned to subvert political power and express no interest in doing so. They are also, on the whole, less "divisive" than protected minorities, like Hispanic nationalists in the American Southwest and fundamentalist Muslims in France, who are generally more open about offending the majority culture. But the *Gesinnungsjustiz* that Jaschke defines in his book has nothing to do with what states once understood as threats to their existence. This new policy punishes insensitive disposition, and that may be the only way, it is stressed, that the residues of the past can be expunged, particularly for those who persist in making mean-spirited arguments.[56]

Internal and Other Contradictions

A final observation may be in order about the relationship of therapeutic ideology to the managerial state. While public administration benefits both materially and in terms of power from the forming of inclusive, multicultural teachings and mentalities, it is also limited by an established set of beliefs. It would be hard indeed for political leaders to disengage from their beliefs, to pursue their own advantage, or to deal with changed public perceptions, without opposition from the ideological core of the political elite. One need only imagine what would happen to his public relations if former President Clinton uttered homophobic, sexist, or white nationalist sentiments for any period of time. Ideology creates limits as well as justifications for power.

Moreover, those who rise to prominence or exercise power as defenders of an ideology usually believe in it, to whatever extent they believe in anything beyond self-interest. It is beside the point whether such ideologues remain entirely consistent in their adherence to their stated convictions. Inconsistencies do not betray necessarily a lack of conviction, whether the one being challenged is Senator Hillary Clinton, who does not live among the black constituents she champions, or Emperor Charles V and King Louis XIV, who defended the Catholic faith while begetting children out of wedlock. Consistent behavior does not have to accompany moral and visceral acceptance of a body of belief in order to prove that the adherent accepts that belief internally.

But the doctrine upheld may well immobilize when the elite in question encounters unaccustomed situations. When or if, for example, multiculturalism starts to lose its popular hold, would those associated with its reign be able to free themselves from unprofitable convictions? The problem is not simply the inertia of those already in power but the sentiments and ideals attached to their exercise of power. A case in point is the angry reactions found among European journalists, politicians, and judges to the inclusion in the Austrian government of a populist of the Right, Jörg Haider. The attempt by the largely Socialist European Community to isolate Austria for internal political choices was a frontal assault, as noticed by the Swedish, Danish, and Czech governments, upon Austrian sovereignty. It highlighted the effort by a supranational, economically collectivist, and ideologically multicultural institution to impose its view of the Good on a small, unwilling country. Those who were imposing their values believe that Haider represents for all to see the unconquered vestiges of European fascism. These vestiges account not only for Haider's insufficient or reluctant expiation for Nazism, but also for his generally insensitive politics. His opposition to immigration, his decentralizing plans for Austria, and his classical liberal economics make him a threat to what his accusers deem as essential for human betterment. A successful Haider would work to undo that vision of the world that the political and media elites consider as good for every Westerner.[57]

A dossier on populist mavericks published in *Corriere della Sera*, similar to feature articles printed in the French, German, and American presses, attributes to European opponents of immigration interlocking reactionary positions, from inciting homophobia to denying the

Holocaust.[58] Although no credible documentation for these charges is presented in most of the cases adduced, there is no reason to believe that those who make them do not accept their validity. Nor is there reason to doubt that, for the accusers, all of the charges are inextricably connected.

Note the managerial-therapeutic elite feel confident about the future, as long as they can exorcise the unhappy, demonic past. The dossier on the "extreme Right" in Europe featured in *Corriere della Sera* announces good news as well as bad, namely, that the Finns had "rejected Haider," when they elected as their president Socialist and pro-gay feminist Tarja Halonen. Among her vaunted qualities, Halonen is someone who hopes to increase the rate of Third World immigration into Finland.[59] But how would the globalist elite and its media allies "cope" if large numbers of voters move away from politicians like this one, or if candidates attacked by the media survive and prosper as focal points of politically incorrect opposition? If the fitful reactions against Haider are an indication at all, adjustment for those in power may not be an easy thing. The present ideological justification for their control may become an "unsubdued legacy" in the face of an unexpected historical turn.

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1. See Paul Gottfried, *After Liberalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), particularly 62–71; for a full-blown celebration of public administration as the source of material progress, see *The Power of Public Ideas*, ed. Robert B. Reich (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). See also James Kalb, "The Tyranny of Liberalism," *Modern Age* 42–43 (summer 2000): 23–52, for a study of the moral suppositions of the behavior control inherent in "inclusive societies"; and Paul Gottfried, "La politique thérapeutique," *Catholica*, spring 2000, 33–38; and the attempt to define the permitted ambits of Holocaust discussions in *Le Monde*, February 21, 1979, 23.

2. Thomas Szasz, *Psychiatric Slavery* (New York: Free Press, 1977); Rieff, *Triumph of the Therapeutic;* and Christopher Lasch, *The True and Only Heaven* (New York: Norton, 1979), 450–65.

3. See *Sports Illustrated*, October 2, 2000, 120; "For the Mets, Another Dreary Night in Georgia," *New York Times*, October 13, 2000, D1; Jeff Pearlman, "At Full Blast," *Sports Illustrated*, December 27, 1999, 60; and Karen de Carter, "Multicultural Morass," *Laissez Faire City Times* 4, no. 50 (December 11, 2000): 28–29.

4. See Steve Pearlstein, "In Canada, Free Speech Has Its Restrictions," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1999, A41.

5. Editorial in *Le Monde*, January 14, 1994; see Bernard Darco's medical analogies in his discourse on "le néo-rascisme culturel," in *Le Monde*, January 11, 1994.

6. See the lead story on European popular opinion in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 26, 1999, A1.

7. See the poll results and analysis in Renato Mannheimer, "Anche all'esecutivo bis l'Italia Chiede più lavoro," *Corriere della Sera*, January 27, 1999, 7; Marco Tarchi, "Populismo Italian Style," *Trasgressioni* 13 (December 2000): 77–108; and Yannis Papadopoulos, "Il nazionalpopulismo nell'Europa occidentale: Un fenomeno ambivalente," *Trasgressioni* 13 (December 2000): 109–37.

8. *American Enterprise* 11, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 70.

9. Frederick Lynch, *The Diversity Machine: The Drive to Change the "White Male,"* 2d ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2000); Alvin J. Schmidt, *The Menace of Multiculturalism: Trojan Horse in America* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997).

10. Lino Graglia, "'Hate Speech' Codes and 'Political Correctness': Fruit of 'Affirmative Action,'" *Northern Kentucky Law Review* 23, no. 3 (1998): 505–14.

11. Robert Weissberg, *Political Tolerance* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1998), particularly 7–9, 226–28. For a candid statement of "coercive tolerance," see Stanley Fish, *There's No Such Thing As Free Speech, and It's a Good Thing Too* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

12. *Richmond Times Dispatch*, November 3, 2000, B2, 8; *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, May 7, 2000, A9; on the alleged relation between Rocker's outburst and the Confederate flag as rallying points for Nazi-like hate, see David J. Garrow's feature article, "John Rocker Has Become a Human Confederate Flag," in the *San José Mercury News*, June 11, 2000, A1.

13. See the discussion of this topic in Paul Gottfried, *The Conservative Movement*, rev. ed. (New York: Twayne-Macmillan, 1992), 42–66; and the symposium piece on the American Right, Paul Gottfried, "After the Decades, Has the Conservative Movement Triumphed?" *Insight*, March 22, 1999, 25–27.

14. Daphne Patai, *Heterophobia: Sexual Harassment and the Future of Feminism* (New York: Newman and Littlefield, 1998), 11, 12. See also Paul Gottfried, review of *Heterophobia*, by Daphne Patai, *Society* 37, no. 2 (January/February 2000): 78–80. Probably the most pitiless dissection performed on Daphne's distinction between the moderate and less-moderate feminists is the review of her book by Carol Iannone in *Academic Questions* 14, no. 1 (winter 2000–2001): 27. Although appreciative of Patai's analysis of radical feminism's coercive aspects and negative attitudes toward the opposite sex, Iannone underlines the historic, social, and cultural links between the two feminisms.

15. Francis Fukuyama, "It Could Have Been the German Century," *Wall Street Journal*, December 31, 1999, A10.

16. Bernard-Henri Lévy, *L'idéologie Française* (Paris: Grasset, 1981), 16–18, 264–65, 260, 263–64; the epilogue to this work overflows with extravagant architectural images centered on a French fascist danger that "lacks any center" but is enveloping the institutions of the anticapitalist Left and the nationalist Right. While Lévy fears there may be no "positive solution to a threat so insidious, lying in wait everywhere *[à l'affût de tous parages]*," he does not rule out vigorous censorship, particularly in his comments on the "black nationalist force." See also Jürgen Habermas, *Die Nachholende Revolution* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990); and Ralph Giordano, *Die Zweite Schuld oder von der Last Deutscher zu sein* (Hamburg: Rosch and Röhring, 1992).

17. Robert Weissberg, *The Politics of Empowerment* (Westport: Praeger, 1999), 187.

18. See “Clinton Urges Boost in Rights, Hate Crimes Coverage,” *Washington Post*, January 16, 2000, A5; and the editorial discussion of the Hate Crime Prevention Act in the *New York Post*, April 8, 1999, 37.

19. Quoted in Günter Müchter, “Die moralische Abrüstung der Linken and die Erblast DDR,” in *Medien Dialog*, 8/98, p. 24.

20. Quoted in *Medien Dialog*, 8/98, p. 26. See also the favorable opinion concerning Grass’s attitude toward the DDR and concerning his stated anxiety about the rightist dangers of German unification in Ian Buruma, “Gunter’s Ghost,” *New Yorker*, October 19, 1992, 92; and *Medien Dialog*, 8/98, p. 24.

21. See William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996, 25–34; Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 153. A critical work that deals devastating blows to Bloom’s preferred version of American democracy is Claes G. Ryn, *The New Jacobinism: Can Democracy Survive?* (Washington, D.C.: National Humanities Institute, 1991); see also Irving Babbitt’s perennial classic on the degradation of American constitutional republicanism into egalitarian sentimentality and imperial appetite, *Democracy and Leadership* (1924; reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1979).

22. Lee Edwards, *The Conservative Revolution: The Movement that Remade America from Robert Taft to Newt Gingrich* (New York: Free Press, 1999); the quotation from Rusher is from his triumphalist speech on May 26, 1999, given at the Conservative Century dinner sponsored by the American Conservative Union (“Conservative Century,” *Insight*, June 21, 1999, 6).

23. See the long chapter “The German Connection,” in Bloom, *Closing of the American Mind;* and my response to the arguments contained therein, Paul Gottfried, “Postmodernism and Academic Discontents,” *Academic Questions* 9, no. 3 (summer 1996): 58–67.

24. Schmidt, *Menace of Multiculturalism*, 8.

25. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *One Nation, Two Cultures: The De-moralization of Society* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 78; 76–84.

26. Interview with Raimondo in *Report/News Magazine* (Alberta Edition), April 10, 2000, 34.

27. Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis of Public Authority* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 2–3. See also Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).

28. Jeffrey M. Berry, *The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

29. Ibid., 142–43, 38. Although Berry has focused on real strategic differences between conservative and liberal lobbies, he does not take account of how the media and public administrators view the two sides and their sponsors. For a detailed study of this dimension of political life, see Stanley Rothman and Amy Black, “Elites Revisited: American Social and Political Leadership in the 1990s” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 11, no. 2 (1999): 169–95.

30. See Lynch, introduction to *Diversity Machine;* see also Dana L. Cloud, *Control and Consolidation in American Culture and Politics: Consolidation in American Culture and Politics* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1998).

31. See Benedict Kautsky, introduction to Rudolf Hilferding, “Das Historische Problem,” *Archiv für Politik* (1953), 295.

32. Ibid., 296, 302–3.

33. Ibid., 315–16.

34. Ibid., 317.

35. Ibid., 323–24. Although an economic materialist through most of his life, and the author of the Marxist text on late capitalism *Finanzkapital*, Hilferding came to understand the dynamic character of the modern state more clearly than some of his classical liberal contemporaries in Central Europe. By the thirties he had moved beyond their fixation of associating government growth with attempted comebacks by or with a continuation in power by an old-fashioned ruling class that had refused to be displaced. For example, two outstanding liberal economists—Joseph Schumpeter, in *Zur Soziologie der Imperialismen* (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1919); and Ludwig von Mises, in *Bureaucracy* (Spring Mills, Pa.: Libertarian Press, 1983)—ascribe the imperialist adventures carried on by the European states to reactionary social forces. Unlike Hilferding, neither appreciated sufficiently the revolutionary and Jacobin character of these expansionist politics or the novel aspects of modern political centralization.

36. Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit*, 9–16.

37. Cited in *Die Deutsche Frage*, a collection of documents published by the Lower Saxon Landeszentrale für politische Bildung (1982), 70.

38. Gregor Paul Boventer, *Grenzen politischer Freiheit im demokratischen Staat: Das Konzept der streitbaren Demokratie in einem internationalen Vergleich* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1985), 58.

39. This party ban, found in article 9 of the Basic Law, is given considerable treatment by Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse in *Politischer Extremismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung), particularly 280–83.

40. Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit*, 94–95, 95–111, 261–77.

41. Typifying this linkage made in Germany between secure constitutional government and tightly maintained ideological conformity are Kurt Sontheimer, *Die Unversicherte Republik* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1979); Rudolph Wassermann, “Rechtsstaat heute,” *Manual 75. Jahrbuch* (1975), 198–202; and Volker Hauff, *Sprachlose Politik* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1979).

42. See Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit*, 95–107, 295–307.

43. Hauff, *Sprachlose Politik*, 25.

44. Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit*, 174.

45. Ibid., 174; see also Hans-Gerd Jaschke, “Verschlungene Tradition: Zur Geschichte des Rechtsextremismus in der Bundesrepublik,” *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte* 40, no. 9 (1989): 513–23.

46. Günter Rohrmoser, *Kulturrevolution und Gewaltmentalität* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 1978).

47. Jaschke, *Streitbare Demokratie und innere Sicherheit*, 261–79, 163–72.

48. See the relevant legal commentary by Alexander von Stahl in *Junge Freiheit*, May 11, 2001, 5.

49. For a study of the constitutional implications of closing the bank accounts of those holding political views that do not appeal to the bank managers, see Burkhard Boemke, “Kontenkündigung als Sittenverstoss,” *Juristische Schulung*, May 1, 2001.

50. Martin Walser, “Die Banalität des Guten,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, October 12, 1998, 15.

51. Daniel J. Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Norton, 1996), 42–53; according to Goldhagen, "Anti-semitism is the alltime leading form of hatred in Christian countries" (42) and permeates Western Civilization from its embrace of Christianity onward. Novick, *Holocaust in American Life*, 208–37.

52. Richard Iton, *Solidarity Blues: Race, Culture, and the American Left* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

53. See Fish, *No Such Thing;* John J. Wilson, *The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher Education* (Durham: Duke University, 1995); and for the linking of empiricism to an escape from social activism, Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), 323–29, 389–97.

54. *Hate Crime Report: The Violence of Intolerance* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Justice), project director, Rose Ochi, 1998; *Le Monde Diplomatique*, January 16, 1999, editorial page. For an approving report on the punishments meted out by French courts for xenophobic remarks and challenges to the Nuremberg Tribunal's descriptions of "crimes against humanity," see *Le Monde*, December 19, 1997, 10.

55. Janet Reno, "A Hate Crime Website," Department of Justice Communication, November 14, 1997, www.usdoj.gov.

56. For a perceptive essay on the thematic shift in popular and journalistic conceptions of Nazism from its totalitarian to its racist aspect, see Claude Polin, "Racisme et totalitarisme," in *Racisme/Anti-racisme*, ed. Andre Béjin and Julien Freund (Paris: Librairie des Méridiens, 1986), 147–60; and by the same author, *L'Esprit Totalitaire* (Paris: Sirey, 1977). Also dealing with the same general theme is Maurice Druon, *La France aux ordres d'un cadavre* (Paris: Fallois/Le Rocher, 2000).

57. Claus Wolfschlag, *Das antifaschistische Milieu* (Graz: Stocker Verlag, 2001).

58. *Corriere della Sera*, February 7, 2000, 10 and 11.

59. Ibid., 11. Although an extensive literature already exists in French criticizing the "obsessional" denunciations of the "fascist menace," what is being argued in this chapter differs markedly from these assessments. See, for example, François Darras, "L'épouvantail Haider," *Politis*, February 10, 2000, 4; Pierre-André Taguieff, "Qu'est-ce qu'un débat démocratique? Esprit démocratique et loi de soupçon," *Esprit*, January 1994, 116–35; and Taguieff, "Les conditions de construction d'un mouvement alternatif en France," *Critique socialiste*, January/March 1986, 39–40. Unlike most French critics of "antifascism," I do not argue that the invectives unleashed against the "fascist danger" is the "alibi" adopted by the European Left for doing nothing about consumerist and ecological problems and for accepting a "neoliberal, capitalist status quo." Least of all do I intimate that antifascism is a pale substitute for revolutionary ideology or, as Alain Finkielkraut maintains in *Le Monde*, June 6, 2000, 17, a trick by which the political class can play at being "insurgent pariahs" while behaving like people in power. Rather, "the antifascist siege mentality" that these commentators notice serves to build popular sentiment in favor of social engineering and therapeutic-managerial interventions. Antifascist crusades, and the practice of *"délationnisme"* (informing) to which it gives rise in Europe, belong to a postliberal assault on the remnants of a Christian bourgeois civilization. Far from being an "alibi" for abandoning a revolutionary ideology, these crusades represent a radicalized and de-economized version of the revolutionary Left. Two works, both by cultural traditionalists, that make a parallel argument are Eric Werner, *L'avant-guerre civile* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1998); and Christian Jelen, *La France éclatée* (Paris: Nil Editions, 1996).

4

A Sensitized World

In *Promised Land, Crusader State*, Walter A. McDougall traces the stages in the evolution of American foreign policy from the country's founding. Focusing on two biblical images, the Hebraic notion, picked up from the Puritans, of a godly society removed from a world of sinners, and a militarized Christian mission to convert the heathens, if necessary by the sword, McDougall shows how the second image has come to replace the first for American international relations. The most recent phase of these relations is "global meliorism," a tendency McDougall finds to be ascending since the 1960s. It is vividly exemplified by President Lyndon B. Johnson's comments about extending domestic wars against poverty to other societies far away. McDougall cites as an illustration of this melioristic aim a speech given by Johnson at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965, calling for "a greatly expanded co-operative effort" to bring American-style prosperity to Indochina: "We dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope. And we shall make it so."[1]

McDougall is right to distinguish such a view of American foreign relations from the "liberal internationalism" once associated with Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. For these earlier internationalists, the goal of foreign policy was international cooperation, to be achieved under Anglo-American auspices, and occasional support for the principle of national self-determination. But liberal internationalists did not hope to make the world over to suit American tastes, and the ideals they invoked, as noted by McDougall, could be articulated on the eve of U.S. entry into World War II by noninterventionists as well as by fervent Anglophiles. More importantly, these ideals were not sufficient for the polarized world of the Cold War or for a struggle that lasted as long as that war did. With the future of the globe hanging in the balance, it may have been inevitable that the

United States should present its own side as the only alternative model to the Communist example—a tendency already prefigured in the earlier struggle waged against Nazism and fascism. Moreover, as the United States expanded its welfare state, amid expressions of self-congratulations, it became common to interpret this political appendage as basic to the American way of life. By 1966, McDougall observes, South Vietnam received 44 percent of the Agency for International Development's entire budget. Although this funding often disappeared into a black hole, it was considered necessary to build Vietnamese prosperity as a precondition for an anti-Communist Vietnamese democracy. The American practice of throwing federal money at domestic problems was being applied to international trouble spots as well.[2]

While this analysis is both useful and accurate, it omits mention of another pressure leading to global meliorism: the dynamics and ideology of the American managerial state. In a defense of the Vietnam War made by Johnson in 1966, Americans were told that "our foreign policy must always be an extension of our domestic policy. Our safest guide to what we do abroad is always what we do at home." Thus our military involvement in Southeast Asia "had its origin in the same presidential impulse that gave rise to the Great Society."[3]

This speech is paradigmatic for a view of American foreign policy that continues to be dominant. This view already existed embryonically in the 1960s, but by the 1970s, during the Nixon-Kissinger era, foreign policy considerations shifted from geopolitical interest to the propagation of "American values." In the 1980s, the notion of global democracy came to dominate Cold War strategy, as welfare-state anti-Communism became a defining mark of the struggle against Soviet imperialism. The National Endowment for Democracy and Reagan's security advisor Elliot Abrams typified the new course in combating the Communist enemy, now viewed as anti-Semitic, opposed to the international labor movement, and essentially antidemocratic.[4] The same set of ideas was also turned against the authoritarian Right, as the United States backed the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and the overthrow of Augusto Pinochet in Chile. This flowering of internationalist idealism had support from across the American political spectrum. What divided the Left and the Right was only the question of whether the U.S. government was to get tough with

the Communists as well as with the authoritarian Right. Neither American faction fussed over distinctions between internal and external politics; both approached foreign relations in the context of a massive proselytizing enterprise.[5]

Whereas the meliorism pushed by Lyndon Johnson consisted for the most part of bringing the Great Society to Indochina, by the end of the century, as NATO forces bombed Serbia, President Clinton announced to a G-8 Summit in Bonn that the new millennium required a world without ethnic hate. In an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16, 1999, Clinton again justified military action against Serbia for driving Albanians out of Kosovo as an assault on bigotry. The common future was "threatened by the oldest demon of human society: our vulnerability to hatred of the other, those who are not like us." Prime Minister Blair hailed this military operation as a blow against the obsolete notion of national sovereignty and helped organize a Commission for Democratic Education that would operate in conjunction with NATO. Headed by a director and deputy director sympathetic to feminist and expressive freedoms, this commission would function as a disseminator of pro-diversity attitudes, understood both in the ethnic and social senses. A similar mission is being tackled by the Canadian foreign ministry, partly in cooperation with the Organization of American States, throughout the Western Hemisphere. Sending authorized military and civilian personnel to instruct Third World Hispanic and Amerindian populations in feminist values and practices and in the proper organization of family relations, Canadian government publications now identify these efforts with the spreading of diversity. In a highly instructive interview, held in Washington, D.C., on March 31, 1999, President Clinton responded to a query by CBS commentator Dan Rather concerning his feelings about having to send young people, as Rather put it, into "the valley of the shadow of death." Clinton said, "I do have a lot of pent-up feelings, and I think the President is supposed to keep a lot of feelings pent up. But let me say I think throughout human history one of the things that has most bedeviled human beings is their inability to get along with people that are different than they are, and their vulnerability to be led by demagogues who play on their fear of people who are different than they are."

This new internationalism, as suggested by Clinton and Blair, aims at nothing less than a transformation of human consciousness. In this

respect it is light years away from that liberal internationalism that gained vogue in the first half of the twentieth century. In its visionary scope, the new meliorism goes beyond material tinkering in far-off places, such as Johnson's attempt to export the Great Society. What the current project seeks to do is to overcome history as the cumulative record of prejudice, by extending the domestic revolution in sensitivity to other parts of the globe. Calling this neo-Wilsonianism misses its radical nature. Thus, when Charles Gati, Flora Lewis, Morton Kondracke, and Ben Wattenberg wrote passionately in favor of American intensive involvement in reconstructing post-Communist East Central Europe in the early 1990s, they mistakenly identified their plan as Wilsonian.[6] Their consuming interest in "exporting American democratic values" to an area supposedly grappling with an authoritarian past has a far more contemporary origin. Neither Wilson nor FDR had proposed that the United States commit itself to "moralizing" societies with which Americans were not at war.

While Wilsonians and the current meliorists could have been equally in favor of the United States playing world police, the second are ideologically more intrusive. They generally endorse supernational units of political control, like the European Community, and insist that these instruments be used to advance fashionable social agendas, such as promoting gay rights internationally. The enforcement of the gay agenda among EC members has been going on since the mid-1990s, in the framework of advancing "human rights." Thus, recently the EC commanded the British armed forces to create a more welcoming environment for gays, on the grounds that they had been heretofore excluded from some aspects of British military life.[7]

Recently, this value imposition has taken another form in the United States and in the EC, treating those who are perceived to be outside the prescribed value-consensus as a "threat" to international peace. The angry responses by EC officials, such as Romano Prodi, and various Western political dignitaries to the granting of a minor cabinet-level post in the Austrian government to Jörg Haider included references to a new international threat. American security advisor Sandy Berger warned that his country would not sit idly by in the face of what was going on in Austria.[8] Throughout February 2000, there were many other warnings by, among others, the U.S. president and secretary of state, the Italian, French, and Belgian premiers, and the

British prime minister and foreign secretary. In all of them references were made to Haider as a global danger, for opposing immigration into his country, recalling Hitler's "successful employment policy," and opining that "decent people" could be found among the Waffen SS.[9] The upshot of the warnings issued by various heads of state was summed up by the director of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, which had been set up in Vienna to report on the alleged assault on democracy there. Director Beate Winkler expressed anguish that "Europe is going through a dangerous phase. There is an increased move away from centrist positions, and right-wing, even far-right positions are losing their taboo." Then, to underline the danger of the present drift, Winkler brought up the specter of the past: "It starts with discrimination, then comes exclusion, and it can go as far as the Holocaust."[10]

Despite Haider's subsequent departure from the Austrian government, after partially apologizing for his faux pas, neither the EC nor the offended Western political figures thought the "crisis" was over. Measures to quarantine Austria economically and diplomatically remained in force through the spring of 2000, as long as EC leaders continued to fear that democracy was endangered.[11] Meanwhile, to avoid other "antidemocratic" threats, German Chancellor Schröder sent warnings to the Italian government that grave repercussions would follow if center-right politician Gianfranco Fini were allowed back into a national cabinet. For those who follow such arcane matters, it might be mentioned that Fini's *Alleanza Nazionale* had incorporated, among other ailing factions, the Movimento Sociale Italiano, a predominantly Southern Italian neofascist, pro-American party (subsidized by the CIA) that had crested by the late 1950s.[12]

Weekly Standard editors William Kristol and Robert Kagan provided a counterfactual picture of international relations when, in *Foreign Affairs*, they set out to defend a "neo-Reaganite perspective." From the authors' pleas for a foreign policy to accompany "the remoralization of America at home" and admonitions about the "relativistic multiculturalism" being practiced by American diplomats, it would seem that American foreign affairs are being conducted by raving nihilists. Allegedly reflecting this cynicism is an unwillingness to "recognize that the principles of the Declaration of Independence are not merely the choices of a particular culture but are universal, enduring, self-evident

truths." Some conservatives had drifted into the prevalent cynicism by embracing "the pinched nationalism of [Pat] Buchanan's *America First*, where the appeal to narrow self-interest masks a deeper form of self-loathing."[13] The references to the hidden motives of American neoisolationists and the insistence that the Declaration of Independence, properly read, mandates an activist and even missionizing foreign policy are both open to question. Even more so is the underlying assumption that the current American foreign policy has been divorced from moral concerns.

The opposite seems to be the case. The UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva features almost daily orations and policy statements, many given by American and British leaders, on what must be done to combat "xenophobia" and "ethnic hate" internationally.[14] In February and March 2000, Western political celebrities weighed in against the "fascist" danger in Austria, competing with each other to find a sufficiently grim punishment for Austrians, whether or not they voted for Haider. Secretary of State Albright dug her fingers in deeper by scolding the Austrians for "not making peace with their past."[15] All of this came less than a year after the bombing of Belgrade and Pristina, presented as the punishment for ethnic hate taking the form of ethnic cleansing. In short, there is no evidence that, under the impact of multicultural professors, Americans are pursuing amoral international relations. The problem is not a drift into relativism, but, rather, according to Henry Kissinger, a plunge into theocratic politics in a new key. Western states are lapsing into liturgical formulas each time they try to talk about politics.[16]

Equally apparent is the critical observation by the Canadian journalist Eric Margolis that the current moralizing about historical sins is always directed against the Right: "Italy's prime minister Massimo D'Alema has been Haider's most vocal European critic. What chutzpah! D'Alema is a 'modern' Communist. His Communist party is part of Italy's growing coalition. Communists, let's recall, murdered 100 million civilians last century, Hitler 12 million. According to the Euro double standard, reformed Communists are dandy, but anyone to the right of the moderate left must be an extremist or a Nazi."[17] Margolis's insight is entirely correct (save for the designation of Socialist D'Alema as a member of the Italian Communist Party). Euro-Communists and their Socialist allies have been relentless in calling for action against

politically incorrect figures and statements, while ignoring the beams in their own eyes. This strategy, adopted in the wake of the Soviet collapse, may be intended to deflect attention from the evidence of Communist brutality and the craven cover-ups provided by Western Communist parties. It is also an attempt by Socialist leaders to truckle to Communist coalition-partners by turning public anger against exaggerated antiestablishment dangers on the right.

The present double standard exemplifies the fixation of Western intellectuals on old ideological battles and battle settings. The mise-en-scène to which they return is Europe in the 1930s. What interests them is not so much the real confrontations of the time, but the possibility available for intellectuals to rework the past as object lessons. Thus we are present at reenactments of what Ernst Nolte calls "the European civil war" that once took place between Communists and fascists and their respective devotees. Warnings are occasionally sounded about the obsoleteness of this frame of reference, as when two moderately center-left journalists, Tony Judt and Jacob Weisberg, suggested that the attacks on Haider evoke the wrong historical parallels. We are no longer living in the 1930s; while Haider undoubtedly has made reckless statements in reaching out to an older generation, he is essentially a critic of sclerotic socialist bureaucracy; finally, Austria in 2000 is not the same depression-wracked, broken society that welcomed Hitler's occupying armies in 1938.[18]

Obsessing about right-wing extremism takes the form of returning to Hitler each time Western governments impose sanctions or go to war against "human rights" violators, be it Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic. One mocking journalist has suggested creating a "Hitler of the Month Club" to which international malefactors are now routinely consigned.[19] Essential to this demonization is the appearance of Elie Wiesel on news programs for the purpose of comparing some breaking international crisis to Hitler's Final Solution.[20] Although these lamentations may appeal to those already converted, there is the snag of Wiesel's contradicting himself when he asserts that Nazi crimes were "uniquely" evil. On March 20, 1999, in a televised address to the American people explaining the war against Serbia, President Clinton furnished his own gloss on modern history: "Sarajevo, the capital of neighboring Bosnia, is where WWI began. WWII and the Holocaust engulfed this region. In both wars Europe was slow to recognize the

dangers and the United States waited even longer to enter the conflict."[21]

Although neither Clinton nor most of his listeners may know what really occurred in the Balkans in 1914 or in the early 1940s, it may be useful to show the extent of Clinton's appeal to a make-believe history. Contrary to what has been stated, World War I broke out because the major powers did *not* resist plunging into a Balkan crisis. Moreover, it is doubtful that U.S. entanglement in that crisis would have led to peace instead of widening the conflict. As for the Holocaust that took place in the Balkans, it was not the Serbs, but the Bosnian and Albanian Muslims who worked for the Nazis in rounding up and killing Jews and Serbs. It testifies to the power of the Holocaust as a malleable symbol and to general historical ignorance that it could be applied to a situation so thoroughly unlike the one that had befallen Serbia in 1941.

Illustrating the "blame game" that centers on historical burdens and symbols is the loud disagreement now heard in the Italian Senate over a national "day of remembrance" for the Holocaust. While the Center Left (which now prominently includes the Communists in Western Europe) pushed through the House of Deputies on January 27 a remembrance of "Nazi-fascist" atrocities, the bill nonetheless has been stalled in the Senate. The Center Right insists on a modification that would extend the official remembrance to "all victims of political tyranny," and the Center Left and its journalistic sympathizers have responded by attacking this as a subterfuge. Supposedly, the Right is trying to "refocus responsibility for readily passing the anti-Semitic legislation of 1938 that deprived Jews [in fascist Italy] of public positions and for collaborating in the deportation of Italian Jews." They are therefore diverting attention from the rightist hidden evil of anti-Semitism by bringing up the already half-forgotten crimes committed by non-Western Communists. Italian columnist Clelia Piperno explains this alleged subterfuge as follows: Unlike the crimes ascribed to Communists, anti-Semitism continues to be a pressing daily concern. Given the presence of Holocaust-deniers and the furtive painting of Swastikas on buildings, it must be assumed that "anti-Semitism is a plant that seems to have infinite roots and with which humanity will have to grapple forever."[22]

Presumably, Communists and Socialists will explain how to come to terms with this inveterate evil by banning inappropriate

communications, as they have already begun to do in Italy, and by decrying the notice taken of Communist mass murder as a tactic of fascist self-defense. The most astonishing part of this brief, however, is the strongly implied link between members of the Polo coalition (headed by Italian television magnate Silvio Berlusconi) and Fascist Party deputies who voted for the Jewish-exclusion act of 1938. The first, though they speak Italian and are predominantly male, do not represent the second. It is even misleading to identify the entire history of Italian fascism with the Salo Republic, formed in 1943. Although some fascists were active in both Mussolinian regimes, the Italian government that deported Jews was set up as a Nazi puppet state, after the Allied invasion of Italy. Italian Black Brigades and the Nazi SS were the groups directly responsible for the deportation of Italian Jews in 1944. This was a moral crime, but not one committed by the fascist assembly of 1938, despite its truckling to Nazi anti-Semites. Most importantly, the coalition of Silvio Berlusconi has no more to do with the fate of Italian Jewry sixty years ago than those making the absurd charges against it. One should wonder why this charge continues to be made without drawing justified scorn.[23]

Those who engage in this practice are not, for the most part, Marxists or Marxist-Leninists. It is hard to show that Jospin, Prodi, Schröder, or any other vocal antifascist embraces dialectical materialism or is about to nationalize key industries in his country. It is not Communism, but anti-anti-Communism that drives many of those who feign ignorance of Communist mass murder. In the 1980s, Jean-François Revel, a former Communist, pointed out that to be against Communism means being “antiprogressive” and therefore being cheek by jowl with right-wing extremists. When Angela Davis spoke at Harvard University in December 1991 and deplored the downfall of East European Communist regimes, she received a standing ovation from a crowd of more than five hundred professors and students (two hundred other members of the Harvard community watched Davis’s performance over closed-circuit television). It is unlikely that this approval, apparently shared by the *Harvard Crimson*, was expressed for the decrepit tyrannies that had recently fallen and which, in many cases, had bestowed awards on the speaker.[24] The thunderous applause was more likely being directed toward the antifascist cause that Davis presumes to speak for and which her well-wishers identify

with a feminist, black, socialist revolutionary. She and her side are imagined as locked in mortal combat with international fascism.

Furthermore, the unconquered fascist past has a remarkably fluid content. It keeps taking the shape of whatever is deemed politically incorrect, be it restrictions on immigration, enforcement of customary gender distinctions, or paying tribute to a recognizably European national heritage. While reasonable people may disagree about any or all of these positions, it is a bit of a stretch from there to generic fascism or to its gruesome Hitlerian subtype. But that stretch is negotiable as soon as one appeals to a hypothetical regression, that is, to the idea that one slippery slope leads to an even more perilous one. If one accepts what seem to be indelicate social premises, one opens oneself and others to a desensitization process that might culminate in Haiderism or even worse. After all, Haiderism, like Hitlerism, is about excluding the other and appealing to national solidarity, and as soon as one allows such distinctions into public discussion, all hell might break loose, particularly since the prejudice in question is said to suffuse the Western subconscious.

A question that arises here is to what extent should the new internationalism be applied to non-Western societies. Are non-Westerners to be viewed as fit targets for the behavioral policies that Western governments are imposing on their own willing subjects? Allegedly, there are historical circumstances that make these policies applicable to the Western white Christian populations on which they are now being tested. If these groups and their ancestors have been associated with forms of oppression against designated minorities, certainly they would seem to be in need of reconstruction. Defenders of multiculturalism have taken the position that the "identities" of Western victims are necessary for their moral validation. Women, blacks, and Amerindians, as explained by Charles Taylor, have had to fashion for themselves "positive identities," as part of the "politics of recognition," and they have done so, or been guided into following this course, in order to overcome the "negative, devaluing identity" that had been thrust on them before.[25] But since outreach to certain groups is what is practiced by the managerial state at home, why should this not be something that it does elsewhere?

Other considerations would seem to necessitate a mission to the Third World for groups who rate as historic victims in the West. As one cultural historian, René Girard, has observed, the *"victimophilie"* that

has come to define Western Christianity is, like the older Christianity it replaced, universalist in scope.[26] It should therefore seem clear to Western Christian victimologists that many of their "suffering just" are victimized outside of the Western world as well as within it. The sneering comments uttered by Anglo-American prelates about their conservative counterparts in Asia and Africa at the Lambeth Anglican conference in the summer of 1999 may portend stormier encounters between liberal Christians and non-Western ones. Although, in the Balkans, Western leaders and journalists took the side of Muslims against Christians, by the fall of 1999 a new political spirit was becoming evident. National newspapers in the United States and England were calling for action, and not ruling out military force, to bring gender equality to Muslim Afghanistan.[27] The two positions are not necessarily at odds: If sides must be taken between Christians and Muslims, the new internationalism will rally to the Muslims, everything being equal, as it is not when Russian power becomes a factor, as it does in Muslim Chechnya. On the other hand, when the conflict is between the demands of feminists and a non-Western patriarchal religion, it is clear who trumps whom. It is also clear which side exercises more influence in Western countries. Since September 11, calls have been heard from, among others, the First Lady, to force Afghan society to move toward gender parity. One expects this public issue will be around for some time.

Finally, the politics of recognition is no more than what its name signifies, the reduction of identity to a political tool that elites may wield as they see fit. The increasingly tortured efforts to define group identity among multiculturalists always come back to the need to validate what is arbitrary. This arbitrariness operates in two ways. Identity, for Richard Rorty and Charles Taylor, is a subjective choice, which brings a cultural dimension or entails an ideological stance (the two are not mutually exclusive). Identity is not something that defines a subject, but something the subject may assume for a particular reason at a particular point.[28] Presumably, identity is a condition that one may feel inclined to slough off as one's position in life changes—or else as one ceases to feel victimized.

Identity as recognition, however, is something to be granted, which means (and the multiculturalists are politically right here) by those in power or by those who intend to seize it. The predicate does not have

an ontological status that adheres to it, as it does in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, or an evolutionary or more or less fixed character, as it does in the anthropology of classical conservatism. Identity, in the multicultural sense, is neither about universal qualities of likeness or unlikeness nor about acculturation, family bonding, and shared genes. Identity as here understood has a relational and confrontational content and is contingent for its own validation on those who bestow *political* acknowledgment.[29] This last qualification is essential for understanding the connection of the new identitarian politics to the managerial state. Identity is something to be extended or withheld, depending on whether a person or collection of persons is beneficial to what the regime in question is undertaking. This remains the case with political projects like sensitivity to victims and overcoming one's historical burdens. There are some victims the state may consider particularly worthy of assistance or some burdens that it wants to see overcome sooner rather than later. Such political choices may take into account the culpability of Western society but need not necessarily do so.

Finally, those making these choices do not have to target specifically Western peoples while working for cultural and mental changes. In advertising a meeting of the OAS, scheduled to convene in Windsor in the spring of 2000, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs expressed its commitment to making the gathering "more inclusive, conducted in a spirit of international transparency and openness."[30] But while this apparent statement of goodwill was framed in multicultural cliché, it also revealed a starkly imperialist intention. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs gave as "Canada's goal" for sponsoring OAS activities the promotion of "the Inter-American Children's Institute, the Inter-American Commission of Women, and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights." Every one of these organizations, assigned by the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs to "the family of Inter-American institutions," aims at altering social patterns as they are found in traditional non-Western societies. Third World critics are correct when they charge these commissions and the UN agencies designed to recondition populations with being instruments of Western imperialism.[31] The advocates of behavior modification are clearly proud that their efforts are now reaching beyond a Western base.

Despite the apparent rejection of Western identities present in this new mission, those Western social engineers who embark on it exercise financial, propagandistic, and sometimes political forms of control. This situation, an imperial mission with a changing moral and cultural content, is not unprecedented. It was illustrated equally well by the metamorphosis of the Roman Empire from a pagan to a Christian imperium. By the end of the fourth century, the Roman mission was no longer the *renovatio antiquitatis* preached by Augustus and Virgil, but the forging of a Christian commonwealth. A Christianized Rome was charged by the Emperor Theodosius to eradicate paganism, including its own ancestral religious past.[32] In a less natural way, but one still relevant to our case, Persia went from being a Zoroastrian to a Muslim empire after being invaded by Arabs in A.D. 640. The new Muslim government suppressed the Zoroastrian practices of the Sasanian dynasty that had been overthrown. But, at the same time, the religiously changed Persia became the center of the Muslim Caliphate established in the eighth century in Iraq and Iran.[33] Imperial expansion does require a collective dedication to a particular enterprise, but not necessarily to the same one under whose auspices it had started. Nor does the managerial ascendancy, of which the United States is the most powerful representative, require that the same ideology be associated with all phases of managerial governance. As long as its subjects remain submissive to those in authority, power can be exercised in the name of more than one ideal or vision.

In the case of mass democracy in the managerial state, the legitimating ideology has moved from advancing "scientific" management of public affairs and providing widespread access to material benefits to the invigoration of designated victims and to the sensitization of everyone else. Support for the last two ideals does not exclude any and all appeal to the earlier ones. Managerial regimes and their defenders have been quick to take credit for material improvements, for example, the rise of the GNP and the life expectancy in the United States, despite the fact that government redistributionist plans have not contributed significantly to the improvements in question. It is the impact of material and technological advances, minus the kind of destructively grasping state common to the Third World, as pointed out by Peter Bauer, which accounts for growing Western affluence.[34] The prosperity being observed is the latest phase of a

process that has gone on for several centuries. It is not, as the U.S. media often seem to be suggesting, a product of the social concern of the American administration.[35]

The new internationalism to which reference has been made has not overshadowed the older form completely. It is therefore possible to encounter arguments among Western political leaders that favor U.S.-promoted free trade or the rule of law. Nonetheless, the view advanced by Samuel Huntington about a "clash of civilizations," between a constitutionally structured, capitalist West and its non-Western rivals, overlooks the changes that have overtaken American society.[36] Huntington creates the impression that the United States is pretty much the same politically and morally as it was in the early twentieth century. He thereby ignores the managerial and therapeutic transformations that have shaped American and European governments in the second half of the twentieth century. A missionizing and reforming regime has taken the place of a bourgeois liberal polity and has begun to impose its sensitizing ideology on the non-Western world.

A final characteristic of the global meliorism that has evolved in the United States and its imitators is the breaking down of distinctions between what is national and international. Movements of the Right in the United States that stress this difference have less and less appeal. This is not for the reason given by unfriendly critics of Pat Buchanan, that Americans are too generous to embrace "pinched" nationalist opinions. What has happened is that the United States has come to define its national character in multinational and even multicultural terms. The reconstituted (neoconservative) Right and Center Left both accept a globalist formulation of American identity, and each favors the present immigration policy (in force since the mid-1960s), by which over a million immigrants, mostly from the Third World, arrive in the United States legally each year. The fact that the U.S. GDP has more than doubled since the 1960s, while unemployment rates are now at about 4 to 5 percent, argues Peter Schuck, has had a weakening effect on the anti-immigration movement. By 2000, opposition to the high level of Third World immigration had dwindled to 45 percent, having fallen by 34 percent from where it had been in the mid-1990s. This figure may be temporarily affected by the events of September 11, but the question is whether those events will have a long-term effect on the trend toward greater Third World immigration and the popular

acceptance of that happening. While Peter Brimelow is correct that U.S. economic growth over the last few decades could have been sustained with minimal immigration, and that this influx has in fact hurt the underclass and impeded minority assimilation, none of these objections may be historically relevant at the present time.[37] The fact that immigration took place during a period of growth undercut its saliency as a political issue. That circumstance allowed the managerial-media elite to present immigration from the Third World as the price of material growth. But while the economy turned bad in 2001, opposition to immigration did not surface as a critical issue in what would seem ripened circumstances. The politics of immigration does well when all ships are rising but does not sink when economic indicators are less promising.

The image of an American nation being pushed into risky entanglements by foreign powers is an American conservative nationalist illusion. It was the American government that created UN cover to launch military action against Iraq in 1991 and did the same with NATO when it prepared for war against Serbia in 1999. By 1999, however, U.S. management had been refined. When, on March 25, President Clinton delivered a speech comparing Serbian ethnic cleansing to Nazi genocide, President Chirac, Prime Minister Blair, *Le Monde, Nouvel Observateur*, and other parts of the French national press reached immediately for the same tropes and parallel. As French social commentator Régis Debray has speculated, the timing was such as to make it hard to rule out the likelihood of direct influence. But Debray also notes that the impact and increasing homogeneity of the Western media leave open the possibility that Western leaders on two continents were being edged simultaneously toward the same thinking and outcome.[38]

Conservative nationalists also exaggerate the extent of popular opposition in the United States to political actions they disapprove of. Whether one is speaking about government support for black and Latino ethnic expressiveness, the costs of illegal immigration, or the inevitability that white Americans will become a minority if present immigration policies are continued, the trends and political actions deplored by the Old Right have not become national wedge issues. Such matters are correlated to problems that have caused worries in particular places, for instance, in Southwestern border areas or in Utah,

where the drug trade has fallen into the hands of illegal immigrants. On the other hand, nothing connected to American nationalist politics resonates as strongly as the concern registered in polls about "fighting discrimination in the workplace." Not even quotas and affirmative action in education, issues that engage the entire American Right, have aroused a national opposition as noticeable as what is counterpoised on the other side. Note the U.S. president who did most to promote multiculturalism enjoyed job-approval ratings of over 60 percent. The continuing inability of the antidiversity side to make a fight of it should indicate why therapeutic socialization continues to make inroads at home and abroad. Contrary to what its opponents believe, it has not changed the political landscape significantly.[39]

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1. Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 150–51.

2. McDougall, *Promised Land*, 188–95. On the questionable costs of foreign aid, see Nicholas Eberstadt, *Foreign Aid and American Purpose* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1988).

3. Cited in Thomas G. Paterson, and Dennis Merril, eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Policy: Documents and Essays*, (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1995), 2:553.

4. See Paul Gottfried, "The Multiculturalist International," *Orbis* 46, no. 1 (winter 2002): 145–58; and *Wall Street Journal*, October 9, 1991, A14.

5. This convergence of Right and Left in the framework of an American missionary enterprise is the subject of Ryn, *New Jacobinism*, and of Lasch, "Obsolescence of Left and Right."

6. Charles Gati, "From Sarajevo to Sarajevo," *Foreign Affairs*, fall 1992, 64; Flora Lewis, "Postcommunist Blues," *New York Times*, September 22, 1990, A22; Kondracke, "Democracy Gang," *New Republic*, November 6, 1989, 30.

7. *New York Times*, January 24, 2000, A16.

8. Prodi quoted in "Estrema Destra," *Corriere della Sera*, February 7, 2000, 10–11; Berger quoted in Donald McNeil Jr., "Why Austria Faces Anger," *New York Times*, February 5, 2000, A15.

9. Marc Lacey, "U.S. Will Reconsider Tier If Haider Joins Coalition," *New York Times*, February 21, 2000, A12; Roger Cohen, "A Haider in Their Future," *New York Times Magazine*, April 30, 2000, 54.

10. *Europa* 391 (November 1999): 24.

11. See *Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2000, A23; and *New York Times*, February 29, 2000, A3.

12. See Charles Vaugeois, "Du MSI à l'Alliance Nationale: Histoire et mutations du néo-fascisme italien," *Enquête sur l'histoire*, July–August 27, 1998, 13–22; and Marco Tarchi, *Dal*

MSI ad AN (Bologna: Mulino, 1997).

13. Kristol and Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” 33.

14. See the proceedings of the Fifty-fourth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, ed. by Michael J. Dennis, in *American Journal of International Law*, January 2000, 94.

15. See *New York Times*, February 21, 2000, A12; and “Haider and the Hypocrites,” *New Republic*, February 21, 2000, 1.

16. Kissinger, *New York Post*, August 17, 1999.

17. Eric Margolis, “Heil Haider!” *Toronto Sun*, February 6, 2000, C6. Another view about the commotion directed at Austria concerns President Romano Prodi of the EU, who may have diverted attention from his executive failures by exacerbating the tensions that arose; see *L’Express*, April 13, 2000, 24–25.

18. Ernst Nolte, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg, 1917–1945: Nationalsozialismus und Bolschewismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1997), 46–106; Tony Judt, “Tale from Vienna Woods,” *New York Review of Books*, March 23, 2000, 8–10; Jacob Weisberg, “The EU, Not Haider Threatens Austrian Democracy,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 4, 2000, A15; Peter Beinert, “Quiet Times,” *New Republic*, May 13, 2000, 6.

19. See George Szamuely’s “Soros’ World” and “Decline of the West,” written for the *New York Press* and available on www.antiwar.com; and Barbara Amiel, “Fear and Loathing in Austria,” *National Post*, February 16, 2000, A18.

20. Elie Wiesel, “The Question of Genocide,” interview in *Newsweek*, April 12, 1999, 37.

21. See “Clinton Voices Anger, Compassion and Intransigence,” *New York Times*, March 20, 1999, A7.

22. Clelia Piperno, “Il Male Oscuro,” *Il Mattino*, April 17, 2000, 17; for a penetrating criticism of the “blame the Christian West” syndrome among progressive intellectuals, see Jacques Ellul, *The Betrayal of the West*, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (New York: Seabury Press, 1978).

23. Neither side in this debate mentions the indiscriminate slaying in 1944 and 1945 by antifascist vigilantes of more than a hundred thousand Italians considered to be fascist sympathizers; see Paul Serant, *Les vaincus et la libération* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1964); and Silvio Bertoldi, “Roma liberata: Giustizia alla italiana,” *Corriere della Sera*, November 25, 1996, 19.

24. Jean-François Revel, *Comment les démocraties finissent* (Paris: Grasset, 1983), especially 243–392; on Angela Davis, see the feature story in *Harvard Crimson*, December 13, 1991, 1–2; and the impassioned account of Davis’s visit to Harvard in Thomas E. Woods Jr., “Angela Davis’s History,” *Peninsula*, February 1992, 1–4.

25. Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 10.

26. René Girard, *Je vois Satan tomber comme l’éclair* (Paris: Grasset, 1999); see also Girard, interview by Stéphen de Petiville, *Catholica*, spring 2000, 10–15.

27. Megan Reif, “Beyond the Veil: Bigger Issues,” *Christian Science Monitor*, May 3, 2000, 11; Scott Peterson, “Lives Still Restricted,” *Christian Science Monitor*, December 30, 1999, 1.

28. Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition*, 11, 12.

29. Ibid., 14–16.

30. *Canada Worldview* 7 (spring 2000), 10.

31. See Noam Chomsky, “Brave New World Order,” *New Statesman and Society*, December 20, 1991, 19.

32. John Bury, *History of the Late Roman Empire*, vol. 1 (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Press, 1958).

33. Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2,000 Years* (New York: Scribner, 1995), 51–86.

34. Peter Bauer, *Equality, the Third World, and Economic Delusion* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981).

35. See, for example, Sean Wilentz, “Yawn,” in *New Republic*, February 28, 2000; and Sean Wilentz, “Give It a Rest,” *New Republic*, March 6, 2000, 8.

36. See Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 183–291.

37. Peter Schuck, “Emigration and Immigration,” in *New Republic*, April 13, 1998, 16; and Peter Schuck, “Dual Nationality,” *Wall Street Journal*, March 18, 1998, A22. Peter Brimelow, *Alien Nation: Common Sense about America’s Immigration Disaster* (New York: Random House, 1995); and George J. Borjas, *Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). For analyses of the globalist view of American identity shared by the Center Right and Center Left, see Piccone, “Crisis of American Conservatism”; and John Lukacs, “The Stirrings of History,” *Harper’s* 281 (August 1990): 47–49.

38. Régis Debray, *Introduction à la médiologie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000).

39. Typical of the books trying to sway American public opinion on the economic and social costs of immigration is Edward N. Luttwak’s *The Endangered American Dream* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

5

Whither the Populist Right

A major anxiety of the mainstream European press is the rise of what is perceived as the anti-immigration Right. Identified with such critics of Third World immigration and of European Union domination as Christoph Blocher in Switzerland, Jorg Haider in Austria, Jean Le Pen and Bruno Mégret in France, and Karen Jespersen in Denmark, this "xenophobic" force supposedly stands in the way of European integration and the overcoming of Western prejudice. European newspapers, typified by the *Guardian*, equivocate about whether any of this signifies a "resurgence of old-style fascism," but they also dwell on the past consequences of "xenophobia," leading to Hitler's Final Solution. It would be hard to dismiss as mere coincidence the detailed and overwhelmingly negative report in *Le Figaro* that the Danish people had voted against the adoption of the euro and were unhappy with the EU with the closely juxtaposed and thematically related commentary by Franco-Israeli historian of fascism Zeev Sternhell. Although Sternhell presents the fascist danger as a "permanent *French* temptation," he spreads his nets wider by asserting that "the undesirables of yesterday were Jews; those of today are Arabs or Africans. Those who displease may change, but the principles never vary, neither in France nor elsewhere."[1]

It is doubtful *Le Figaro*'s editors accept all of Sternhell's remarks, particularly his identification of Marxist-Leninism with the Enlightenment and with a revulsion for war and violence, which is contrasted to the fascist "cult of violence." Sternhell is also fond of the Euro-Communist practice of minimizing Communist wrongs by dismissing them as "Stalin's crimes," without noticing that such horrors marked other Communist societies as well. None of these subterfuges may please Sternhell's current sponsors, but his polemic does serve the need of a mass newspaper that is both pro-immigration and generally pro-EU. It

draws a fashionable parallel between fascism eliding into Nazism and European opponents of Third World immigration. Through the use of guilt by association, *Le Figaro* proceeds to tie the Danish Social Democrats to the xenophobic Right; both speak about *"démocratie de clocher"* (village democracy) while Social Democrats are rushing to join the anti-immigration Danish People's Party (Danske Folkeparti) without breaking from their old comrades entirely.[2]

The question should be asked whether these critics on the globalist corporate-capitalist center-right have targeted an ideologically unified movement. Does that degree of unity they attribute to the nationalist and regionalist opponents of Euro-bureaucracy and Third World immigration in fact exist? To some extent, this unity can be traced to a pattern of interlocking circumstances. In Western and Central Europe, mass parties have emerged in response to common grievances: overreach by the EU in trying to control the cultural and economic life of European countries, the influx of predominantly Muslim Third World immigrants into relatively homogeneous European regions, and those punishments meted out by major powers to members who shower votes on antimulticultural parties.

This last problem, which came to the fore after the Haider victory in Austria, has returned with calls inside and outside of Belgium to "isolate" the Vlaams Blok. This was the reaction of leading European newspapers and of the politicians of other Belgian parties after this newly formed anti-immigration front had picked up 33 percent of the vote in Antwerp and had done almost equally well in other Flemish cities in Belgian local elections held on October 9. Such protest movements have reared up across Western and Central Europe on the regional and federal levels alike. The Lega Nord, centered in Milan and led by Umberto Bossi, the Vlaams Blok operating in Flanders under thirty-seven-year-old Filip Dewinter and Christoph Blocher's Democratic Union of the Center, building upon a mostly Swiss German electorate, exemplify regional protests against federal and EU control. These regional movements oppose not only immigration to which their voters have not consented but also the transfer of regional wealth into federal welfare systems. The Front National (FN), the Danish People's Party, and the Alleanza Nazionale (AN) all stand for the interest of the nation-state but join with regionalists in highlighting certain shared positions—dislike of the EU, unhappiness with immigration, and explicit attachment to a cultural heritage they would like to preserve. The

Freiheitliche Partei in Austria has moved occasionally in both directions, stressing regional independence in its homeland of Carinthia but recasting itself as more of an Austrian national party as its electoral base has continued to expand. The Front National in France has moved decisively in the other direction. Rising in the seventies and eighties as a defender of French unity (which it still is in its unalterable opposition to Corsican autonomy), the FN, more recently, has appealed to the ideal of decentralization. This fits well with its view of the federal bureaucracy, and of the ruling party blocs, in France as *"la zélée servante du mondialisme"* (the enemy of rooted communities), national or otherwise.[3]

All of these groupings have reputations (usually exaggerated) for being on the "extreme right," a label that once worked to their electoral advantage. The Front National acquired a mass base in the 1970s that incorporated those still sympathetic to the Vichy government and those in the sixties who had opposed the French withdrawal from Algeria. Although destined to be complemented and superseded by others, these followings did help the FN put together an electorate that by the eighties was extended into the teens.[4] The same development occurred in Austria, where the Freiheitliche Partei was able to attract aging former Nazi members, including, significantly, Haider's father, as well as Austrian regionalists. Although less directly linked to the postwar remnants of the interwar Right, the Alleanza Nazionale does have roots in the neofascist Movimento Sociale d'Italia (MSI), a party that erupted into being in the late forties. Gianfranco Fini had joined the Movimento at age twenty, in reaction to what he perceived as Italian Communist control of universities and Communist street violence in his native Bologna. After the death of MSI founder Giorgio Almirante in 1988, Fini, then in his forties, had been able to reconstruct the neofascist into a "postfascist" movement. He joined the center-right coalition of Italian media magnate Silvio Berlusconi and formed a coalition government with him in May 1994.[5] By then long established right-wing support may have gone to the populist Right in any case. But populist leaders drew off that support more effectively from other parties (particularly the socialists) once the multicultural Left had begun attacking them as radical rightists.

Moreover, such parties have gained numbers in reaction to the post-Communist Left, or to Western Communist parties that have

reconstructed themselves as guardians of multiculturalism. The communications of the Mouvement National Républicain (put out by the *frontistes* who in 1998 broke from Jean Le Pen and followed his erstwhile lieutenant Bruno Mégret) decries the Communists less as retread Stalinists than as destroyers of French and European identity. The Communists, according to another split-off faction from the FN, Unité Radicale, are said to apply the *"laminoir universaliste"* (universalist flattener) that denies to Europeans the kind of "historical, ethnic-cultural community" that European governments now guarantee to non-Europeans and non-Christians.[6] And to make sure, we are told, that Frenchmen and Europeans cannot freely discuss this double standard intended to bury them culturally, the Left, led by the Communists, have invented the concept of a "crime of opinion" and direct it against their opponents.

The Left is further accused of agitating to institute "commemorative politics," the purpose of which is to make Europeans feel guilty for "fascist crimes" that supposedly resulted from their Christian heritage. This too, it is said, is indicative of the continued war of the anti-European Left to eradicate European pride, while hiding what they themselves have done as longtime apologists for Communist crimes.[7] This line of attack, against leftist thought control, has helped to arouse sympathy for the populist Right. In the *New York Times*, a commentator who is by no means friendly to the populist Right explains: "In Germany and France, a conservative reaction is evident against what the French call 'the angelic Left,' which is accused of imposing a stifling political correctness on debate and of backing a multicultural tide that will sweep away the European nation state."[8]

The by now feared populist movements also feature leaders who claim to speak both to and for historical nations or besieged regionalists, against media-administrative elites. A cult of the leader seems inevitably attached to all such movements, partly related to the emphasis they place on circumventing ordinary party politics and enacting plebiscitary democracy. It would be erroneous and even anachronistic to stick onto this new orientation an "antiliberal" label. One must, first of all, make the case that the managerial therapeutic regime that the populists are combating is essentially "liberal," a point that my book *After Liberalism* disputes at great length. Put succinctly, the populist Right represents, for the most part, a postliberal movement

in a Western world that is becoming less and less bourgeois and in which nation-states and Western identity have grown progressively weaker. It is unclear whether those Danish socialists who followed Jespersen and Pia Kjaersgaard into the People's Party are more or less "liberal" than those who remained in the Social Democratic majority. What distinguishes them is a differing judgment about the preconditions for maintaining a Scandinavian welfare state, and its underlying values, if the influx of non-Western Muslims is allowed to continue.[9] It must also be asked if what European populist leaders famously demand—referenda, an end to welfare burdens, and more government accountability over immigration—are intrinsically "illiberal." However offensive they may be to the journalistic Left, these stands do invoke a recognizably liberal principle, the consent of citizens. Depicting the opponents of populism as "liberal" and the populists as unreconstructed Nazis or fascists is dishonest and misleading. Such fictions misrepresent the Nazis as essentially proponents of anti-immigrationism, while treating current political debates in the framework of interwar battles that never took place in the way they are now presented. And most significantly of all, the confrontation that has erupted is not between liberals and antiliberals but between two postliberal concepts of democracy, one, managerial-multicultural, and the other, plebiscitary national or regional.

The populists have been out there arguing that they, not their opponents, are the champions of popular government. In 1999, Christoph Blocher, a self-made business tycoon in Zurich and the son of a Swiss Reformed pastor, rode this issue to a stunning electoral upset in the German Swiss cantons. In October 1999 his Democratic Union of the Center coalition moved up in the Swiss federal elections, from 15 to 22.8 percent of the votes cast, to become the largest party bloc in the Swiss assembly.[10] From all accounts, it managed this feat by going after the grievances associated with bureaucratic elitism. From 1992 to 1998 the Swiss were made to absorb, albeit with considerable grumbling, a greater and greater number of asylum seekers. By 1998, Switzerland was taking more than 12 percent of the predominantly Muslim refugees the European Union had agreed to resettle among its member countries. This controversial decision came not from the once largely autonomous Swiss cantons but from the Social Democratic federal government, acting in concert with the EU.

Moreover, the federal government was passing on to the cantons the resettlement costs, which aroused anger in Zurich, where almost half of the Muslim refugees had chosen to live. Blocher appealed to material interests but also complained with credibility that distant bureaucrats had trampled on the popular will. A related theme is interwoven into the statement of support for the Vlaams Blok that came from the French nationalist faction Unité Radicale. Flemish regionalism is held to be a blow for "democracy," a form of government understood as emanating from the will of a firmly rooted people. The French nationalists contrast their concept of democracy, evident among the Flemings, to the machinations of "putative democrats," who take advantage of multicultural electorates.[11]

Such appeals to rooted democracy, against what is portrayed as bureaucratically controlled mass democracy, have played on the European continent well. Haider adopted this rhetoric to win to his banner over a quarter of the Austrian vote; the Vlaams Blok, the Democratic Union of the Center, and maverick socialists in Scandinavia have played on the same theme (or, in the Danish case, an adapted leftist variation) to make similar electoral inroads. The motto of the Vlaams Blok, *"Eigen Volk Eerst"* (one's own people first), epitomizes the intended linkage between self-conscious peoplehood and popular government.[12] At the same time, mainstream parties and politicians have selectively assimilated the populist views that seem to be catching on among European electorates. Christian Social Party chief Edmund Stoiber in Bavaria, the head of the Danish Social Democratic government, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, and the center-right MRP coalition in France all bring up concerns that the populists have already retailed, be it traditional national values, immigration, or the need for local, accountable democracy. Despite the continuing differences between the regionalists and nationalists and between the socialists and would-be dismantlers of welfare states, European populists opposed to immigration and the EU have stayed on good terms. They and their followers—and, far less charitably, their opponents—recognize the family resemblance among them.

Despite the recent surge among these movements, none of them has been able to grow into a majority party. Save for the Freiheitliche Partei and for the Democratic Union of the Center, the populist parties of the right have generally not exceeded a percentage of the national

vote beyond the high teens. Most count on regionally based electorates that nourish but set limits on popular support. Examples are obvious and would include the Lega Nord in Lombardy and more generally in northwestern Italy, and the Vlaams Blok in Flanders, but also include nationalist parties with well-developed regional bases, like the Front National (drawing heavily from southern coastal towns and from Parisian *banlieusards* anxious about North African immigrants) and the Alleanza Nazionale (sustained mostly by Sicilian and southern Italian support).

Without a multiparty proportionate representation, the Lega Nord would not have obtained its present leverage in Italian national government. The same may also be true for the AN. At its high-water mark in March 1994, the Alliance collected as much as but no more than 13 percent of the registered votes in the Italian legislative election.[13] In France the split that occurred in 1998 among various factions in the FN made it less of a force for several years in French national politics than it had been before. Until Le Pen's second-place finish in the first round of the French presidential race on April 21, 2002, the FN's vote was divided, quite acrimoniously, between the followers of Le Pen and those of Bruno Mégret. Although Le Pen's run for the presidency against Jacques Chirac temporarily reduced rivalries on the "extreme" right, such problems will likely resurface in the wake of Le Pen's defeat. In Austria and Switzerland, the populist Right does have a true national base, but the host countries are subject to intimidation. Haider resigned and apologized after Euro-American global democrats had isolated his land economically and diplomatically. Given their humble position, the Austrians may count themselves fortunate in not having suffered worse. In the ancient world, the Melians and Mytilenes were both destroyed for displaying insubordination by Athenian "democratic" imperialists. Such a fate seemed for the Athenians to be "just," which meant consistent with the right of a hegemonic power to discipline a straying "ally."[14]

What is alleged to be the populist Right, moreover, sometimes appeals to concerns that benefit the managerial establishment as much as they do its opponents. The EU has gained acceptance among Europeans partly as a protector of regional minority rights. It continues to enjoy such a reputation among Welsh and Scottish regionalists, who are not bothered or affected adversely by the Union's multicultural

agenda.[15] Cases do exist—for example, the quest for independence pursued by Corsican and Briton separatists—where the EU has intervened on the side of regional democracy. Here Union officials have been firmly allied to the regionalists, against right-wing populists who are upholding the interests of the nation-state.[16]

Another problem for the populist Right is that what it features as a political organizational style is not limited to a single ideology. As noted by the Italian journal *Borghese*, populist campaigns are a way that contemporary political leaders scare up electorates, namely, through a cult of personality that can survive the declining interest in party politics. Successful populist personalities include Bill Clinton and Tony Blair as well as Haider, Le Pen, Blocher, Fini, and Bossi. Presently, the most influential populists are those in the most powerful countries, who are dead set against the programs advanced by the populist Right.[17]

Not surprisingly, establishment populists can appeal to "the people" against the "rich" and "special interests" without having to abandon public administrators, media allies, or, in the United States, the legal profession. The major breakthroughs achieved in Western managerial states, as in the postwar victory of British socialism, have featured populist upsurges and egalitarian reformers. This populism of the Left has been turned against politics-as-usual, typified by bourgeois safeguards protecting property and by traditional constitutional restraints on the state. Not only fascists but also social democrats, as observed by Friedrich Hayek in *The Road to Serfdom*, have described parliamentary government dismissively as a "talk shop."[18] While populist movements on the right may have only very limited strategic possibilities, it may be important to underline the limits of the strategy in question. Successful advocates of big government, who can harness social resentments and build personal cults, reveal the ideologically inclusive character of charismatic politics.

What the populist Right and the anti-immigrationists and EU-critics in Scandinavia have done is contribute to a trend exhaustively documented by Dutch-Israeli historian Martin van Creveld. In the judgment of Creveld as presented in *The Rise and Decline of the State*, the structure of state authority established in early modern Europe has been coming apart precipitously over the last quarter of a century. In international relations, Creveld sees this tendency fully at work. Individual European states do not have the same power to make

war as they did in previous centuries. Both the building of nuclear arsenals and the ready intervention of supranational agencies, such as NATO and the UN, have limited or ended the power of once sovereign states to settle disputes militarily. The resources available for prosecuting wars and supranational or imperial custodians of the status quo have worked against the right to wage war, once held to be a defining mark of state sovereignty.[19]

Equally important, the prestige of the state, as that institution was traditionally understood, has grown feeble. Uncomfortable with their distinctly national pasts, the states of Europe are running away from what they once were. The German government has refused emphatically and repeatedly to take back the body of the last German emperor from the Dutch, who no longer wish to pay for its burial site. The German Chancellor claims that he does not want to "send the wrong signals to the outside world," by which his critics understand him to be saying that Germany has ceased to be in any meaningful sense the country that German emperors had helped unite in the late nineteenth century. The new Germany hopes to be viewed as a juridical concept, an enforcer of "human rights," and a collection of people who are doing penance for the burden of German history.[20] Also reflecting this devaluation of one's national past, the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, put in place by the current English government, has gone beyond recommending that "Britain be called a multi-ethnic, multi-faith society." The Commission strenuously urged the Parliament to shun further references to "British," "because of its connotation of racial exclusivity and imperialism."[21]

Creveld would view such acts as being related to the problem that European nation-states are simply unraveling. This tendency can be inferred from a process of disintegration that is affecting most of the activities associated with European states. The military decline of these regimes, certainly relative to the United States, the challenge posed to their survival by regional autonomists and supranational organizations, and their difficulty in raising funds for social programs are all cited to demonstrate this general deterioration. Creveld brings up as further evidence for his argument the increased role of the Internet, as a vehicle of international contact, and a global economy that is oblivious to national frontiers. In this environment, it is thought, the loyalty once paid to nation states has become increasingly uncertain.

Although Creveld overstates his thesis, particularly when he depicts welfare states as collapsing, his interpretive perspective nonetheless deserves attention. If Thomas Hobbes proclaimed the sovereign state to be the ultimate machine, its present European form is becoming one without inherited substance. States repudiate or redefine out of existence what had been their national character, while surrendering more and more of their sovereignty to the EU. This denatured state machine is also undertaking a contradictory project, criminalizing and punishing the expression of identitarian sentiments in the majority population while pretending to speak for the "nation" it is culturally suppressing. This dubious project, Creveld insists, of enforcing antinational national identities bespeaks the stumbling of a onetime giant, trying to arrest its fall by assisting in its demise. European nation-states have become "feminized" bureaucracies, heavily staffed by women engaged in feminist politics.[22] States no longer talk about heroic pasts nor evoke the kind of national loyalties that had marked them well into the last century. They are becoming inconveniences in a First World society dominated by supranational institutions, expanding technology, and multinational commerce.

The European populist Right and its reception provide further proofs of Creveld's picture of the decline of nation-states. From the standpoint of the political establishment, this "inconvenient" Right opposes any view of nations and regions that treats them as unfinished multicultural projects, and it goes after those sprawling administrations intended to resocialize European populations. A transparent sign of the weakness of nation-states, harped on by the populist Right, is their slavish imitation of American fashion. The adoration of "diversity" as the worship of victims, and the disparagement of the European past are said to be the homage that Europeans must offer to American moral and cultural domination. They are the incorporations of Anglo-American liberal Protestantism undertaken by politically and economically weaker societies. No longer the European Left, which has adopted and intensified this American legacy, but the populist Right warns against the *Pax Americana* that is turning into imperial sway.

Gianfranco Fini recalls that it was the efforts of the Communists to keep him and other Bolognese from seeing John Wayne in the pro-American movie *The Green Beret* that pushed him into becoming a member of the anti-Communist MSI. As late as May 1972 that party of the right, marching under the banner "Destra nazionale," won 3 million

votes and fifty-six seats (becoming the fourth largest Italian party) in the national legislative election. At that time the MSI still received American funding as an anti-Soviet party, and Fini, like others drawn to the anti-Communist Right, was outspokenly pro-American.[23]

Now an overshadowing theme for the European Right, in opposition to the Center and Left, is the fight against "Atlanticism" as an instrument of U.S. control. Since the Gulf War in 1991, the "extreme" Right generally, and particularly in France, has sided with the "victims of American imperialism." During the bombing of Serbia it was impossible to find any populist Right on the Continent that did not lean toward the Serbs, as the European side. This struggle was seen as one that pitted American and American-dominated NATO aggressors, favoring the Muslim Albanians, against "European" civilization.[24] Such a perception indirectly confirmed the observation made in 1995 by *National Review* chief editor John O'Sullivan: "For much of the world's left, the U.S. today is utopia."[25]

For the Left, especially in Europe, the post–Cold War United States is the enforcer of "antifascist" and multicultural ideas that are triumphing in American society and among its human-rights allies. The long-demonized American capitalist empire no longer upsets the European Left as monolithically as it once did. The Cold War and the Soviet-led Communist bloc are now gone, while multiculturalism and some phantom of the 1930s Popular Front have filled the need for programs on the left resulting from the death of conventional socialism. For the Left, at least until the recent war against terrorism, the United States has become the indispensable partner in promoting its work, against obstinate European nationalists and antiglobalists. One should not exaggerate the meaning of occasional demonstrations, even violent ones, by the European radical Left, against American corporations and American militarism. It is an Oedipal reflex directed against a political culture from which the European Left draws all of its ideas.

On the populist right there prevails a deeper resentment against Americanization, but it is not likely to win out in the present unfavorable circumstances. First, there is the issue of overwhelming American military and economic power, and beyond that is the even more daunting presence of American culture. Unlike the fifties and sixties, when the American Left was parasitic on Central European Marxism and French existentialism, the beginning of the twenty-first century

reveals the tyranny of American social movements over Europe. Feminism, gay rights, and the continuing transmogrification of European postmodernism into American multiculturalism and the American cult of victims have taken Europe by storm. This may be only one among other byproducts of the Cold War, but it is the one that defines the present European politics, the falling of the Marxist European Left into a stale imitation of the new American universalism.[26]

The opponents of this order are heavily concentrated in small European countries or in particular regions of middle-sized European states. Their views are filtered through a generally hostile media in their own countries and in the United States. This filtering, moreover, turns into censorship, when the "fascist" danger is deemed as particularly grave, and applied to entertainers as well as politicians. Right-wing heavy-metal rock singers complain, for example, that AOL Time Warner and other American distributors take their "identitarian" recordings off the market because the lyrics are judged to be "intolerant."[27] It is of course irrelevant whether the black or Hispanic recordings these megacompanies do distribute reek with even greater intolerance. The question is one of power—or of the bad cards held by European opponents of multiculturalism. Suitably symbolizing the Americanization of Great Britain (or whatever it chooses to call itself) are the results of a recent extensive survey taken among Englishwomen by Lloyds Bank to determine the "most respected mother" in the country.[28] Unlike such surveys in the past, which typically favored and expressed popular loyalty to the Queen Mother and the Queen, the latest winner is Cherie Blair, the militantly feminist attorney wife of the prime minister and a champion of multicultural values. Following immediately behind this avatar of a new "Cool Britain" came Catherine Zeta-Jones and one of the Spice Girls.

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1. *Guardian*, August 26, 2000, 8, weekend edition; *Le Figaro*, October 2, 2000, 14.

2. *Le Figaro*, October 2, 2000, 14, 5; the glaring double standard about Communist crimes runs through Zeev Sternhell's most recent work, *L'idéologie fasciste en France* (Paris: Fayard, 2000).

3. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, "Belgium's Local Elections Dominated by Far Right," *Daily Telegraph*, October 10, 2000, 1. See also the leading Flemish newspaper, *De Mogen*, October 8, 2000, 1. For the disapproving stories on the Populist Right, see *Guardian*, October

18, 2000, 21; and October 23, 2000, 19. On the transformations undergone by the F.P, see Paul Hockeres, "Jörg Haider, Austria's Far Right Wunderkind," *World Policy Journal* 12, no. 3 (fall 1995), 75–76, and M. A. Sully, *The Haider Phenomenon* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997). See also the relevant statements by the Movement National Républicain (which includes the larger part of the now split Front National) in *Communiqué de Presse de MNR* (the youth organization of the movement), November 2, 2000; and the congratulations extended to the Vlaams Blok in the *Communiqué de Presse de Bruno Mégret*, October 8, 2000.

4. See the account of the Front's rise in Pierre-André Taguieff, *Le National Populisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1989); and Anne Tristan, *Au Front* (Paris: Gallimard, 1987).

5. See the sympathetic but generally objective treatment of the postfascist Italian Right in Marco Tarchi, *Cinquant'anni di nostalgia: La destra italiana dopo il fascismo* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1995); and Vaugeois, "Du MSI à l'Alliance Nationale."

6. *Communiqué de Presse d'Unité Radicale*, October 10, 2000, 25.

7. *Communiqué de Presse de Bruno Mégret*, November 22, 2000; a recent set-to occurred between the French Nationalist Right and its leftist opponents when Catherine Mégret, wife of the director of the MNR, and mayor of Vitrolles-en-Provence, offered to pay special family allowances to those of French and European stock in her municipality who produced children. The French Left, egged on by the communists, hauled Mégret before the district court at Aix-en-Provence, charging criminal discrimination against North African Muslims. This move then led to other demonstrations at the courthouse by Mégret's municipal employees, and to published expressions of support on November 8, 2000.

8. *New York Times*, September 9, 2000, A1.

9. See the interviews with Karen Jespersen, Mogens N. J. Camre, and other deputies associated with the Danish People's Party in *Junge Freiheit*, February 11, 2000, 3. As late as 1995, Jespersen was featured as an exemplary feminist and as an earnest Social Democrat in *Women's International Network News* 21 (winter 1995): 166.

10. See the ungracious but extensive coverage of Blocher's electoral victory in "La Destra Conquista la Svizzera," *Corriere della Sera*, October 25, 1999, 1, 12; and in "Christoph Blocher," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, October 27, 1999, 1.

11. *Communiqué de Presse d'Unité Radicale*. Despite the splintering of the FN into three discrete nationalist formations, efforts are being made to bring them back together into one unified movement. All three groups were active, for example, in planning a European summit to be held at Nice (December 6–8, 2000), aimed at blocking the entry of Muslim Turkey into the EU and the implementation of a "European Chart of Fundamental Special Rights." See the *Communiqués* issued by the MNR, FN, and UR for November 27, 2000.

12. See the highly philosophical discussion of Flemish peoplehood furnished by Urbain Decat in his October 15, 2000, interview with Robert Steuckers; and the biography of Filip Dewinter, youthful leader of the VB, on the party's website, www.vlaamsblok.be.

13. Vaugeois, "Du MSI à l'Alliance Nationale," 19, 20.

14. Thucydides, *Historiae*, Oxford Classical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 3:36–48, particularly the closing remarks made by the *demagogos* Cleon (3:40, 16–25) about the need to act "justly," meaning ruthlessly, by those in power; and W. Robert Conner, *Thucydides* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 80–108.

15. On the balancing of integrating and regional forces in the development of the EU, see W. Wallace, "Rescue or Retreat? The Nation-State in Western Europe, 1945–1993," *Political Studies* 42 (1994): 52–76.

16. See the *Communiqué de la Coordination*, November 6, 2000, issued by the bridge builders among the FN, UR, and MRP. A shared concern among these French Nationalist factions is the current French government's ceding of autonomous powers to Corsica.

17. "Sistemi de governo," *Borghese* 42 (October 1999): 42–48.

18. Friedrich Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), 12–14.

19. Martin van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 336–415.

20. See Roger Cohen, "Is Germany on the Road to Diversity?" *New York Times*, December 4, 2000, A14. Note the role being played by Edmund Stoiber, Bavarian minister-president, an outspoken populist critic of the multicultural Left, in the building of an Austrian coalition between the Austrian Center Right and the Freiheitliche Partei; see *Main Post* (Würzburg), September 10, 1999, 1.

21. The report of the Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain is available on the website of the Runnymede Trust, www.runnymedetrust.org.

22. See Creveld, *Rise and Decline*, 408–14. The reference is to other observations offered by Creveld in conversation with the author (October 8, 2000) at a Conference on the State held in Auburn, Alabama, at which both of us were participants.

23. See the closing chapter of Tarchi, *Dal MSI ad AN*.

24. For the confrontation between the anti-American Right and the pro-American establishment Left in the wake of NATO's action against Serbia, see P. M. Gallois, *Le Soleil d'Allah aveugle l'Occident* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 1995). A text that the antiwar European Right has helped to popularize is Noam Chomsky's *Le Nouvel Humanisme Militaire* (Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme, 2000); Chomsky is a figure long associated in the United States with the anti-Vietnam Left.

25. John O'Sullivan, *American Enterprise* 6, no. 4 (July/August 1995): 31.

26. Note the argument in this chapter about the Americanization of the European Left is diametrically opposed to the one in François Furet's *The Passing of an Illusion: the Communist Idea in the Twentieth Century*, trans. Deborah Furet (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 9–12. Furet believes that the "revolutionary obsession with equality" and the revulsion for bourgeois culture, which he perceives as growing stronger in American society, are essentially foreign imports. From this perspective, the United States does not create but merely absorbs and adapts corrupting political ideas that originate in the Old World.

27. See Eric Owens, "The New Nationalist Music," *American Renaissance* 11, no. 11 (November 2000), 1–5.

28. *New York Post*, October 24, 2000, E34.

Conclusion

A Secular Theocracy

Therapeutic and Nontherapeutic Managerial States

It has been argued in the preceding chapters that the managerial state does not provide services in a value-free manner. Inherent in its operation is an ideology that has come to pervade both the political class and those it purports to serve. Public administration has focused with increasing zeal on sensitizing "democratic" citizens. It fights what it presents as the prejudiced past by fashioning a new public consciousness and by upholding, as explained by columnist Michael Kelly, a selective "rights liberalism" at the expense of the older "libertarian liberalism."[1] While the acceptance of these changes may be related to material prosperity, other variables play a role as well. Material and medical advances have characterized Western history for several centuries without producing the extent of state involvement in social life that exists at the present time. Moreover, a public willingness to allow the state to provide for entitlements does not have to bring the acceptance of socialization by public administrators. Supporters of the welfare state have not always been receptive to a sweeping reconstruction of their lives. Labor unionists in the past, for example, were not known to hold progressive views on lifestyle issues. Indeed in the United States, blue-collar Democrats in the sixties resisted their party's takeover by the social Left. In Italy and France a similar development occurred when the petite bourgeoisie and factory workers, neither of which is well-disposed toward Third World immigration, gravitated toward the "extreme right." Not all progressive forms of socialization, moreover, must entail a cult of victims, in which those seen as marginalized by traditional Western societies are accorded special status. One can certainly imagine government social planning that does not feature victims and victimizers or celebrate the "enriching" experience of demographic transformation.

Social historian Allan C. Carlson has written about the paths that public administration might have taken or tried only tentatively. Carlson is struck in particular by the "sea change in values" undergone by "women's rights."[2] Both feminists of the thirties, like Eleanor Roosevelt, and the Christian Democratic authors of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 assumed that the cause of women required the protection of the family by the state. Advocates of "women's rights" fifty years ago believed that governments should protect motherhood by making sure that male workers received a family wage. Public administration was thought to be a suitable vehicle for discouraging an unfair wage structure that might drive women away from their homes and children, into the workplace. Carlson maintains that an earlier, relatively traditionalist concept of the welfare state was discredited by the intensive efforts of Scandinavian socialists. Gunnar and Alva Myrdal and their disciples, UN Secretary Generals Trgve Lie and Dag Hammarskjold, prefigured a new trend in social planning, away from natality and family cohesiveness toward the liberation of women from the home. Social planners bearing modern feminist views, Carlson tells us, nudged welfare states in the same direction throughout the Western world.[3] The result should not be surprising, for welfare states went in the direction they may have been inclined to go in any case, toward social engineering and away from bourgeois society. This new direction came inter alia from cultural forces that Carlson's subjects personified, particularly the liberal Protestantism attributed to Swedish theologian and social planner Dag Hammarskjold.

This book has highlighted the religious variable that has contributed to the social policies of Western political elites. Those policies, we maintain, have a necessary relation to liberal Christianity, and especially to a "deformed" Protestant Reformation. Absent a Protestant culture of social guilt and of individuals ashamed of their collective past, the therapeutic state could not have taken the hold it has. To the extent this culture can root in alien soil, it depends on the possibility of transferring distinctly American values and attitudes. But even with this transfer, a popular repugnance may persist in some places toward liberal Protestant sentiments, for example, toward what Germans call *Sündenstolz*, pride in being a repentant social sinner, or toward creating more open borders as a precondition for a multicultural society, whence the recurrent opposition to political correctness and to

social engineers that is encountered in Italy, Austria, France, and other predominantly non-Protestant parts of Europe. Such opposition, however, must deal with a hostile international situation, involving not only American economic-military predominance, but also the American moral and conceptual monopoly of acceptable meanings for "democracy" and "right." All other meanings assigned to these terms have become for the European media synonymous with fascism—or with a fascist predisposition quite broadly understood.

A critical observation made by moral conservatives is that the United States is now suffering from "secularization." It is full of relativists who desist from making judgments about what has been conventionally viewed as socially immoral, be it homosexuality, the blurring of gender roles, or adultery. The same critics remind us that most Americans go to church faithfully and once freed of wayward elites would return to sound moral opinions. Both assertions are partly correct. Americans attend church services at higher rates than do most Europeans and often profess what are recognizably Christian beliefs. On the other hand, most Americans polled do not take offense at nontraditional lifestyles or the "liberal" social positions endorsed by political and religious leaders. The fact that former Democratic vice-presidential candidate Joseph Lieberman favors a woman's right to a third-term abortion and cosponsored gay rights legislation in the Senate does not injure his image among Christians as a morally and religiously conservative statesman. This image of Lieberman as a traditionalist has been expressed by conservative journalists, most notably William F. Buckley, as much as in the center-left media.[4] Although this judgment may indicate that polite Christians are reaching out to an Orthodox Jew, it also reflects well contemporary Christian attitudes. Exhibiting solidarity with gay and feminist politics is not thought to exclude being pious or godly. Since victim-conscious, feminist Christianity now defines the dominant American religious culture, it is possible to be "religious" and politically correct both at the same time.

An Unsecular Secularism

This observation leads to questions about an association that has been made since the pioneering research of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, between secularization and modernization. Supposedly as

societies become more secularized, they abandon the religious myths and doctrinal mysteries that had once permeated their fiber. They become more materialistic in their understanding of nature and of themselves and regard reasoning intelligence as sufficient for solving human problems. Although much of this process may be uniformly observable in modern societies, it is also the case that secularization takes place differently in different places, with different cultural histories.[5] Arab nationalists, Zionists, and the IRA all represent secularism as much as do liberal Protestants in the United States and Canada protesting restrictions on gay and feminine self-actualization. All secularizers bear the marks of those religious cultures whence they and their ideas come. And, as the Semiticist and historian Elie Kedourie points out in his studies of Middle Eastern nationalisms, what starts out as a nonsectarian nationalist movement may end up affirming a once-discarded religious context. Although in the early twentieth century fervent Arab nationalists included Maronite and Orthodox Christians, looking for secular bonds between themselves and Muslim Arabs, Arab nationalism was destined to go in a different direction. Within a few generations, explains Kedourie, Islamic and Arab identities became intertwined aspects of Arab nationalism, even for those strains of it that formally rejected any close affiliation with the Muslim clergy.[6] Similar developments can likewise be found among Jewish and Irish nationalists. Although both groups revealed strong (but perhaps only apparent) secularist tendencies in the early twentieth century, each made peace with and came to depend on indigenous religious establishments after achieving nationalist political goals.

Religious myth is not something to be replaced in the secularizing process by scientific materialism or some variant thereof. Transpositions take place as well—for example, the substitution of designated victims for the older adoration of religious martyrs or that of successive utopian visions for the biblical final age. Scholars, most notably Eric Voegelin and Jacob Taubes, who have traced ancient Gnostic themes in modern millenarian politics, correctly look for the nonrational sources of secular progressivism. Their approach recommends itself as those scientific claims that social engineers once fabricated lose credibility. Two French theological commentators, Jacques Ellul and René Girard, follow a similar course: both explain the religious appeal of the new progressivism by examining recycled

Christian images integrated into contemporary therapeutic politics. The notion of the "suffering just" has been "brought up to date" and now signifies Third World, gender, and lifestyle victims.[7] Girard speaks of Christianity being "wrenched" into a cult of victims, but he does recognize that some Christian elements can be discerned in the reworked materials. Shifting emphases and selective presentation are different from having to invent a theological outlook out of whole cloth.

In the Protestant world the recycling of religious themes has served to advance therapeutic-managerial rule partly by discrediting moral opposition. Insofar as Americans are still idealistic, they have come to believe in the special claims of those held to be the "suffering just." This attitude can be inferred from a commentary that psychoanalyst and political scientist Stanley A. Renshon offers on the "lost core of American politics." Renshon comments on the unwillingness of then presidential candidate Robert Dole (in a debate with President Clinton) to explain his alleged opposition to "special rights" for gays and lesbians. Instead of addressing the question posed by a woman Unitarian minister (and advocate of the legislation proposed), Dole went on to speak about the afflictions he had endured as a disabled veteran: "We've suffered discrimination in the disability community. There are 43 million of us. And I can recall cases where people would cross the street rather than meet someone in a wheelchair." Dole warned sternly that "we shouldn't discriminate—race, color, whatever, lifestyle, disability," before digressing with equally jumbled syntax into his views on foreign policy.[8]

Renshon devises reasonable responses that Dole might have given to the question about discrimination. Dole might have raised the concern that "some advocates and allies of the gays might use these laws in ways that most Americans would not support, for example, using the idea of a hostile climate to require the teaching of gay lifestyles in public schools," a situation that had come up in New York City and in other areas with large gay movements. Renshon hazards the observation that "a primal conflict had arisen between people of different racial, ethnic, and cultural heritages and between those who view themselves as culturally disadvantaged and those whom they see as culturally advantaged." These conflicts, which Renshon considers as now "without boundary," being limited by neither time nor space, spill into government and society constantly. They underscore two

major political developments of the present age: a “therapeutic politics,” that is, “a politics of feeling that has displaced the older American one of adjusting self-interests” and the “triumph among the ambitious of ‘lying for justice.’”[9]

What Renshon says in this matter is both true and boldly stated. Yet equally relevant is that only one side in this “primal conflict” claims convincingly to hold the moral high ground, while its critics have been reduced to evasion and procedural quibbles. Jurist Ronald Dworkin draws what is now a widely accepted distinction between a “constitution of principle” and a “constitution of detail.” Into the first Dworkin reads what is a recognizably “liberal social agenda,” while leaving to legislatures the dry technical side of governing.[10] This division may be one most Americans have come to embrace, including Republicans Robert Dole and George W. Bush, who never respond to gay advocates in the manner suggested by Renshon. And note that manner of argumentation does not require one to take traditionalist stands: It merely raises the question of diminished liberties for those who are not gay.[11] The fact is, multicultural and designated-victim considerations have become inseparable from American public virtue, and center-right politicians now shiver at the thought of violating these new moral standards.

Judged from the standpoint of firm control, not bourgeois liberty, the contemporary managerial state and its sensitized care have been a resounding success. The march of public administration may be becoming irreversible, in the same way that the Augustan empire could move on to the dual realm of Diocletian but not back to the pre-imperial republic that had existed before the Roman civil wars of the second and first centuries before Christ. In much of the Western world, it is hard to see how already atrophied social institutions, starting with weakened, disordered nuclear families, can be sufficiently revived to provide a support system that would take the place of the one furnished by the managerial state. The intergenerational family operating within a community of fixed and shared responsibilities may exist among Old Order Amish and Mennonites; it is certainly not the defining structure in which most Americans and Europeans now live—or, unless desperately dependent, would want to be placed. It is likewise hard to imagine that liberal Protestantism, which is seeping into non-Protestant religion as well, will be supplanted in the near future by a strikingly

different religious culture that will impel Western society in a different moral direction. The religious outlook described in this book does not seem endangered and in fact continues to function as an emotional resource for the dominant political ideology.

The *moral-religious* acceptance of this ideology comes through in an extended account that University of Pennsylvania historian Allan C. Kors offers of the multicultural indoctrination given to college freshmen across the United States. Kors depicts the ordeals of Euro-American students in orientation classes aimed explicitly at humiliating them. Films are presented to belittle the intelligence and cultural heritage of "blue-eyed" Americans, while minority group leaders egg on the other students to hurl epithets at their unsuitably Germanic-looking classmates.[12] In surveying Kors's findings, one is led to reflect that parents and students offer no resistance to this merciless hazing. Saying that such humiliation, which goes on in numerous colleges and universities, is an acceptable price for those wishing to attend a desirable educational institution ignores certain facts. It is hard to imagine that Jews, Japanese, blacks, or other ethnic or racial groups with a strong sense of collective identity would quietly accept these forms of individual and group humiliation. Only those who hold their ancestral group in low regard, or believe there is value in creating this impression, would allow such injury to be directed against themselves and their children.[13] And such a population has proved malleable to the behavioral reconstruction that has come from the managerial state. The social guilt and collective sense of shame that liberal Christianity has aroused have served the interest of, among others, political elites.

Soft Totalitarianism and Its Pleasures

Critics of our political culture have begun to pay attention to its "totalitarian" dimension. Ernst Nolte, who has seen himself tarred with the "residues of fascism," offers this somber reflection: "As long as one does not challenge the received, antifascist account of German and European history, critical perceptions will not change. There will continue to be a kind of soft totalitarianism, which is certainly not bloody, which allows some range of opinions, and which is even permissive in matters that are not politically important, but intellectually it is totalitarianism all the same. And I am not at all optimistic about the

future of Germany."[14] Nolte constructs a picture of "soft totalitarianism" similar to what is being said about the managerial-therapeutic regime. Subjects may move from place to place and make consumer choices, but what they communicate and are allowed to believe are increasingly monitored. Hurtful thought and insensitive communications are relentlessly brought under surveillance. Verbal offenders against the "antifascist" order in Europe are fined and imprisoned, but such actions do not lead to widespread, vocal opposition. This may be owing at least partly to the fear that conspicuous opposition to such control can be interpreted as an actionable offense. Yet it is also the case that the punishment of the politically incorrect has not aroused that much concern in most Western countries. In surveys taken there, one is more likely to encounter demands for chastising the offenders than calls for restoring diminished liberties.

A variation on Nolte's critical observation is in a commentary by Italian historian Augusto Del Noce, delivered in lectures at the University of Rome in 1977–1978. Contrary to the idea that totalitarian practices betray "the vestiges of Hitlerism and Stalinism," Del Noce discovers them in the "scientific" management of society, the discrediting of traditional authority, and the progress of secularism. These tendencies have not increased human freedom, Del Noce tells us, but have empowered social scientists and "scientific" administrators to recode human nature. Impelling this enterprise is the war against "all forms of knowing that are not deemed as scientific." But what in Del Noce's formulation is seen as the "totalitarianism of dissolution" does not bring about the triumph of science.[15] It elevates those who proclaim a postreligious science and equate the promotion of the social good with acts of will. "Reason itself is made to undergo negation," for the new totalitarians treat it "instrumentally," in relation to desired behavioral goals. Science is thereby reduced to a superstition, or to a certification wrapped in mystery and attached to a group of privileged power-bearers. Del Noce emphasizes the natural course that is at work in mass democracy, "a process that begins with the loss of the Greek discovery of morality and ends with the negation of [philosophic] Reason and the persecution of dissidents."

A Catholic traditionalist, Del Noce does concede that his own religion had persecuted scholars and philosophers in the past but makes a distinction between the older sporadic intolerance and modern

"totalitarian" threats. It is the pervasiveness of the modern "cult of science," combined with its ominous use by those seeking power, that distinguishes it from older forms of despotism.[16] The fixation of the modern age on material gratification, says Del Noce, has led to long-term social consequences: It has allowed those rightly or wrongly thought to be raising living standards to appropriate the authority that had once devolved on the priesthood.

While this book makes statements that overlap Del Noce's brief, some qualifying remarks are in order. Del Noce is depicting an earlier phase in the managerial ascendancy, exemplified in the United States by the educational and social theories of John Dewey and Herbert Croly. At that point social reconstruction and egalitarian ideology went hand in hand with the appeal to science and to the overcoming of "religious otherworldliness." Educators and social scientists aimed at framing a public philosophy that would celebrate human progress and a scientifically planned age. Two penetrating works, Friedrich Hayek's *The Counter-revolution of Science* and Friedrich-Heinrich Tenbruck's *Die Abschaffung des Menschen: Die unbewältigten Sozialwissenschaften*, take apart those imperialist claims that social engineers were making at midcentury.[17] Whereas such pretensions were apparent during the early stages of managerial democracy, a post-"scientific" behavioral approach to social problems took their place by the second half of the twentieth century. That approach is therapeutic and not "scientific." Grounded at least partly in religious sentiment, it relates to a culture of social guilt and designated victims. The new social engineering depends on and strengthens the fit created between popular morality, shaped by churches, schools, and the entertainment industry, and the reforming role of the administrative state. Focal points of opposition have been progressively eliminated.

Equally important have been the tortuous ways the therapeutic state hides its strong-armed tactics. Its bullying is turned by its legion backers into effusive caring or into the necessary responses to outbursts of prejudice that only the grossly insensitive would dispute. Thus the muzzling of dissent becomes a proactive step in combating bigotry, while in Europe the jailing of those who present the past inappropriately is justified as an attempt to curb "hate." Inconvenient facts are suppressed or willfully and proudly distorted as acts of inclusiveness, while those who provide empirical verification for

"hurtful" opinions in Canada and Europe suffer grave legal consequences as part of their "resocialization." The obscuring of the true character of the therapeutic state also takes place when establishment journalists pretend that government is limiting itself while ignoring its persistent expansion. Thus columnist Peter Ford in the *Christian Science Monitor* makes much of the fact that European regions are taking back control for some economic decisions from the European Community and from national administrations. According to Ford, "Europe may be leading the world into what may turn out to be the next stage of a human organization, a layered set of connections, both smaller and larger, closer and further away than countries." Syndicated columnist Georgie Anne Geyer offers a kindred perception, that while some administrative power has been transferred by European nations to Brussels, these countries are now having second thoughts about submitting to a "soulless bureaucracy."[18] Nation-states and ethnic regions are hesitating to go any further in divesting themselves of autonomy.

Although Geyer and Ford are generally critical of centralized, monolithic government, each commits the same oversight when discussing countertrends. Both call attention to a secondary tendency, that the EC has conceded control of public works and other spending programs to European regions, without bringing up the more significant secular trend, the continuing transfer of sovereignty to the "soulless bureaucracy" in Brussels. The moral, social, and ideological foundations and practices of those political entities that will be sharing fiscal power with the Eurocrats, are thought to be unalterably prescribed. Gay rights, feminist and multicultural directives, and liberal immigrationism provide the policy parameters imposed from above; only as long as regions accept these controls will they be treated as political players.[19] "Extremists" who do not observe multicultural proprieties will undergo collective discipline, as recently happened in Austria, for forgetting "the lessons of the past." But once having accepted the imposed prerequisites for decency, European regions and nations cease to be distinctive. They become atomized imitations of each other, even if they are permitted to have different theme-park decors and to retain linguistic particularities.

Unlike medieval Christianity, the enforced commonality in the current managerial setting is not shared ritual and sacramental

mysteries or ecclesiastical authorities, but a tightening system of managerial control. It is one that requires its subjects to behave unnaturally, despising their ancestry and inherited morals and at least pretending to reach out for "enrichment" to alien groups and to the practitioners of unconventional lifestyles. Submission to these behavioral and verbal guidelines, without the physical bullying carried out by the Nazi and Soviet states, can only be explained by looking at today's Western culture.

This evolving culture presupposes rejection of biologically determined loyalties to kin and natural community, the altruistic force that Edward O. Wilson and other social evolutionists view as inherent in human associations.[20] The regnant therapeutic ideology demands that the majority population of the West work to rid itself of the tares of its ancestral history. Although this response to bad conscience need not be traced to exclusively religious causes, liberal Christianity facilitates the popular receptiveness to what is being politically decreed. A liberal Christianity dressed up selectively with New Testament teachings about self-denial and sin provides the suitable theological framework for multicultural politics.

A Self-Destroying Multiculturalism

There is, however, a fly in this ideological ointment, which is not likely to go away. The stress on diversity is tied to a xenophile celebration of changing populations and non-Western immigrant communities. The reason for this celebration is the hope of enriching what is thought to be morally impoverished. In Germany this logic has been carried even further, by identifying the continuing reception into the country of Third World populations with atonement for the Nazi past.

This religious mind-set recalls the one explored in depth by English historian Corelli Barnett. In studies on the impact on the English ruling class of Evangelical Protestantism, Barnett finds a weakening of political will in his subjects that he traces to humanitarian sentiment. As explained in his massive scholarship, the retreat from empire, costly socialist programs, and the neglect of technological development in twentieth-century England have a religious point of reference. Each is derived at least partly from the "New Jerusalemism" that came from

Protestant Nonconformists and Evangelical Anglicans. Barnett examines this formative outlook by looking at the shared religious background of English social reformers and at the social teachings of Anglican churchmen throughout the period treated. From his grimly titled works *The Collapse of British Power* (1972) and *The Pride and the Fall* (1986), one is led to conclude that in a country showing steady, widespread church attendance and absent strong countervailing tendencies, particular forms of faith can affect (and have affected) modern political life.[21]

Such considerations of a religiously grounded worldview also explain the attraction of multicultural ideology. Although embracing this ideology may be a precondition for power, it might be asked whether the hegemons can preserve their hegemony without making timely adaptations. For it is not at all clear that our elites will trim their sails to deal with the storms into which their faith and emotions are carrying them. A case in point is the stubborn resistance to a reconsideration of immigration shown by the American media and by the leaders of the two major American political parties. U.S. Bureau of Statistics projections indicate that by 2100, the American population will likely stand at close to 600 million people. It is also likely that given their continuing predominance among the more than 1.5 million legal and clandestine immigrants entering the United States annually, together with a higher birth rate (by two-thirds) relative to non-Hispanic whites, Hispanics will become the majority or near-majority of the U.S. population by 2100.[22] Syndicated columnist Don Feder observes that in New York's metropolitan area, the largely Hispanic foreign-born make up 28 percent of the population but 50 percent of those on welfare, and they contribute disproportionately to violent crime.[23]

The continental European situation is less acute. Although immigration has surged as a key issue in some European elections, it has generally not precipitated the massive demographic dislocation that has beset entire regions of the United States. Some Italians are unhappy that 1.2 million legal immigrants (out of a total national population of nearly 60 million) have settled in their country since the early 1980s. This influx has put the foreign-born population of Italy at about 2 percent, as compared to 9.8 percent for the United States (a figure that has doubled since 1980).[24] Until the recent arrival of Albanians, most of the grumbling against the *forestieri* (outlanders) in

Northern Italian cities was directed at those recently arrived from Calabria, Apulia, and Sicily. In France the percentage of immigrants, of those not born in the country but who reside there, has remained at about 7.3 percent. (*Étrangés*, those who reside in France without holding citizenship, constitute about 6.4 percent of French inhabitants.) European allotments for those claiming refugee status has likewise begun to fall, even in England, France, Germany, Denmark, and Sweden, despite their center-left governments. The *Guardian* takes note of this trend when it laments "Europe's failure to adjust to being a continent of immigration, such as America and Australia."[25] Furthermore, given the subreplacement native population birthrates, Italy, France, Germany, and other European countries have practical reasons for importing labor. And though an increasing share of European migratory labor comes from the Third World, like the now majority North African representation among French immigrants, between 30 and 40 percent of the migrant laborers now found in Europe are European.[26] The population displacement of that continent is in any case less dramatic and economically more understandable than what is taking place in the United States.

Here, by contrast, the expansive direction of immigration has no clear-cut economic justification. Voluminous and meticulously researched studies, by, among others, George Borjas, Roy Beck, and Edward Luttwak, confirm that the present immigration, made up mostly of low-skilled Hispanics, weighs uncomfortably on the American underclass. The transfer of cheap labor takes low-paying jobs away from those least well off or depresses their wages.[27] It also has the effect of engendering divisive national movements unleashed against the Anglo population, for example, the Chicano "Nation of Aztlan," which flourishes in California and throughout the American Southwest, and other advocates of Hispanic irredentist goals.[28] Admitting large numbers of Hispanic immigrants each year, people then exposed to Hispanic nationalists, will not help defuse this problem. And having bilingual programs made available for these immigrants, while ethnic consciousness-raising programs are targeted, in the form of government-mandated university education, at other Hispanics, seems equally unwise.[29]

The pro-immigration side in the United States, nonetheless, faces fewer and fewer popular obstacles: The other side is unceremoniously

kept out of the public conversation, while a majority of Americans have become benignly indifferent to or positive about the government's immigration policy. The key question for this discussion is whether that policy benefits those in power. Does it advance or help maintain their control, or will the current approach to immigration affect negatively those who set and administer this policy?

Some advocates of expanded immigration do profit in the short run and may therefore not be inclined to heed warning signs. Corporations and commercial enterprises that benefit from low wages and easily intimidated workers are the most often cited example, but other illustrations can be pointed to as well. In the nineties the Democratic Party in the United States took measures to "regularize" the status of illegal residents; President Clinton and Vice President Gore rushed to extend citizenship to Hispanics in California before the completion of the stipulated waiting period, while granting amnesties to more than six million predominantly Hispanic "undocumented workers."[30] Democratic leaders know they are serving a reliable constituency. But why do Republicans take exactly the same positions, although non-Cuban Hispanics vote by a three-to-one margin for the Democrats? The increase of Hispanic registered voters in California, going from 10 percent in 1990 to 14.5 percent by the end of the decade, contributed heavily to the victory of Democratic Governor Gray Davis (who picked up 78 percent of the Latino vote).[31] Augmenting that vote is not likely to improve Republican electoral prospects, as may be inferred by the two-to-one margin among Hispanic voters in California that Al Gore enjoyed over George W. Bush. Despite his Latino relatives and liberal views on immigration, sometimes given in Spanish, the president only achieved a few percentage points more in the Hispanic vote than had fallen to previous Republican presidential candidates.[32]

When Republican congressional leaders, such as longtime congressman Richard Armey, endorse high levels of immigration and the periodic regularization of illegal workers and their families, one should not ascribe these acts to partisan interests entirely. Unlike House Republicans, the Italian Center Right, led by the Lega Nord, holds mass protests against their government's indulgent attitude toward illegal immigrants. Before a crowd of more than twenty-five thousand assembled in Milan on December 16, 2000, Umberto Bossi decried clandestine immigration as a "leftist production" meant to

undermine Italian national and regional identities. The spirited head of the Lega Nord aimed his shafts at the Papacy as well: By calling for the admission of more Third World refugees into Italy, the Pope and his advisors have made themselves into the "instruments" of European disintegration. Unlike the American Center Right, Bossi and others who addressed the anti-immigration march and demonstration in Milan had no trouble recognizing illegal Third World immigrants as the "future voters" who would be aligned to the other side.[33]

Underscoring their ideological turn of mind is the way American academics argue furiously that opening American borders and expanding the United States's non-Western composition will advance feminist and expressive freedoms. In a collection of essays, *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* edited by Susan Okin, most of the academic contributors do not engage Okin's observation that gender-specific oppression may grow in the United States and throughout Western countries as a result of being flooded by non-Western populations. A passionate response to this contention, considered by Okin's fellow contributors, comes from University of Toronto professor Will Kymlicka. In his academically acclaimed *Multicultural Citizenship*, Kymlicka maintains that cultural and lifestyle diversity brings moral benefits and not social division. These benefits are so great that the United States and Canada are urged to bestow on diversity-providers entire sets of "group rights."[34] Although these collective rights may conflict with individual ones and even sanction the oppression of minorities whom Kymlicka considers the most victimized, it is nonetheless imagined that everything will go well in a multicultural future.[35] Third World minorities can be made to shape up without forfeiting their authenticity. Most astonishing, as noted by one feminist, an anti-immigration critic of Kymlicka and of other contributors to Okin's anthology, is the unreflective multiculturalism found among these academic dignitaries: "Even the strongest feminists in this book do not seem to grasp that importing millions of misogynist foreigners conflicts with their goal of furthering the rights of women."[36] Tens of millions of "misogynist foreigners" will make it less likely in any case that the future will belong to the anthology's contributors.

Such critical remarks are not an expostulation from the cultural Right. The relevant question at this point is not how to retrieve the past but how to preserve the postliberal managerial dispensation. That order

will not be able to sustain itself unless it can deal with docile individuals of the kind described in this book. It will not benefit and may destroy that order if the culture shifts in ways that diminish its control. If a certain kind of multiculturalism may have that effect, reasoning leaders will try to prevent it from destabilizing society. This has not happened with immigration: Short-term gain and ideological commitment have both driven the managerial class and its media and academic priesthood toward "empowering" those who live parasitically on multicultural institutions. Hispanic racialists, Third World patriarchs, and Mexican irredentists will likely eat up the present regime, if given the demographic chance. What will then ensue will not be a return to what the managerial state supplanted. At most a precarious truce may be struck, before the advocates of group rights resume their competition for power.

On the other hand, not all who support the current managerial elites are disregarding a possible and even likely future. Fallback positions have been defined and taken that allow for social experimenting without the destabilizing costs of unmanageable diversity. Karen Jespersen and the Danish People's Party have raised such an argument against Third World immigration, emphasizing its risks for modern, emancipated women. An immigration restrictionist who defends the American managerial state, Michael Lind, speaks about the need to assist those disadvantaged minorities already present in the United States.[37] Like anti-immigration socialists in Scandinavia, Lind calls for vigorous attempts by Western governments to advance family planning in the overpopulated Third World. Such planning may help reduce the need for mass immigration and lessen the future degradation of the global environment. It might also aim at increased opportunities for women in premodern societies, who are now burdened by childbearing. This proposed outreach to Third World countries, minus immigration, is thought to mirror the ideals of a progressive regime, albeit one able to maintain its rule.

Despite the value these prescriptions may have for those in power, the revised forms of multiculturalism have not taken hold in the United States. Journalists, media celebrities, and government administrators all keep the banners flying for expansive immigration. According to one survey commissioned by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations in 1995, the elites being questioned favor high levels of immigration without indicating much concern about the educational skills of

incoming immigrants or about the influx of illegal ones.[38] Only 28 percent of elite respondents thought that controlling illegal immigration was an "important thing." This figure stands in marked contrast to 83 percent of nonelite respondents who had been recently surveyed in a Roper poll.[39]

Although popular opposition has been declining since the midnineties, it is doubtful that elites will go on benefiting from mass immigration. Right now this hardened position is still yielding gains, for example, opportunities for "experts" to prescribe solutions for social and cultural strife. But staggering numbers of unfriendly foreigners must tell in the end. To whatever extent our elites take their ideology seriously, one in which the enemy is always a fascist, Southern racist, Christian sexist, or one's own insensitive self, they do not reckon with the fall that may await them. Thinking these leaders govern through calculation disregards the fantasy aspect of their vision, one that has likewise spread among their citizen-subjects. The relation between the two is derived partly from a shared obsession, a misplaced quest for religious redemption that takes the form of worshipping at the multicultural shrine. Such a fixation would not be so perilous if the tragic self-delusion were not so deep and widespread. In Greek mythology the Litai, divine respondents to our supplications, come only after Ate, the goddess of mischief, has wrought havoc. For the managerial class and its multitudinous supporters, it might be best if the repairing deities come sooner rather than later.

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1. See Michael Kelly, "How Clinton Saved Liberalism," *New York Post*, November 17, 1999.

2. Remarks delivered by Allan C. Carlson to the annual meeting of Civitas in Toronto, Canada, April 24, 1999; see also A. C. Carlson, "U.N. Declaration on Human Rights," *Family in America* 14, no. 8 (August 2000): 1–4.

3. Allan Carlson, *The Swedish Experiment in Family Planning: The Myrdals and the Interwar Population Crisis* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1989).

4. Paul Gottfried, "Is Lieberman Worthy of Conservative Kudos?" *Insight*, September 11, 1999, 44–45.

5. See Paul Gottfried, "The Protestant Reformation and the Modern World," *The World and I*, February 1999, 16–28; and Gottfried, "Thinking about Secularisms."

6. Elie Kedourie, *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies* (London: Hutchinson, 1970); and S. G. Haim, "Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism," in *The Middle*

East in Transition, ed. W. Z. Laqueur (Portland, Oreg.: International Specialized Books, 1980).

7. Jacques Ellul, *Perspectives on Our Age* (Seattle: House of Anansi Press, 1997); and Girard, *Je vois Satan tomber comme l'éclair*. Ellis Sandoz's *The Voegelinian Revolution* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982) provides the best overview in English of Eric Voegelin's examination of the "gnostic temptation" in Western political and intellectual history. The University of Missouri Press is publishing *The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*, a projected thirty-four-volume series. See also Jacob Taubes, *Vom Kult zur Kultur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik der historischen Vernunft* (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1996).

8. Stanley A. Renshon, "The Lost Core of American Politics," *Society* 37, no. 6 (September/October 2000): 9.

9. Ibid., 10.

10. Ronald Dworkin, *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

11. Stanley Renshon examines the avoidance of truth as a defining trait of contemporary American politics in *High Hopes: The Clinton Presidency and the Politics of Ambition* (New York: New York University Press, 1996).

12. A. C. Kors, "Thought Reform 101," *Reason* 31, no. 10 (March 2000), 26.

13. For critical considerations of this linkage between anti-Westernism and contemporary American political culture, see Ernst Nolte's *Historische Existenz: Zwischen Anfang und Ende in der Gechichte* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1998), 631–38.

14. Ernst Nolte, interview by Thomas Dumont, *Catholica*, summer 2000, 79.

15. *Introduzione a Augusto Del Noce*, preface by Francesco Mercadante (Rome: Pellicani Editore, 1999); all quotations from the lectures discussed are from this text, 315–55.

16. The totalitarian thrust of technological civilization is a recurrent theme in Del Noce's widely known work, *L'epoca della secolarizzazione* (Milan: A. Giuffré, 1970). A critical examination of the questionable but by now conventional identification of fascism with "resistance to Progress" can be found in Del Noce's *Fascismo e antifascismo* (Milan: Leopardi, 1995).

17. F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason* (New York: Free Press, 1955); Friedrich-Heinrich Tenbruck, *Die Abschaffung des Menschen: Die unbewältigten Sozialwissenschaften* (Graz: Styria, 1983); see also Friedrich-Heinrich Tenbruck, *Zur Kritik der planenden Vernunft* (Freiburg: K. Alber, 1972).

18. Peter Ford, "In the Vanguard of the European Union," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 2000, 6; Georgie Anne Geyer, "Identity Crises Rock England," *Washington Times*, July 31, 2000, A19.

19. An extended dossier in *Le Figaro Magazine*, December 11, 2000, 52–67, examines the politics of Western self-rejection and its impact on French national identity. On the relation between the current egalitarian politics in Europe and the role of willful cultural minorities, see Arnaud-Aaron Upinsky, *La tête coupeé: Le secret du pouvoir* (Paris: Le Bec, 1998).

20. Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), particularly 110–14; see also James H. Hunt, *Selected Readings in Sociobiology* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980), 7–30, 38–68.

21. Corelli Barnett, *The Pride and the Fall* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 11–54, 276–304; and Corelli Barnett, *The Collapse of British Power* (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972).

22. An online publication, www.vdare.com, featuring articles by Peter Brimelow, Scott McConnell, and Steve Sailer, deals almost exclusively with the likely effects of Hispanic

immigration on American society. See also Joseph L. Daleiden, *The American Dream: Can It Survive the 21st Century?* (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 2000).

23. Don Feder, "Strength in Diversity? Not!" *Social Contract* 10, no. 2 (winter 1999–2000): 136–37.

24. On Italian immigration problems, see *Corriere della Sera*, July 17, 2000, 1, 2. Although generally pro-immigrationist, *Corriere* disputes the UN prediction that given its economic infrastructure and low birthrate, Italy will be forced to import upwards from 357 thousand immigrants each year, mostly from the Third World.

25. "Xenophobic, Anti-Immigration Mentality," *Guardian*, August 29, 2000, 1.

26. See Philippe Bernard, *L'immigration: Les enjeux de l'intégration* (Brussels: Le Monde, 1995), 22–35.

27. Borjas, *Heaven's Door;* Roy Beck, *The Case against Immigration* (New York: Norton, 1996); and Luttwak, *Endangered American Dream*, 181–212.

28. See Maria Hsia Chang's "Multiculturalism, Immigration, and Aztlan," *Social Contract* 10, no. 3 (spring 2000): 207–11.

29. Despite its passionate pro-immigration rhetoric, John J. Miller's *The Unmaking of Americans: How Multiculturalism Has Undermined America's Assimilation Ethic* (New York: Free Press, 1998), particularly 129–39 and 192–97, stresses the conflicts between multicultural policy and any reasonable effort at absorbing Hispanics into the American "mainstream." For a similar view, see Ron Unz, "The Right Way for Republicans to Handle Ethnicity in Politics," *American Enterprise* 11, no. 3 (April/May 2000): 34–37.

30. *New York Times*, September 2, 1995, 1; and Diana Hull, "Amnesty Ad Infinitum," *Social Contract* 10, no. 4 (summer 2000): 276–79.

31. See Peter Brimelow, "Un-American Activities," *National Review*, June 6, 1997, 32, 44; Peter Brimelow, "America's Assisted Suicide," *National Review*, November 25, 1996, 95.

32. For critical comments about the mostly futile Republican outreach to Hispanics, see John O'Sullivan, "Following the Returns," *National Review*, December 18, 2000, 30–31; Lawrence Auster, "My Bush Epiphany," www.worldnetdaily.com, September 19, 2000; and *Sam Francis Weekly Column*, November 29, 2000, www.samfrancis.net.

33. "Lega, migliaia contra i clandestini," *Corriere della Sera*, December 18, 2000, 1, 6.

34. See Susan Moller Okin, ed., *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); especially useful for understanding the potential for conflict between feminist aims and Third World immigration is Okin's introductory essay. Will Kymlicka, *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

35. This view, which is not limited to the multicultural Left, dominates the essays of Michael Barone and of other moderately conservative contributors to the symposium "Fixing Our Immigration Predicament," in *American Enterprise* 11, no. 8 (December 2000): 14–34. See also Mark Wegierski, "Canadian Conservatism and the Managerial State," in *Telos* 108 (summer 1996): 169–78.

36. See Brenda Walker's review of Okin, *Is Multiculturalism Bad?* in *Social Contract* 10, no. 4 (summer 2000): 283.

37. Michael Lind, *The Next American Nation: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution* (New York: Free Press, 1996). Edward Levy and John Attarian take opposing positions on the question of whether American liberals can be brought along to favor immigration restrictions for the sake of American workers or because of civil tranquility in Levy

and Attarian, “Liberals and Immigration Reform,” *Social Contract* 10, no. 4 (summer 2000): 229–43.

38. *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 1995), 39. The council’s data indicate that the American public favors the expansion of social entitlements far more than the “leaders.” Opposition to foreign entanglements can be said to stem from an appetite for social spending, which may be frustrated because of the costs of overseas involvement. On the sources of resistance in the United States to multicultural and neoconservative globalism, see Paul Gottfried, “The Multicultural International,” *Orbis* 46, no. 1 (winter 2002), 1–14.

39. See the results of the extensive Roper poll on immigration done in early 1996 and commissioned by Negative Population Growth, on www.npg.org/roper/press_release.htm (released February 26, 1996).

It might be helpful to make a distinction with regard to the political class between holding contradictory positions and, to revive a Marxist concept, suffering from internal contradiction. When political and journalistic leaders judge blacks and whites by different standards in cases of interracial violence and hateful speech, they do not forfeit moral authority. Equally relevant, the exploiters of Holocaust-guilt do not cease to appeal to liberal Christians when they equate Holocaust denial with denying the “uniqueness” of Nazi crimes committed against Jews but indulge those who are “deniers” by their own definition. Blacks and gays who have insisted on characterizing their sufferings as “genocidal,” or Holocaust-spokesman Elie Wiesel, who has likened Albanian Muslims in Kosovo to Jews under Hitler, do not (to my knowledge) incur media disapproval or political censure. Who can or cannot use Holocaust analogies depends on the bestowal of moral rights by those who are recognized as speaking for designated victims. Such a right to bring up the Holocaust is not accorded to Polish Catholics or to those who speak for them in the United States, for example, when they compare what happened to them under Hitler (the slaughter of almost three million of their countrymen) to the travails of Jewish victims. The Religious Right gets even less of a hearing when it dares to compare partial birth abortion to Nazi crimes. When unauthorized groups invoke the Holocaust, they arouse Jewish organizations and the media for being insensitive to *authentic* Holocaust-victims. Most of the public, as far as this author can see, go along with the judgments in these matters made by those who represent “conscience”—those who speak for the priesthood of the managerial state. See Novick, *Holocaust in American Life*, 196–99; Israel Gutman’s entry under “Holocaust Denial” in the *Encyclopedia of the Holocaust* (3:681–2); *The Religious Right: The Assault on Tolerance and Pluralism in America*, prepared by David Cantor (New York: Anti-Defamation League, 1994); Paul Gottfried, “Polonophobia,” *Chronicles* 21, no. 1 (January 1997): 12–14, and the commentary on my essay by Andrzej Novak, “Polonofobia,” *Arcana* 13 (January/February 1997): 123–28. On the organized “disinformation” surrounding American population growth as a result of Third World immigration, see Virginia Deane Abernethy, *Population Politics: The Choices That Shape Our Future* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999).

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